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This thesis examines the various techniques which the courts
have used to control unfair contracts over the last three centuries.
The purpose in doing so is twofold: firstly, to demonstrate that
such control has been widely exercised despite the "classical" notion
that the sole function of the courts is to protect the freedom of the
individual will and their duty to give effect to the terms stipulated
in the contract regardless of their fairness; secondly, to identify
the factors and policy considerations which in each area lead to
judicial control.
In Part I the judicially developed techniques of control are
discussed and in Part II the discretionary powers of control conferred
by statute are looked at. Part III examines briefly the various
phases through which judicial controls have gone since the late
seventeenth century and concludes that the present state of controls
is unsatisfactory, largely because there is, as yet, no consensus
about the basis on which such control should proceed. It is suggest¬
ed that the courts should exercise control whenever a contract is
unfair and that the delimitation of what is unfair should proceed by
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INTRODUCTION
"In general unless a contract is vitiated by duress, fraud or
mistake its terms will be enforced though unreasonable or even harsh
and unconscionable".^ The view that the courts do not concern them¬
selves with the substantive fairness of a contract and will not grant
relief from a contract because its terms are unfair has been repeated
in Scots and English law with such regularity and conviction throughout
almost two centuries that recent attempts to develop a more open and
direct control of unfair contracts have been criticised as contrary
to the established principles of contract law.
The idea that substantive unfairness does not affect the validity
of a contract emanated largely from the concept of the bilateral consen¬
sual agreement, a conception which, although it was known much earlier,
2
gained its greatest significance during the nineteenth century. The
"classical" or will theory of contract, as it became known, was the
3
counterpart of philosophical individualism and free market capitalism.
Its fundamental purpose was to give effect to the intention of the
parties and its governing principle that of private autonomy or freedom
of contract. This meant that, with the exception of a few narrow
limitations, the law delegated to private individuals the power to effect
^
Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd. /l%§/
A.C. 269, 295.
2
See, generally, M.J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern
Contract Law (1974) 87 Harv.L.Rev. 917. Cf. A.W.B. Simpson,
The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts (l979) 46 U.Chi.
L.Rev. 533.
3
See, generally, the account of the rise and development of the
classical theory of contract in Kessler and Gilmore, Contracts,
2-14.
2
such changes in their legal relations as they wished.."'" Although the
legal system provided the apparatus or framework, the law which the
parties created within that framework was of their own making. The
role of the courts within this scheme was, in theory, strictly limited
to distinguishing cases of true consent from those where it was defect-
2
ive. Interrelated with the will theory of contract was the idea that
3
things have no intrinsic value. It followed from a combination of
these theories that the fairness of an exchange could not be judged
ab extra.
Wt is the consent of the parties alone, that fixes
the just price of any thing, without reference to
the nature of things themselves, or to their intrinsic
value.4
The classical theory presupposed that the contractual parties would be
free men of sound judgment, acting rationally and with their eyes open,
and that by bargaining a fair result would be reached.
Since the rise of the classical theory of contract two funda-
5
mental changes have taken place. In the first place, the majority of
contracts concluded today are not individually negotiated, but are in
standard form:^ a party is presented with a set of terms prepared in
^
Ibid., page 3> footnote 7.
2




Powell, Essay on the Law of Contracts, 229.
See, generally, Friedmarm, Law in a Changing Society, 119-160;
Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, especially 571-715.
^
The literature on standard form contracts is vast. See, for example,
N. Isaacs, The Standardization of Contracts (l917) 27 Yale L.J. 34;
Prausnitz, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English and
Continental Law, reviewed by K.N. Llewellyn, (l939) 52 Harv.L.Rev.700;
3
advance and used in all like transactions which he either has to accept
or reject in toto. Standardized contracts have great commercial
utility; for example they save time and facilitate a rational allocat¬
ion of risk. However, while the use of standardized contracts leaves
a party free to decide whether to enter into a contract or not, it
deprives him of the freedom to co-determine its content. The exclusive
power to determine the terms of a standard form contract resides in the
form offeror. This power is often abused by drafting the form contract
one-sidedly: unduly favourable to the offeror and with scant regard for
the interests of the offeree. And as standard form contracts are
seldom intended to be closely studied, the offeree frequently submits
to terms of which he was unaware or which he did not understand and which,
if invoked, would substantially change the value of his bargain or the
balance of the remedies which are ordinarily available to and against
him. In some cases a party may have to submit to unfair terms even if
he is aware of them, because there is no other party who can satisfy his
needs or who offers substantially different terms.
Secondly, the classical model of contract was both a response
to and a reflection of a change in the social and economic role of con¬
tract at the time. Since then liberal individualism, the philosophy
responsible for raising consensus from being merely the basis of contract¬
ual liability to being the touchstone of the entire contract, has been
K.N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? - An Essay in Perspective
(l93l) 40 Yale L.J. 704; P. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion -
Some thoughts about Freedom of Contract (l943) 43 Col.L.Rev. 629;
N.S. Wilson, Freedom of Contract and Adhesion Contracts (1965)
14 I.C.L.Q.172; H.B. Sales, Standard Form Contracts (l953)
16 Mod.L.Rev.318.
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largely superseded "by a philosophy of greater socialization.
In spite of these fundamental changes in the substance and
function of contract the principle of freedom of contract, in particular
with regard to the constraints which it places on the power of the courts
to control substantive unfairness, has remained in the position of "con¬
stitutional monarch" right up to the present day. It has provided the
framework within which almost all discussion of contractual fairness has
taken place.
It is my belief that the principle that the courts do not concern
themselves with the substantive fairness of a contract is contradicted or,
at least, substantially qualified, by the actual practice of the courts,
and that over the last three centuries discretionary powers of control
have been assumed by the courts in various areas in order to give relief
2
from unfair transactions. The clearest instance in early law of a
doctrine against unfair contracts was provided by the usury laws. Al¬
though the common law courts, which administered these laws, showed no
inclination to extend their application, the Chancery courts, drawing
on the policies underlying the usury laws,developed various doctrines
to redress hard bargains in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
These were frequently applied until late in the nineteenth century and
then, largely as a result of the fusion of law and equity, fell into
The phrase is that of M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability
(1969) 78 Yale L.J. 757, 775.
See, also, the survey by S.M. Waddams, Unconscionability in Contracts
(1976) 39 Mod.L.Rev. 369.
5
disuse. Scots law with its single system of law and equity exercised
a similar jurisdiction of discretionary justice primarily through the
utilisation of a wide notion of fraud. This concept, as well as
Chancery's protective doctrines, were whittled down during the nine¬
teenth century, but in some forms continue to exist today. Since the
nineteenth century contractual unfairness has arisen primarily where
standard form contracts are used between parties with unequal economic
power and resources. It would be wrong to suppose that the courts
merely turned a blind eye to unfairness in those cases: while profess¬
ing allegiance to freedom of contract they have attempted to limit the
validity and effect of unfair terms by a variety of surreptitious and
indirect techniques. Although these controls seldom involve a clear
articulation that the contract or contract terms are too unfair to be
given effect to there can be little doubt that, if the decisions are
scrutinised as Lord Diplock has suggested,"'" by looking at what they say
in the light of what they do, the courts have, in effect, been doing
just that.
By the middle of the present century there was a growing
realization in both legal systems that "covert tools are never reliable
2
tools" and that the indirect control of transactional unfairness was
itself leading to uncertainty, was,in the absence of clear criteria,
resulting in the striking down of fair contracts and also, that it was
unable to deal comprehensively and effectively with the problem of
A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co.Ltd. v. Macaulay /l974/ 1 W.L.R.
1308, 1315.
^
K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review (1939) 52 Harv.L.Rev. 700, 703.
6
unfair contracts.
As a result some courts assumed a more direct control of unfair
contracts. This lead was neither widely followed nor universally wel¬
comed and the legislature was moved to intervene. Following the lead
of American law"'" the courts were recently given the statutory power to
police contracts for unfairness in certain clearly circumscribed circum¬
stances. However, the legislative provisions cover only limited areas
and there is no consensus as to the extent to which courts may control
unfair contracts falling outside the scope of these statutes nor is
there any general agreement about the basis on which control - whether
judicially assumed or conferred by statute - should proceed.
This work examines the various methods by which the courts have
controlled contractual unfairness. This is done in order to determine
not only the extent to which the unfairness of a contract is a factor
which induces the court to exercise control, but also the policy grounds
on which the courts proceed, the factors which render a contract object¬
ionable, and the circumstances on which the granting of relief depends
in each area.
Definition and Scope
The term "unfair" has no meaning in itself. Its content depends
upon judicial interpretation and may differ according to the context in
which it is used. As used here the term denotes unfairness in the
contract itself - either through a specific term or through its overall
effect. This use contrasts with the classical notion of an unfair
Uniform Commercial Code, section 2-302.
7
contract as one which has been imperfectly assented to, but corresponds
to the meaning which is usually assigned to terms such as "unconscionable"
or "unreasonable""^ in the sphere of judicial control. Where these latter
terms are habitually employed in specific types or areas of control they
will generally be used in those contexts.
The question when a contract or contract term will be unfair is
dependent on the test employed by the courts. In some cases a contract
is regarded as unfair merely by reference to the substantive features
of the contract. Mostly, however, the question of unfairness is also
2
inextricably bound up with procedural aspects. This entails that
substantive features which may be perfectly fair in some circumstances
will be regarded as unfair and constitute a sufficient ground for relief
in other circumstances.
It is one of the legacies of freedom of contract that few of the
methods of control focus directly on the substantive fairness of a con¬
tract. Many are formally concerned only with the propriety of contract
formation. Some of these are discussed, but others such as misrepresenta¬
tion, mistake and error have been omitted. Although the effect of the
latter doctrines is often to relieve a party from a substantively unfair
Yates, Exclusion Clauses in Contracts, 188-191 draws a conceptual
distinction between "unconscionability" and "reasonableness". In
my view neither of these terms has yet developed into distinct
term of art and such a distinction is therefore unjustified.
The term "procedural" unconscionability was first used by A.A. Leff
in Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause (l967)
115 U.Penn.L.Rev. 485 - a discussion about Section 2-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code - to denote unfairness in the process of
contracting as opposed to substantive unfairness. It has since
gained some currency on this side of the Atlantic.
8
contract they raise so many unconnected, issues that it was thought
inappropriate to include them in a work of this nature.
Method
Neither Scots nor English law has dealt with unfair contracts
in a single uniform manner. Different types of unfairness and
different factual settings have evoked different and often distinct
types of control. In order to appreciate the full extent of control
it is thus necessary to cover wide, and often disparate areas of
contract law, which in turn makes strict classification difficult.
The work is divided into three parts. Part I which deals with
the judicially developed remedies is subdivided into three sections:
Section A examines mainly English law, hut where there is substantial
similarity between the systems, Scots law is discussed alongside it.
Section B deals only with Scots law and Section C, which deals primarily,
but not solely with the techniques used to combat unfair standard form
contracts, covers both Scots and English law. Part II discusses the
statutory tests of fairness and Part III examines critically the develop¬
ment of the judicial controls as they appear from the foregoing survey.
PART
10
A - ENGLISH LAW
1 - USURY1
The prohibition of usury was the first large-scale attempt
to control unfair contracts. In spite of the fact that formally
the prohibition applied to a comparatively small number of the total
contracts concluded the term usury soon came to encompass almost all
extortionate bargains. The usury laws were of fundamental import¬
ance to the development of the various doctrines against unfair cont¬
racts, not only because they highlighted one particular manifestation
of unfairness - unequal exchange of values or inadequacy of consider¬
ation, as it later became known - but also because they provided a
conceptual framework which was to prove of the utmost importance to
the way in which the judicial regulation of unfair contracts was
later to proceed. It was natural that the influence of the usury
laws was most strongly felt where financing arrangements were in¬
volved, but the insights gained there were rapidly given wider effect
by the Chancery courts.
Usury has been defined as a stipulation in a contract of loan
in terms of which the lender receives an additional amount as profit
2
for the use of the money, and for the risk of its total or partial loss.
See, generally, Ashley, English Economic History and Theory:
15 Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences,"Usury". 193-197; Bellot, The
Legal Principles and Practice of Bargains with Moneylenders; Holds-
worth, A History of English Law, especially Vol.VIH, 100-113.
Bellot, ojd. cit.. 1.
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Today this remuneration is generally called "interest" with the term
"usury" reserved for such interest as may be excessive.
The medieval prohibition of usury found one of its sources in
the Aristotelian notion that money, unlike plants and animals, does
not reproduce itself - pecunia necuniam narere non potest. Prom
this it followed that the just price for a loan was the repayment of
the principal sum without more. The prohibition was at the same
time a reflection of Christian ethics: through it the moral injunct¬
ion that a person should not take payment for helping his fellow-man.
was transformed into a rule of positive law. The underlying moral
imperative was further strengthened by the economic reality of the
time. The system of trade was primitive and provided little scope
for productive capital investment with the result that where loans
of money did occur it was predominantly for the purpose of "consumptive
expenditure""'" that is, for immediate use by the borrower during a
period of crisis precipitated by some personal disaster such as
illness or failure of crops. As the borrowers were generally either
necessitous or extravagant "/t7he exaction of interest as payment for
aid extended under such conditions could readily be described as a
breach of Christian duty and a deliberate exploitation of another's
2
need". The circumstances in which loans occurred and the dire
position of the people to whom they were given played a significant
role in providing a moral basis for the prohibition of usury.
"*"
Ashley, op., cit.., Vol. 1, Part II, 435-
2
J.P. Dawson, Economic Duress and the Pair Exchange in French and
German law II (1937) 12. Tul. L. Rev. 42, 44.
12
Although the laws of Scotland"'"and England in theory prohibited
the taking of interest until well into the sixteenth century a
considerable discrepancy had by that time developed between the ideal
and the reality. Not only were certain groups such as the Jews
exempted from the prohibition, but various commercial contracts and
2
instruments were devised to circumvent the strict rule against usury.
The basis of these lay in the much earlier linkage of the principle
of usury with the canonist doctrine of iustum pretium, which laid
down that profit in buying and selling was acceptable only in so
3
far as it provided a reasonable compensation for labour and risk.
Together these concepts formed part of an extensive and intricate
philosophical system developed by the canonists which profoundly in¬
fluenced not only the economic theories then prevailing, but also
4
many aspects of private law.
As early as the thirteenth century a distinction was drawn
between a mere payment for the use of money and sums paid in order to
compensate the lender for loss resulting from non-payment, either in
the form of damnum emergens or lucrum cessans. Initially, the loan
itself was gratuitous and additional payment was made only where the
loan was not repaid on the stipulated date and where the loss was
proved. By the end of the medieval period, however, this loss came
to be presumed and the principle of the gratuitous loan became a
fiction.^
1
See, generally, Bell's Commentaries, 327-330.
^
See Bellot, op. cit. , 32-37; Holdsworth, op. pit.., 104-106.
3
See, Hahlo and Kahn, The South African Legal System and its Back¬
ground, 460-461, and Ashley, pp. cit.. Vol. I, Part I, 146.
4
Dawson, pp. cit., 44-45.
5
Holdsworth, pp. cit., 103.
13
The growth in trade and the development of an economic system
based on money led to a transformation in the views of the church and
eventually a change in the official attitude became inevitable. In
both Scotland and England legislation permitting the taking of inter¬
est was introduced."'" Although this was an important development
it was a reform rather than a revolution. Despite the fact that the
taking of interest was thenceforth allowed it was only legal if it
did not exceed a prescribed maximum rate. The principle of usury
was thus not denounced. This, Ashley suggests, was due to the
authority of the church which,
caring for the masses of the people, for the weak and stupid,
might think it well to maintain a prohibition which imposed
no restriction on the activity of the traders in the towns,
who were well enough off to take care of themselves. The
original prohibition had really aimed at preventing the
oppression of the weak by the economically strong. The
gradual exemption from the prohibitions of methods of
employing money which did not involve oppression, instead of
obscuring the original principle, may be said to have brought
it out more clearly.2
During the next few centuries variations in the permitted maximum
rate of interest occurred, but otherwise the usury statutes underwent
no major changes.
Under the concerted onslaught of liberal individualism and
the laissez-faire economists the attitude to usury, as to many other
aspects of commercial law, underwent a profound change in the nine-
3
teenth century. Rather than attack the taking of usurious interest,
In respect of Scotland see the Acts of 1597, c. 247 and 1621, c.28.
For English law, see Holdsworth, pp. cit.
^
Ashley, op., cit., Vol. I, Part II, 438-439.
3
See, 15 Encyc. Soc. Sci., pp. cit., 196-197.
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it became the conventional wisdom to defend it. The repeal of all
usury laws in 1854 therefore came as no surprise.'*'
Although those laws which permitted the taking, but controlled
the rate of interest constituted a departure from earlier notions of
commutative justice and were indicative of greater commercial freedom,
they also retained sufficient protective measures to show that the
earlier postulates had not been entirely jettisoned. The condemn¬
ation of excessive profits implicit in them gained an influence much
wider than the immediate field in which these laws operated. The
standards of equivalence demanded by the usury laws familiarised the
Chancery courts with the notion of fair exchange in contracts generally'
and provided them with a conceptual framework which facilitated inter¬
vention on similar grounds in areas falling outside the immediate
scope of the laws of usury, such as catching bargains with heirs, un¬
conscionable bargains with those suffering from weakness and necessity
and forfeitures generally. In retrospect the movement of ideas
from the area of usurious loans to that of unfair transactions in
equity was natural and not overly tortuous. The fundamental aim of
the usury laws, namely the protection of weak, defenceless borrowers
from often rapacious moneylenders was, after all, equally apposite
in the dramatic situation of the cases which confronted equity.
The repeal of the usury laws left the borrower unprotected and
the moneylender free to pursue his business without fetters. Although
17, 18 Victoria c.90.
See, J.P. Dawson, Economic Duress - An Essay in Perspective (1947)
45 Mich. L. Rev. 253, 278.
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the Chancery courts endeavoured to intervene on behalf of the
borrower where their jurisdiction allowed, such protection was of
course limited. Scots law which operated without a separate equity
jurisdiction and was consequently even more thoroughly affected by
freedom of contract, provided even less protection to borrowers than
English law. The legislature, moved largely as a result of the ensu¬
ing exploitation of borrowers by the moneylenders, put the Moneylender
Act 1900 on the statute book. This Act and the Moneylender Act 1927
came into force in both Scotland and England. These Acts, as well as
their successor, the Consumer Credit Act 1974 are examined in Part II.
16
2 - INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION IN THE COMMON LAW
The enforcement of the usury statutes was the responsibility
of the common law courts. But despite their experience in this
area they were unwilling to use the usury jurisdiction as a basis for
extending, by analogy, that power of control to other contracts which
stipulated for an unequal exchange. English law never recognised the
civil law doctrine of laesio enormis and the common law courts took
a dismissive attitude towards the question of the adequacy of con¬
sideration. The general rule, it was said, is that the courts will
not inquire into the adequacy of consideration."'" The position today
remains unchanged. To a large extent the refusal to review the
adequacy of consideration is connected to the origin and function of
the doctrine of consideration: it arose as a technical formula for
delimiting those promises to which legal liability should attach and
it was never intended as an instrument for attacking unequal agreements.
It is thus understandable that "/i7n the common law system the struggle
over consideration was a struggle to express the results of procedural
developments in areas where policy and fairness required enforcement,
2
not cancellation or revision."
The principle that consideration need ndt be adequate has not
precluded the courts from using the doctrine as a device to combat
unfairly procured contracts under the pretext that there was a com¬
plete absence of consideration. This technique is frequently used
^
See, for example, Basset v. Nosworthy (1673) Rep.t.F.102,104-
Also Chitty on Contracts SS 143-146; Treitel, Law of Contract,
56-57 who does however recognise that the rule is subject to a
number of exceptions.
J.P. Dawson, Economic Duress - An Essay in Perspective (1947) 45
Mich.L.Rev. 253,277.
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to deny validity to an agreement concluded under pressure from a
promisee who threatens a breach of an already existing contractual
duty and whose only consideration in return for the new promise is
to perform his pre-existing duty."'" A similar situation is presented
2 3
by those cases where a debtor or creditor has, under pressure from
his counterparty, compromised a claim and accepted in full settlement
an amount less than that which is in fact owed. Again the courts
have determined that a promise to pay only part of what is owed will
not provide consideration for the accord. It has been correctly
pointed out that if the purpose of this technique is to refuse
validity to agreements induced by improper pressure the formula used
is inappropriate. By not focussing on the general merits of each
agreement the courts are forced to strike down not only those agree¬
ments which are improperly obtained and unfair but also those which
are not obtained by any unfair dealing and which are entirely reason-
4
able and fair.
Despite the fact that technically consideration need not be
adequate a few early cases exist in which common law courts gave
1
Stilk v. Myrick (1809) 2 Camp.317. According to the earlier case
of Harris v. Watson (l79l) Peake 102, the agreement was invalid
because it was against public policy. Since Stilk v. Myrick it
has been customary to base the invalidity on the absence of
consideration. See also The Atlantic Baron /1978/3 All E.R.1170;
Pao On v. Lau Yin /197973 All E.R.65, 76-78. Also J. Adams, Note
(1979)42 Mod.L.Rev.557.
2
Poakes v. Beer (1884)9 App.Cas.605, approving the rule in Pinnel's
case (1602)5 Co.Rep.117a.
^ D.& C.Builders Ltd. v. Rees /I96672 Q.B.617, discussed"by W.R. Cornish
(1966) 39 Mod.L.Rev.428.
^
R.J. Sutton, Duress by Threatened Breach of Contract (1974)20 McG. L.J.
554-555; S.M. Waddams, Unconscionability in Contracts (1976)39
Mod.L.Rev.369, 388; Treitel, op., cit., 73-74, 89.
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relief from agreements,ostensibly on the sole ground that they in¬
volved a grossly unequal exchange of values. On the whole these
cases are of a very early date, the reports are brief and the prin¬
ciples underlying the decisions are -uncertain and ambiguous.
In the earliest case, James v. Morgan4, the defendant con¬
tracted to buy a horse from the plaintiff. The purchase price was
to be a barley-corn for the first nail in the horse's shoe, two for
the second and so on, doubling the amount for each nail. As the
horse's hooves contained thirty-two nails he was obliged to pay five
hundred quarters of barley-corn, the value of which far exceeded
that of the horse. In assumpsit by the plaintiff the defendant
pleaded that he should be directed to pay in damages only the value
of the horse which was £8. The court complied "for a catching
2
bargain shall not be taken advantage of".
3
In both Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen and Hume v. United
4
States of America the judges were of the opinion that the principle
5
of James v. Morgan was strengthened by Thornborow v. Whitacre.
In that case plaintiff paid defendant 2s.6d. and agreed to pay a
further £4.17s.6d on the completion of defendant's performance.
Defendant in turn undertook to deliver to plaintiff two grains of corn
on Monday 29 March and four grains a fortnight later and so on,
doubling the amount for each fortnight for a year.^ Defendant's
1 (1664) 1 Lev. 111.
2
6 Mod. 305 n. per Hyde C.J.
3 (1750) 2 Ves. 125.
4 (1889) 132 U.S. 406.
3 (1704)2 Ld.Ray.1164; also reported as Thornborough v. Whitacre
(1703) 6 Mod.305.
g
The Ld. Ray report refers to "every other Monday" which was inter¬
preted by Holt C.J. as alternate Mondays. The Modern Report,
however, speaks of "every Monday during the year".
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counsel argued that because of his client's poverty performance was
impossible and that he was thus not liable on the agreement. The
case was eventually settled out of court when it became clear that the
court would award only "reasonable""'" damages to the plaintiff.
In Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen. Lord Hardwicke L.C.,
in setting out the different types of fraud which may affect the
validity of an agreement, referred to fraud which "may be apparent
from the intrinsic nature and subject of the bargain itself; such
as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one
hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other; which
are unequitable and unconscientious bargains" and cited James v. Morgan
2
in support. In terms of his Lordship's analysis that type of fraud
is inferred solely from the gross inadequacy of the consideration or
the gross inequality in the values of the respective prestations and
it exists quite separately from the types of fraud which might affect
bargains with expectant heirs or bargains between parties with unequal
bargaining power.
It may be argued that the inadequacy of the reports of James
v. Morgan and Thornborow v. Whitacre makes them doubtful authority
for a separate head of fraud and that, at most, they are applications
of the principles which govern the measure of damages. Yet in the
much later case of Hume v. United States of America, Fuller C.J.
referred to and approved both these cases. The plaintiff had under¬
taken to supply certain goods to a government hospital. In terms
of the written contract the price was 60c per pound, whereas the
1
(1703)6 Med. 305.
2 (1750)2 Ves. 125.155.
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current market value was less than 2 c per pound. As the purchase
price had remained unpaid the plaintiff claimed the price as set out
in the document. The defendant pleaded that it had intended to
buy at 60c per hundredweight and that the price stipulated in the
document was due to a clerical error. Puller C.J., in giving
judgment, for the defendant, accepted Lord Hardwicke L.C.'sview
that a contract which is inequitable and unconscientious on its face
may be relieved from on the ground of fraud and he interpreted James
v. Morgan and Thornborow v. Whitacre as authorities for a doctrine
which empowers the courts to reduce an extortionate and unconscion¬
able price according to the fair entitlements of the parties."''
The judgment did not, however, rest solely on that ground.
The particular facts of the case also raised issues of public policy
and the Chief Justice maintained that parties must realize that the
public officers with whom they deal are agents of the government and
2
as such must act bona fide and fair.
The cases just referred to are but scant authority for the
view that a common law doctrine existed in terms of which relief
would be given from an agreement solely because of inadequate con¬
sideration. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen and Hume v. United
States of America show that in later times the review as to the
adequacy of consideration was subsumed under the ground of equitable
fraud. This phenomenon will be discussed later.
1
(1889) 132 U.S. 406.
^ ibid.
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3 - INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION IN THE
COURT OF CHANCERY
A number of late sixteenth century and early seventeenth
century cases create the impression that the Chancery courts were
prepared to set aside agreements on the ground of inadequacy per se.
The reports are, however, so brief that it is impossible to state
with certainty the ground on which the courts based their decisions.
In Oddy v. Torlese"^ the plaintiff had undertaken to pay £950 to
the defendant. He proceeded to pay £500 and both parties then
agreed that until such time as the plaintiff could pay the remaining
£450 in a lump sum he should pay the defendant £80 annually. It
appeared that the plaintiff had on that account already paid £300 more
than the outstanding £450 plus interest. The court held that the
plaintiff need make no further payments but that he could not reclaim
the amount by which the £450 owed had been exceeded. No reason was
2
given in support of the judgment. The court in Fawcet v. Bowers
similarly gave no reason for setting aside a contract in terms of
which the plaintiff in return for £800 had granted the defendant
3
an annuity of £60 for seven years. Maskeen v. Cole concerned the
sale for £50 of a legacy valued by the court at £166. The Lord
Chancellor declared that "under this consideration I should have made
no difficulty in relieving the plaintiff, as not having received one-
half of his legacy." The court was, however, precluded from follow¬
ing this course because "with his eyes open /the plaintiff/ agrees to
1 (1685) 1 Ver. 352.
^ (1693)2 Ver. 287. See also Plumbe v. Carter (1775)1 Cowp. .116
and Jestons v. Brooke (1778)2 Cowp. 793 where Lord Mansfield
refused an action for money had and received on the ground that
the sum claimed was, although not usurious, hard and unconscionable.
5 (1733)2 Madd. 421n.
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this contract he has made ... and confirms it by a new deed."
In contrast to these by no means unequivocal authorities
are those cases wherein it is specifically denied that inadequacy of
consideration per se is a ground for setting aside a transaction.
The report of Wood v. Fenwick serves as a good example:
The plaintiff Wood's wife, as heir to her brother, had an
inn in Newcastle descended to her, which was let at £69
per ann., but was subject to a mortgage. The plaintiffs,
being poor, were inveigled to sell this inn, and all their
interest therein, to the defendant Fenwick for £80, and
after brought a bill for relief against the mortgage, and
all his other debts; and at the end of the bill pray relief
on the whole matter, and the administrator was made defendant.
On hearing of the cause, my Lord Keeper was of opinion, that
though the purchase was not a fair bargain, yet no such fraud
appeared as to set it aside.1
And in Stephens v. Bateman. Lord Thurlow L.C. said that
"It was manifest it was a hard bargain ... But is that a ground to
set aside the conveyance? - No. - The cases are express that the
2
court will not set aside the conveyance on that ground only."
In view of these strong and direct denials that inadequacy
of consideration was ever in itself a sufficient ground for setting
aside an agreement in equity it is better to regard the few cases
which imply the contrary as wrong.
1
(1702) Pr.Ch.206.
2 (1778)1 Bro.C.C. 22, 26.
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4 - EQUITY'S DOCTRINES AGAINST UNFAIR CONTRACTS
It would be wrong to deduce from the formal refusal by both
the common law and the Chancery courts to set aside transactions
solely by reason of the inadequacy of consideration that a judicial
blind eye was always turned to an unequal exchange between the parties
or to unfairness in contracts generally. Although direct common law
intervention in unfair contracts was, apart from the doubtful pre¬
cedents referred to above, limited, it was equity which, especially
from the latter part of the seventeenth century, carried on the
spirit of the usury laws by developing elaborate structures for the
control of unfair contracts.
This came mainly through three separate doctrines: the doc¬
trine against forfeitures and penalties, the principle of withholding
specific performance where a contract is unfair, and the doctrine
against equitable fraud. The doctrine against penalties and forfeit¬
ures was aimed at specific clauses and therefore had a limited field
of operation. The principle of specific performance on the ground
of unfairness applied to all contracts, but the control was limited,
because as we shall see, it still left the plaintiff/creditor free
to claim damages at law. Of the three doctrines against unfairness
it was equitable fraud which gained the widest application.
(a) Equity's doctrine against forfeitures
The present-day law in respect of the equity of redemption,
forfeiture of leases for non-performance of contractual terms and
penal clauses, find a common origin in the jurisdiction of the Court
of Chancery against forfeitures in general."'" Bonds, mortgages and
"*"
See, generally, Yale, Lord Nottingham's Chancery Cases II,
Selden Society, Vol. 79> 7-62.
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leases were the main areas in which equity exercised a policy of
relief against forfeitures. Originally the basis of this relief
was similar in all three cases, but eventually rules peculiar to each
of these factual settings developed."'" The law governing the for¬
feiture of money paid is the product of later developments but it
has been, because of the close resemblance in nature and effect
between penal clauses and forfeiture of money paid, subject to the
same considerations as those that influenced the development of the
law relating to other forfeitures.
The equitable jurisdiction against forfeitures is the
earliest example of the courts' refusal to give effect to clear and
unambiguous terms in contracts by reason of their unfairness. Al¬
though the law in respect of forfeitures has, in many instances,
crystallised into technical doctrines far removed from the original
spirit of equity, it still shows signs of the considerations that
initially compelled judicial intervention. As such it is an import¬
ant exception to the generally accepted view that the fairness of
exchange is legally irrelevant.
(i) Forfeiture of mortgages; the equity of redemption
The equity of redemption, an equitable estate arising in the
mortgagor and carrying with it the power to redeem the mortgaged
1
2
A.W.B. Simpson, The Penal Bond with Conditional Defeasance (1966)
82 L.Q.R.392, 416.
See, A.W.B. Simpson, ojd. cit. ; Turner, The Equity of Redemption,
especially 17-42 and 175-183; Hanbury, Modern Equity, 340-346;
Keeton and Sheridan, Equity 166-178 and 202-209.
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property notwithstanding the fact that the contractual date for
redemption has passed,developed in the Courts of Chancery during the
late-sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. It was conceived as
a remedy to the harshness of the common law which required strict
performance of the mortgage agreement with the result that the
mortgagor who failed to repay the mortgage money on the appointed
day lost his legal right of redemption for ever. The Chancellor
refused to countenance the forfeiture of the mortgaged property
and enforced reconveyance of it to the mortgagor where the latter
tendered the full amount within a reasonable time after the forfeiture.
Initially the Chancery courts assumed jurisdiction on the ground of
conscience"'", regarding it as unfair that the mortgagee should keep
the mortgaged property absolutely when the amount secured by the
2
mortgage may be substantially less than the value of the property.
The unfairness of a successful reliance on the forfeiture clause of
course lay in the gross disparity between the values exchanged
which would result from it. Later, relief was also made dependent
upon a showing of special circumstances of hardship or fraud which
tainted the agreement. However, by the middle of the seventeenth
century the equity had become an established incident of mortgages and
the Chancellors ordered reconveyance of the mortgaged property as a
matter of course, where the mortgagor tendered the capital together
3
with a reasonable sum for the use of the money, "a practice that
"*"
Turner ojd. cit.. 23.
2
G.L. Williams, The Doctrine of Repugnancy III: 'Clogging the
Equity1 and Miscellaneous Applications (1944)60 L.Q.R. 190.
3
Turner, o_q. cit. , 13.
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derived from the wide and undifferentiated jurisdiction of earlier
times to relieve against the unconscionable use of legal rights
generally.
This extension and consolidation of the Chancellors' juris¬
diction coincided with a perfunctory transformation in the basis of
judicial intervention. In accordance with its rule of looking at
the intent rather than the form of transactions, equity came to
regard mortgages and likewise penal bonds, as essentially devices
aimed at securing loans so that when the debtor had paid the creditor
the principal sum, interest and cost, it was all that the latter
could, in fairness, expect for the use of his money. "Equity suffers
not Advantage to be taken of a Penalty or forfeiture where Compen-
2
sation can be made." In essence this meant that the courts would
not allow a forfeiture where it would lead to a gross disparity in
the values exchanged and where the creditor could be suitably com¬
pensated for his loss. No doubt the lingering dislike of usury
3
played an important underlying role in this development. This
"principle of compensation" came to govern the validity of forfeit¬
ures not only in respect of mortgages, but also in relation to leases
and penal bonds. It is clear, however, that the change in rationale
was less significant than appears at first sight. Although inter¬
vention was then activated by a general disapproval of security
Yale, 0£. cit..13.
2
R. Francis, Maxims of Equity, as cited by Yale, ojd. cit. , 16.
3
See G.& C. Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Co.
Ltd. /19147 A.C.25, 54 per Lord Parker.
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devices, the fundamental reason for the court's action remained the
inequality of the exchange which might result from a forfeiture.
What had happened was that the general standard on which intervention
was initially based had developed into a more particularised and rigid
legal rule.
The relief given to mortgagors was of course a direct inter¬
ference with the express agreement of the parties and early in the
development of the jurisdiction the courts had to deal with attempts
to circumvent the jurisdiction. These took many different forms,
for example, stipulating that the right to redeem was limited to the
mortgagor personally"^" or that the money could not be repaid until
2
some future date , options given to a mortgagee to buy the equity of
3 4
redemption or stipulations for collateral advantage. These the
courts steadfastly refused to allow and the principle was soon
established that any terms in a mortgage agreement which limited or
hampered the power of redemption was void. The vehemence with which
the courts protected their creation from infringement stemmed from
two considerations. Firstly, the Chancellors regarded the equity
of redemption as an inalienable incident of mortgages, and secondly
the mortgagor, during the period of development of the equity of
redemption had usually been an impoverished landowner with little
^
See, for example, Howard v. Harris (1683) lVern. 190.
^
Talbot v. Braddill (l683) 1 Vern. 183; affirmed by Jeffreys L.C^ in
(1686) 1 Vern. 394. Knightsbridge Estates Trust Ltd. v. Byrne /193.27
Ch.441.
^
Jennings v. Ward (1705) 2 Vern. 520.
^
G. & C. Kreglinger v. Hew Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Co.Ltd.
/190.47 A.C.25. The case really involved a floating charge
redeemable on one month's notice, but the House of Lords was of
the opinion that the law of mortgages was applicable.
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bargaining power and thus in great need of protection from the money¬
lenders of the day. As Lord Northington L.C. expressed it in
Vernon v. Bethell
... /f/here is great reason and justice in this rule /that the
mortgage agreement may not contain an option for the sale
of the equity of redemption/, for necessitous men are not,
truly speaking, free men, but to answer a present exigency,
will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon
them.1
Under these circumstances the Court of Chancery was not prepared
merely to sit back and observe weak and oppressed mortgagors bargain
away the protection given by the equity of redemption.
The rules against the fettering of the equity of redemption
2
were enforced without reference to the fairness of the transaction.
This rigidity necessarily led to injustice in that perfectly fair
3
bargains were struck down. Lately this approach has met with some
opposition from the courts. As Lord Haldane, L.C. said in Kreglinger
v. hew Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Co. Ltd.:
It was, in ordinary cases, only where there was conduct
which the Court of Chancery regarded as unconscientious
that it interfered with freedom of contract. The lending of
money, on mortgage or otherwise, was looked on with
suspicion, and the Court was on the alert to discover want
of conscience in the terms imposed by lenders... /l7t is
inconsistent with the objects for which they were established
that these rules should crystallize into technical language
so rigid that the letter can defeat the underlying spirit and
purpose.4
1 (1762)2 Eden 110,113.
2
The rules had in fact become so fossilised that Plowman J. could
say in Lewis v. Frank Love Ltd. /l96l/ 1 W.L.R.261, 270 that
"... the doctrine of clog on the equity is a technical doctrine
which is not affected by the question whether in fact there has
been oppression..."
3
See, for example, Samuel v. Jarrah Timber and Wood Paving Corn.
Ltd. /190/7 A.C. 323, 325 per Earl of Halsbury L.C.
4 ZI9147 A.C. 25, 36 and 37-38.
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This view, together with the realisation that the present-day mortgagor
is in many cases a vastly different species from his oppressed and
necessitous predecessor have led to the rejection of the rigid rules
which developed through the centuries and a reassertion of the original
bases of intervention. As Lord Parker said in the same case:
/T7he defendants in this case are appealing to the equitable
jurisdiction of the Court for relief from a contract which
they admit to be fair and reasonable and of which they have
already enjoyed the full advantage... In every case in
which a stipulation by a mortgagee for a collateral advantage
has, since the repeal of the usury laws, been held invalid,
the stipulation has been open to objection either (l) because
it was unconscionable, or (2) because it was in the nature
of a penal clause clogging the equity arising on failure to
exercise a contractual right to redeem,or (3) because it
was in the nature of a condition repugnant as well to the
contractual as to the equitable right.
These statements were extensively discussed by Lord Greene
2
M.R. in Knightsbridge Estates Trust, Ltd. v, Byrne. The case
concerned the mortgage of a large freehold estate for £310,000,
which was to be repaid by instalments over forty years. The
mortgagors wished to redeem after only five years and the matter was
brought before the court. The Master of the Rolls, in the course of
a judgment in which he held the delay in the redemption date to be
valid, corrected "the impression, which was gathering momentum before
the decision, that the court /could/ cancel such a stipulation on
3
the ground that the length of the period is unreasonable," with
reference only to the terms of the mortgage agreement. Equity, his
1
Ibid., 46 , 56.
2 /I932/1 Ch. 441.
3
Hanbury, opu cit.. 342.
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Lordship maintained, will not give relief from the contractual terms
in a mortgage transaction merely because they are unreasonable, but
only if they are oppressive and unconscionable and in order to deter¬
mine whether that is the case the mortgage must be scrutinised in
its proper business setting.4
In the circumstances it was the most natural thing in the
world that the respondents should address themselves to a
body desirous of obtaining a long term investment for its
money. The resulting agreement was a commercial agreement
between two important corporations experienced in such matters,
and has none of the features of an oppressive bargain where
the borrower is at the mercy of an unscrupulous lender...
/Pe are not prepared to view the agreement made as anything
but a proper business transaction.^
But in City land and Property (Holdings) Ltd v. Dabrah, Goff J.
refused to give effect to a term in a mortgage agreement which
stipulated for payment of a collateral advantage on the basis that
it was "unfair and unconscionable" or "unreasonable" in the circumst¬
ances.
The whole question of the circumstances under which a clog
on the equity of redemption will be held invalid was reviewed by
Browne-Wilkinson J. in the recent case of Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd.
v. Marden.4 The plaintiff company, needing £36,000 to buy new
business premises, approached the defendant who agreed to advance the
sum. A mortgage was executed in 1967 charging the building which
plaintiffs were to buy with the money, as security for the loan. Apart
from stipulations as to the payment of interest the mortgage agreement
1 /I932/ Ch.441, 455.
2
Ibid.
5 /1968/ Ch. 166.
4 119737 Ch. 84.
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prescribed, inter alia that the loan could neither be called in or
redeemed during the first ten years and, by clause 6, that any sum
payable as principal or interest was to be "increased or decreased
proportionately, if at the close of business on the day preceding
the day on which payment is made the rate of exchange between the
Swiss franc and the pound sterling shall vary by more than three per
cent from the rate of 12.071" francs to £1", the rate prevailing
at the date of the mortgage.
As the pound sterling dropped dramatically in value vis-a-vis
the Swiss franc during the ten years from 1967, the interest which the
plaintiff company was obliged to pay was substantially larger than
it would have been without the index-linking provision of clause 6
and the plaintiffs brought a summons to determine whether the terms
of the mortgage were not unenforceable in that they stipulated for
an unreasonable collateral advantage.
Browne-Wilkinson J. made an extensive review of the cases
referred to above arid came to the conclusion that "/s7ince the repeal
of the usury laws there has been no general principle that collateral
advantages in mortgages have to be 'reasonable'""^ Just as Lord
Greene M.R. did in the Knightsbridge Estates Trust case, he disting¬
uished between a test of reasonableness and one of unconscionableness,
and declared:
/t/o be freed from the necessity to comply with all the terms
of the mortgage, the plaintiffs must show that the bargain,
or some of its terms, was unfair and unconscionable: it is
not enough to show that, in the eyes of the court, it was




and unconscionable unless one of the parties to it has
imposed the objectionable terms in a morally reprehensible
manner, that is to say, in a way which affects his
conscience.
Although the approach of Browne-Wilkinson J. is to be
broadly welcomed as a consolidation of the movement away from the
rigidity which has characterised this aspect of the law relating to
the equity of redemption for such a long time, the terminological
distinction between "unreasonable" and "unconscionable" does seem
unnecessarily arbitrary. The test of reasonableness has, after all,
often been employed in a way which suggests that it refers to the
fairness of an agreement in its totality. In his Lordship's opinion
"unreasonableness" refers solely to the merits of the terms, whereas
"unconscionability" also requires a showing that an "unfair advantage
2
has been taken of the borrower" or that the "bargain has been
3
procured by unfair means." The judge did, however, alleviate
the evidential burden on the mortgagor when he said that if the
agreement contains an "unusual or unreasonable stipulation the
reason for which is not explained, it may well be that in the
absence of any explanation, the court will assume that unfair advan-
4
tage has been taken of the borrower." Applying this reasoning
to Cityland and Property (Holdings) Ltd. v. Dabrah Browne-Wilkinson









5 ZI9687 Ch. 166.
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and. borrower, the size of the premium and the lack of any explan¬
ation or justification for it, the premium ... was unconscionable
and oppressive.""'"
Turning to the case in hand the judge said that the "Swiss
franc uplift" clause was justified as a device by which the mortgagee
could ensure that he is repaid the real value of his money. There
was, in addition no great inequality of bargaining power between
the parties, the borrowers were protected by independent solicitors
2
and the lenders were not guilty of sharp practice. In those
circumstances the agreement could not be described as unconscionable.
This case indicates quite clearly that the courts will give
relief to a mortgagor if the contract stipulates for the payment of
a sum grossly in excess of the amount of the principal sum plus in¬
terest and if that stipulation can be explained by inequality in the
bargaining strength between mortgagor and mortgagee. There has thus
been a return to the considerations which originally activated equity's
intervention.
(ii) Forfeiture of Leases
There is no doubt that courts of equity have from the
earliest times exercised the right to relieve against clauses stip¬
ulating for the forfeiture of a lease upon breach of any of the terms
3
of the lease contract. This was merely another application of the
1 /l97.27 Ch.84, 110.
2
Ibid.. 111.
Webber v. Smith (l689)2 Vern. 103; hash v. Earl of Derby (1705)
2 Vern. 537; Cox v. Higford (1710)2 Vern. 664; Popham v. Bamp-
feild (l682)l Vern. 79; Grimston v. Lord Bruce (1707) 1 Salk. 156;
Davis v. West (l806)l2 Ves. 475; Bargent v. Thomson (1864)
4 Giff. 473.
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equitable jurisdiction against forfeitures generally.
The underlying principles on which relief is granted in this
field are similar to those which governed the giving of relief in
the related areas of penal bonds and mortgages. They are clearly
expressed by Lord Erskine in the important case of Sanders v. Pone;
There is no branch of the jurisdiction of this Court more
delicate than that, which goes to restrain the exercise
of a legal right. That jurisdiction rests only upon this
principle; that one party is taking advantage of a forfeiture;
and as a rigid exercise of the legal right would produce a
hardship, a great loss and injury on the one hand arising
from going to the full extent of the right, while on the other
the party may have the full benefit of the contract, as
originally framed, the Court will interfere; where a clear
mode of compensation can be discovered. Of this nature is
the case, that constantly occurs, confirmed by Statute...
giving a more ready mode of relief at law: a contract to
pay rent, with a covenant and clause of re-entry for breach.
The obvious intention is to secure the payment of the rent;
that the landlord may not be put to his action of debt,
coming from time to time against an insolvent estate; but
may be enabled to recover possession of the premises. In
that case equity is in the constant course of relieving the
tenant... and upon payment of the rent and all expenses
will not permit the tenant to be turned out of possession;
considering, that in the one case frequently great hardship
might be the consequence; in the other, the party being
placed in the same situation, there is in general no
hardship.^
Courts of equity were also prepared to give relief against
forfeiture on account of breaches other -than payment of rent, such as
obligations to repair or not to assign the lease where it was possible
2
to give the lessor adequate compensation for the breach. However,
(1806)12 Ves. 282, 289. Similar principles are expressed in
Chandless-Chandless v. Nicholson /I94272 K.B. 321, 323; Belgravia
Insurance Co.Ltd. v. Meah /l9647l Q.B.436, 444-445; Barton Thompson
& Co. Ltd. v. Stapling Machines Co./l9667ch.499,509 where Pennycuik J.
suggests that this jurisdiction may be extended so as also to apply
to leases of chattels; Richard Clarke & Co.Ltd. v. Widnall /l97^/
1 W.L.R. 845; Athabasea Realty Co.Ltd. v. Lee /1976767 D.L.R. (3rd) 272.
See Webber v. Smith (1689)2 Vern. 103; Cox v. Higrford (1710)2 Vern.
664; Davis v. West (1806)12 Ves. 475; Sanders v. Pope (1806)12
282. Forfeitures for breach of a covenant to pay rent and for
covenants to insure are now regulated by statute, but the law as
expressed in many of these statutes is founded on the principles
established in the old Chancery cases : Belgravia Insurance Co.Ltd.
v. Meah /Ig647l Q.B.436, 444 per Lord Denning M.R.
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in Wadman v. Calcraft^" Lord Eldon L.C. held that relief was only-
possible where the forfeiture arose as a result of a breach of payment
provisions and not where it is the result of the breach of some other
covenant. The Lord Chancellor reiterated this opinion in Hill v.
2
Barclay despite the decision in Sanders v. Pope where Lord Erskine
decided that relief was in the discretion of the court in a case
where a forfeiture resulted from a breach of a covenant to do
repairs, and the money, together with all costs as well as an increase
because of the loss of time, was spent later and did not injure the
landlord. It was Lord Eldon L.C.'s strict attitude to the enforce¬
ment of contractual obligations which was more acceptable in an era
3 4
of laissez faire. This approach created considerable hardship
and has now been overruled by the House of Lords in Shiloh Spinners Ltd.
5
v. Harding where Lord Wilberforce expressed the relevant principles
as follows:
/w7e should reaffirm the right of courts of equity in
appropriate and limited cases to relieve against forfeiture
for breach of covenant or condition where the primary object
of the bargain is to secure a stated result which can effect¬
ively be attained when the matter comes before the court, and
where the forfeiture provision is added by way of security for
the production of that result. The word 'appropriate'
involves consideration of the conduct of the applicant for
relief, in particular whether his default was wilful, of
the gravity of the breaches, and of the disparity between
the value of the property of which forfeiture is claimed as
compared with the damage caused by the breach.^
1
(1804) 10 Ves. 67, 69.
2 (1811) 18 Ves. 56, 60.
■2
See Bracebridge v. Buckley (1816)2 Price 200; Barrow v. Isaacs
& Son /1891/1 Q.B.417.
^





And Lord Simon of Glaisdale commented that the strict application of
freedom of contract in Hill v. Barclay"^" and subsequent cases
seems to me to demonstrate an abnegation of equity, and to
show that the trail from Hill v. Barclay leads into a juristic
desert... The last hundred years have seen many examples
of relaxation of the stance of regarding contractual rights
and obligations as sacrosanct and exclusive of other
considerations: though these examples do not compel equity
to follow - certainly not to the extent of overturning
established authorities - they do at least invite a more
liberal and extensively based attitude on the par t of
courts which are not bound by those authorities. I would
therefore myself hold that equity has an unlimited and un¬
fettered jurisdiction to relieve against contractual
forfeitures and penalties.^
As in the case of mortgages, the court wil3 therefore relieve
from a forfeiture if exercise of the right of forfeiture would lead
to hardship on the one side and unfair advantage on the other, and
where the landlord can be suitably compensated for his loss. In
short, where a clause functions primarily as a security device the
court will not allow reliance on it where it would Head to a gross
imbalance in the respective performances of the parties.
(iii) Penal Clauses
Parties to a contract frequently covenant that in the event
of a specified breach or breaches the party in default will pay a
certain sum of money to the injured party. Such a provision not
only serves as a form of security for the performance of the primary
obligation, but it also obviates the problem of calculating damages
1
(1811) 18 Ves. 56.
2 /l97^7 A.C. 691, 726.
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after the breach where these may be uncertain or difficult to
quantify. The courts often deny these clauses enforcement and by
so doing they place a clear limitation on the principle of freedom
of contract. The control exercised by the courts dates back to
the era of canon law and was initially greatly influenced by the
prohibition against usury. Although the grounds upon which modern
courts in England and Scotland distinguish between enforceable and
unenforceable damage clauses are similar, the development of control
proceeded along different lines in the two jurisdictions.
Historical Survey: English Law.^
The penal bond upon a condition was the earliest form of
contractual obligation. The purpose of the bond was to secure
performance of the condition; where the condition was -unperformed
the penal sum could be claimed. The Chancery courts at a very
early stage assumed jurisdiction against penal bonds. Although
relief from a penal bond had been given as early as the fourteenth
2
century they survived the canonist era, because, paradoxically,
3
they were regarded as compensatory and not usurious in nature.
By the sixteenth and early seventeenth century such reasoning
had become unacceptable and the need to mitigate the harshness of
penal bonds was clearly felt. And although the basis of Chancery's
^
See generally, A.W.B. Simpson, The Penal Bond with Conditional
Defeasance (1966) 82 L.Q.R. 392; Yale, Lord Nottingham's Chancery
Cases II, Selden Society, Vol.79, 7-30; Williston on Contracts
Vol.5. Sections 769-811.
2
Yale, op>. cit., 27 cites a case in the eyre of Kent in 1313-1314.
3
Simpson, ojd. cit., 412-413.
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jurisdiction had not yet "become settled, Holdsworth is of the opinion
that intervention occurred because'It was obviously against conscience
that a person should recover a sum of money wholly in excess of any
loss incurred.""''
By the time of the Restoration equity's jurisdiction against
penal clauses and forfeitures generally had become crystallised.
They were seen as security devices and were not allowed to stand
where the creditor could be suitably compensated for his loss.
Although there were already signs in the seventeenth century that
the rules governing judicial intervention were growing more rigid,
as for example in the striking down of clauses merely on the ground
of being "security" without more, it was only later that ihe modern
2
distinction between penalties and liquidate damage clauses, based
on whether the clause served merely to enforce fulfilment of a con¬
tractual obligation, or whether it was a genuine assessment of the
damages that may possibly flow from a breach, became generally
3
accepted. After the development of assumpsit the penal bond was
used far less frequently than before but the principles which were
History of English Law, Vol. V, 393-
2
Simpson, aq. cit.. 420 suggests that because contracts had become
more secure after the rise of assumpsit, the courts began to dis¬
approve of security devices inserted in contracts. They regarded
the means of securing the performance of obligations as their
sole prerogative. This view also explains the subsequent
distinction between penalties and liquidate damage clauses. The
courts, in the words of Lord Justice Clerk Inglis in Craig v.
M' beath (I863) IM.1020, 1022, simply regarded it as "not legal
to stipulate for punishment."
^
See, for example, Sloman v. Walter (1788) 1 Bro. C.C. 418.
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originally developed in respect of penal bonds were eventually
extended to penal clauses in all contracts. Although this view of
penal clauses was pioneered by the Chancery courts it was taken over
by the common law when it eventually followed equity into this area."*"
The assumption of jurisdiction by the common law courts
brought with it a tendency to ascribe the distinction between penalties
2
and liquidate damages to the intention of the parties. During the
nineteenth century when the will theory of contract purported to
relate every aspect of a contract to the intention of the parties,
such a notion inevitably gained in popularity. However, such an
approach distorted the policy against penal clauses which had been
developed over many centuries.
The effect of the principles developed by equity has been
summarised by saying that in the determination of
the question whether or not a stipulation should be con¬
strued as providing for a penalty or for liquidated damages
the guiding principle for the courts to observe should be
that of 'just compensation' for injury resulting from the
breach of the contract, and the controlling object should
be to place the injured party in as advantageous position
as he would have occupied had his contract not been broken.
So long as the contracting parties keep this principle in
view the courts will very generally allow them to agree
upon such a sum as will probably be the fair compensation
for the breach of a contract. But when they go beyond
this, and undertake to stipulate, not for compensation,
but for a sum entirely disproportionate to the measure of
liability which the law regards as compensatory, the court
will refuse to give effect to the stipulation and will
confine the parties to such actual damages as may be pleaded
and proved.3
See, for example, Astley v. Weldon (l80l)2 B. & P. 346; Kemble
v. Farren (1829)6 Bing. 141.
2
See, for example, the speech by counsel for the defendant in
Kemble v. Farren (1829)6 Bing.141, 142. Also Jessel M.R. in
Wallis v. Smith (1882)21 Ch.D.243; Lord Elphinstone v. Monkland
Iron and Coal Co. Ltd. (l886)ll A.C.332.
3




The early development of the jurisdiction against penal
clauses was strongly influenced by the laws against usury. In
Home v. Hepburn."^ a case decided in 1549, "the court declared that
"de practica Scotiae" only such loss as was actually suffered could
be recovered and not penal sums "quia saniunt quondam usuram et
2
inhonestum quaestum"
After the Reformation the law was somewhat relaxed as is
reflected by the institutional writers. Bankton said that
/b7ecause damage and interest is frequently of most difficult
estimation; therefore, in obligations to facts, it is advis¬
able, and ordinary to adject a penalty, consisting of a
liquid sum, that shall become due, upon the debtor's default...:
here it is not considered, how far the creditor suffers
detriment thro' non-performance; but the court of session,
in such a case, would probably tax an exorbitant penalty
to the just interest of the party.5
Stair maintained that the "Lords ex officio have power to
modify exorbitant penalties, albeit they bear to be liquidate of
4
consent of parties." And Bell, writing during the height of the
classical period, distinguished between two types of clauses:
Where such penalties /in contracts ad factum praestandum7
are intended as liquidated damages, and especially where
there appears to be nothing exorbitant in the stipulation,
but a reasonable and fair proportion between the loss and
the penalty, a court of justice will not interfere...
But where the penalty is manifestly exorbitant and a penal
forfeiture rather than estimated damage, a court of equity
does interfere; the exorbitancy being taken in some sort
as a criterion whether it be properly a penalty or




In this case an exception was made because the penal clause oper¬
ated against an Englishman and the defendant was condemned "in





Commentaries, 699. See too the same effect Karnes, Equity. 297.
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It is thus clear that although Scots law, even in the time
of Kames and later in that of Bell, had already accepted the English
terminology of "penalties" and "liquidate damages" they did not
necessarily hear the same meanings as in English law. Craig v.
M' Beath4 was a case in which the court was called upon to decide on
the enforceability of a clause stipulating payment of £25 in the event
of a breach. Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis expressed the opinion that
"it is a penalty of that kind which we are bound to modify to the
2
actual loss if duly required by the defender to do so." The question
in these cases, his Lordship continued, was
whether the sum stipulated to be paid in the event of breach
of contract is liquidate damage, or merely represents the
general agreement that a money payment shall be made to
the extent of the damage caused by the breach of contract,
and I have no doubt that, in this case, this sum... is of
the latter kind.^
His Lordship compared this case with another in which the court upheld
a "penalty" as liquidate damage:
The chief ground of our judgment in that case was, that the
sum conditioned to be paid bore a clear proportion to the
amount of loss sustained by the party entitled to claim it;
and from that we inferred that it was the intention of the
parties that the sum named should be held to be the true
measure of the damage. But, in this case, there is no such
proportion.^
It is clear that although the tendency to base the distinction between
penal clauses and liquidate damages on the intention of the parties









deter the courts from concerning themselves essentially with whether
the sum stipulated was extravagant or not.
In the later case of Forrest and Barr v. Henderson"*" the
question whether a sum stipulated to be paid upon breach would be
enforced without modification by the court was said to depend upon
2
whether it was "extravagant, exorbitant or unconscionable." If so,
the amount would be modified to correspond to the damage incurred by
the creditor. Although the terms "penalties" and "liquidate damages"
are used by the judges in this case their meanings are not entirely
clear. It would seem, and the judgments in Craig v. M'Beath support
3
this, that "penalties" are clauses which are inserted solely to
punish a party for non-performance of his obligation. When they are
disproportionate to the damage caused by the breach they may be
reduced. But even when a clause is classified as a genuine pre-
estimate of loss it may be reduced if it stipulates for the payment
4
of an exorbitant sum.
Scots law, therefore, although it paid half-hearted lip
service to the distinction between penalties and liquidate damages
never, or in any case, not before the beginning of this century,
regarded it as of fundamental importance. Where a sum stipulated
was grossly out of proportion to the total loss which could possibly
flow from the breach it could be modified to correspond more closely
with the damage suffered, irrespective of whether it was a penalty
or liquidate damages.
1 (1869) 8M. 187.
2
See also Heir of John Porteous v. John Nasmith 1783 Mor.120.
3 (L863) IM.1020, 1023 and 1024.
^ (L869) 8M. 187 per Lord President Inglis. See also Lord Deas at 196,
Lord Ardmillan at 199, Lord Kinloch at 201, and Lord Neaves at 202.




In modern English and Scots law the question whether a sum
stipulated to be paid on default will he held enforceable or not,
will depend, in accordance with the dictum of Lord Dunedin in the
leading case of Dunloo Pneumatic Tyre Co.Ltd., v. New Garage & Motor
Co.Ltd. ,upon whether the court construes the pecuniary sum as a
penalty, that is "a payment of money stipulated as in terrorem of
the offending party" or as liquidate damages, which is defined as
"a genuine covenanted pre-estimate of damage." If a clause is
adjudged to be a penalty it is unenforceable, but if it is liquidate
damage it will be enforced without reduction. Whether a clause falls
within the one or the other category is said to depend upon construct¬
ion and on the surrounding circumstances at the time that the contract
was concluded and not with hindsight as of the time of breach. This
is so irrespective of whether the term "penalty" or "liquidate damage"
is used by the parties.
We have already alluded to the increasing tendency of courts
to base the distinction between penalties and liquidate damages on
the intention of the parties. Such an approach is misconceived as
the judicial control exercised cannot be explained merely by construct-
2
ion of the contract. If it were solely a question of the intention
of the parties then almost every clause stipulating damage would have
1 £9157 A.C. 79,86.
2
See for example, Lord Radcliffe in Bridge v. Campbell Discount
Co. Ltd. /19627 A.C.600, 624: It is "'a question not of words
or of forms of speech but of substance and of things.' It
cannot really depend on a point of construction..."
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to be enforced as the inclusion of the term in the contract is
assumed to be the expression of the parties' intention. It would
be absurd to expect of the parties to agree to a clause which they
never intended to be enforceable. The real inquiry of the court
is therefore not what the parties intended the clause to be, but
whether a clause is in fact a penalty or liquidate damages. It
has been stated before that in English law this distinction was made
not on the basis of any intention expressed by the parties, but
because the judiciary increasingly disapproved of the inclusion of
terms whose sole function was to compel performance of the contractual
obligations. The enforcement of contracts they regarded as their
prerogative. The terminology was taken over by Scots law but the
case law shows that the terms did not necessarily have the signifi¬
cance that they had in English law.
The most important way in which a' court can establish
whether a clause is a penalty or genuine pre-estimate of loss is to
determine whether the sum stipulated was clearly extravagant when
compared to the greatest possible loss which could flow from the
breach. If so, then the clause cannot be liquidate damage, but can
only be a penalty. This approach was recognised by Lord Dunedin in
the Dunlop case where he maintained that a clause "will be held to
be penalty /sic/ if the sum stipulated for is extravagant and un¬
conscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss that
could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach."""
1 /I91S7 A.C. 79,87.
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Although Lord Dunedin described this test as a rule of
construction, judicial dicta clearly indicate that this is not so,
but that the fairness of the sum stipulated vis-a-vis the estimated
loss is the fundamental test by which the courts decide whether a
clause is enforceable or not. None is clearer than Lord Atkinson
in the Dunlon case:
It was laid down /In Webster v. Bosanquet7 that in determin¬
ing whether a sum contracted to be paid is liquidated damages
or a penalty, one is to consider whether the contract,
whatever its language, would, at the time it was entered
into, have been unconscionable and extravagant, and one which
no Court ought to allow to be enforced if this sum were to be
treated as liquidated damages, having regard to any possible
amount of damage likely to have been in the contemplation of
the parties when they made the contract.2
In Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co. Ltd., v. Don
3
Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castanedo. a Scottish appeal to the House of
Lords, the question was whether a stipulation that
/t/he penalty for later delivery (than times specified)
shall be at a rate of £500 per week for each vessel
was a liquidate damage clause or a penalty -
whether it is, what I think gave the jurisdiction to the
Courts in both countries to interfere at all in an agree¬
ment between the parties, unconscionable and extravagant,
and one which no Court ought to allow to be enforced.4
1 /1912/ A.C. 394 (P.C.), in which Lord Mersey said that "...whatever
the expression used in the contract in describing the payment,
the question must always be whether the construction contended
for renders the agreement unconscionable and extravagant and one
which no Court ought to allow to be enforced..."/398/. In
Dingwall v. Burnett 1912 S.C. 1097, Lord Salvesen equated Scots
law with English law and accepted Webster v. Bosanquet as a
correct exposition of the law.
2 /I9157 A.C. 79, 95.
3 /l90^7 A.C. 6.
^
Ibid., 10 per Earl of Halsbury L.C.
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That this test was the true basis for the decision was reinforced
by Lord Davey where he said that
it is always open to the parties to shew that the amount
named in the clause is so exorbitant and extravagant that it
could not possibly have been regarded as damages for any
breach which was in the contemplation of the parties, and
that is a reason for holding it to be a penalty and not
liquidate damages.
In that case the clause was upheld by the House of Lords evidently
because they regarded the sum as fair in the circumstances.
That the true test for distinguishing between penalties and
liquidate damage lies in the proportionality between the sum stipul¬
ated and the greatest possible loss that could occur as a result of
a breach is further strengthened by the second and third "rules of
construction" which were set out by Lord Dunedin in the Dunlop case.
According to the second test "/i7t will be held to be a penalty if
the breach consists only in not paying a sum of money, and the sum
stipulated is a sum greater than the sum which ought to have been
2
paid." The third test reads:
There is a presumption (but no more) that it is a penalty
when a single lump sum is made payable by way of compens¬
ation, on the occurrence of one or more or all of several
events, some of which may occasion serious and others but
trifling damage.^
The reason for branding such a clause as a penalty, often in the face
of perfectly unambiguous language in the contract, can only be that
Ibid.. 16.
P —
/191^7 A.C. 79, 87 citing Kemble v. Farren (1829) 6 Bing. 141.
3
Ibid., citing Lord Elnhinstone v. Monkland Iron & Coal Co. Ltd.
(1886) 11 A.C. 332, 342.
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the sum stipulated will be greatly disproportionate to the loss
caused by a minor breach.
It is conventionally stated that the fairness of a sum should
be tested as of the time that the contract was concluded and not as
of the time of the breach."'" Yet it is submitted that the courts
must and indeed often do take account of the actual damage that was
caused by a breach. Therefore, in a case where a sum is made
payable on the occurrence of different breaches, some important and
other less serious, the courts will not automatically hold a clause
to be a penalty. Where, for example, the breach that has actually
occurred causes damage which is proportionate to the sum stipulated,
the courts will attempt to construe the clause as pertaining only
2
to such a serious breach and not to a trifling one.
Damage clauses are quintessentially designed for the situation
3
where the loss which may flow from a breach is uncertain. Where
that is the case the courts will generally regard the stipulated
sum as fair and allow enforcement of the clause. But even here
a certain amount of hindsight will be employed and if the sum is
clearly disproportionate to the loss suffered it will often be
4
adjudged a penalty.
See,for example Dunlon Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. New Garage & Motor
Co. Ltd. /I91^7 A.C. 79> 87 and the Law Commission Working Paper
No. 61, Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid (1975).
Contra the South African Conventional Penalties Act. No. 15 of
1962 which in section 3 provides that the sum stipulated should be
compared with the "prejudice suffered" by the creditor. The
Uniform Commercial Code provides in section 2-718 that "Damages for
breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only
at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated
or actual harm caused by the breach."
Webster v. Bosanquet /l912/ A.C. 394.
3
See bunion Pneumatic Tyre Co.Ltd. v. New Garage & Motor Co.Ltd.
/19157a.C. 79, 88 per Lord Dunedin.
^
Ford Motor Co. (England) Ltd. v. Armstrong /l9l/7 31 T.L.R. 267.
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The jurisdiction against penalties is an important instance
of the courts' direct attack on unfair contract terms. The central
reason why the courts intervene in the case of penalties, and also
in the case of forfeitures generally, is the realization that a
person subjected to a penalty would, if it was enforced, lose the
sum stipulated without adequate return and without a breach of duty
on his part commensurate in value to the money paid."'" Although
the courts set out to protect the expectations created by the con¬
tract, they are not prepared to award the aggrieved party more than
he would have received had the contract been performed and thereby
sanction a grossly unequal exchange of values. Unlike many other
areas where the courts scrutinise the fairness of contracts, there is
here no attempt to relate the clause to some defect in the process
of contracting and there is no inquiry as to whether the debtor had
freely and consciously agreed to the term. The mere disproportion
between the sum stipulated and the loss caused by the breach is
sufficient reason to strike down the clause. This practice is
undoubtedly the result of the tendency to see penalties as penal by
nature and, therefore, inherently worthy of disapproval.
The reason why the courts apply a fairness test to damage
clauses is thus the result of special historical factors and this
may be a reason why the courts have been so reluctant to extend the
principles applied in the case of penalties to other contract terms
which, although they may differ from penalties in form, are essentially
Williston, op.. cit. section 769.
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similar in character. Except for a few isolated examples the courts
have shown little inclination to give a wide definition to the
concept of a penalty so as to include such other unfair terms.
Several other provisions such as acceleration clauses"'" and
2discounts for prompt payments resemble penalties in that they serve
to pressurise a debtor into performance. In addition, they may
also resemble penalties in that they stipulate for the payment or
forfeiture of a sum which is much greater than the loss which a
breach would cause to the creditor. Yet they are not subject to
the same principles as penalties and are generally enforceable. The
scope of the law relating to penal clauses is further limited in that
it applies only where a sum becomes payable on a breach of contract.
Where a term stipulates that a payment should be made on the occurr¬
ence of some event other than a breach that provision will not be
affected by the law as to penal clauses and will therefore be
3
generally enforceable.
The problem is even more acute where the clause stipulates
for payment in various situations, one of which is a breach. An
example of this is the "minimum payment" clauses often found in
hire-purchase contracts. This provides that when the contract is
prematurely determined the hirer must bring his payments up to a
certain minimum. It also specifies various circumstances in which
""
See Protector Loan Co. v. Grice (1880) 5 Q.B.D.529. Acceleration
clauses are said to accelerate a party's liability, but not to
increase it.
2
If the discount is unfairly large it may indicate that the smaller
sum was the real debt, and the larger sum merely a penalty.
^ See for example Alder v. Moore /l96l/2 Q.B. 57.
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the contract may be so determined. Where the hirer has committed
a breach and the owner subsequently terminates the agreement the sum
which becomes payable may be regarded as penal"'"if it is out of
proportion to the loss incurred by the owner as a result of the breach.
If, however, the hirer, without committing a breach, merely exercises
a legal right to return the goods, the courts are powerless to inter¬
vene and the hirer will be forced to pay any amount which may be
outstanding on the stipulated minimum irrespective of the loss
suffered by the owner as a result of the early determination of the
contract.^
The injustice of this has been frequently recognised by the
courts and in Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co.Ltd., Lord Denning was
moved to say:
Let no-one mistake the injustice of this. It means that
equity commits itself to this absurd paradox: it will grant
relief to a man who breaks his contract but will penalise
the man who keeps it... It is beyond doubt oppressive
and unjust.3
Similar sentiments have been expressed in Scotland where the same
4
paradox is to be found.
In the Bridge case relief was eventually granted by the
indirect means of construing the hirer's letter informing the owner
"*
See for example Cooden Engineering Co. v. Stanford /l953/l Q.B. 86;
Lamdon Trust Ltd. v. Hurrell /l9557l W.L.R. 391.
^
English law: Associated Distributors Ltd. v. Hall /193872 K.B.83;
United Dominion's Trust (Commercial) Ltd. v. Ennis /19687l Q.B.54.
Scotland: Bell Bros, v. Aitken 1939 S.C.577, followed in Granor
Finance Ltd. v. Liquidator of Eastore Ltd. 1974 S.L.T. 296;
Mercantile Credit Co.Ltd. v. McLachlan 1962 S.L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 58.
5 Z.I9627 A.C. 600, 629.
^
Mercantile Credit Co.Ltd. v. McLachlan 1962 S.L.T. (Sh.Ct.)58;
Mercantile Credit Co.Ltd. v. Brown I960 S.L.T. (Sh.C."c)41.
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that he could not continue payments and therefore wished to determine
the contract - a right conferred on him by the contract - as a breach
and not the mere exercise of an option stipulated in his favour and
the court, by so doing was able to pronounce the minimum payment to
be a penalty and not liquidate damage. Lord Denning was also of
the opinion that the hirer could be relieved on the ground of
existing principles of equity, but this idea did not gain the accept¬
ance of his fellow Lords. The technique used by the majority to
grant relief to the party in that case was employed in earlier - cases'^
2
and has also been used since then. Although it facilitates a
fair result it involves such spurious reasoning that it cannot be
accepted.
Section 100(l) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 now provides
that a debtor under a regulated hire-purchase agreement (or regulated
conditional sale) is able to terminate an agreement prematurely on
condition that he pays the difference between the sums already paid
or payable by him and one-half of the total price. And section
100(5) gives the court the power to order repayment of a smaller sum
if that would adequately compensate the owner for his loss. Where,
however, the Consumer Credit Act does not apply the situation will
still be governed by the common law.
Penalty clauses were discussed by the Law Commission in a
3
Working Paper in 1975- The Commission came out in favour of
^
Mercantile Credit Co.Ltd. v. Brown I960 S.L.T. (Sh.C.t.) 41.
Bowmaker (Commercial) Ltd. v. MacDonald 1965 S.L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 35-
3




retaining the present distinction between penalties and genuine pre-
estimates of loss"'" but they were of the opinion that relief should
also be possible where a clause with a penal effect came into
2
operation without a breach of contract. The Commission accordingly
felt that the rules as to penalties should apply "wherever the object
of the disputed contractual obligation is to secure the act or result
3
which is the true purpose of the contract." This recommendation,
while it would improve the situation slightly, is so cumbersome that
it will most likely lead to further problems of interpretation. To
date this recommendation has not been acted upon.
(iv)' Forfeiture of Monies Paid^"
The question whether a party in breach may recover payments
made by him under a contract is said in both English and Scots Law,
to depend upon the intention with which the payment was made. If
it was paid as a deposit, that is "a guarantee that the contract
5








See generally the Law Commission Working Paper: Penalty Clauses
and Forfeiture of Money Paid No. 61, 1975, 56 e_t seq; Treitel,
Law of Contract 742-745; Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution,
380-386.
^
Howe v. Smith (1884) 27 Ch.D.89, 95. See also Roberts & Cooper
v. Salvesen 1918 S.C. 794, 806 per Lord President Clydesdale
where he says that the law in Scotland is similar to that in
England. Also Commercial Bank of Scotland v. Beal (1890) 18 R.
80, 85. Reid v. Campbell 1958, S.L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 45.
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specific provision in the contract to that effect."'" On the other
hand., where money has been paid as part of the total purchase price
it may be recovered unless it is prohibited by a valid forfeiture
clause in the contract. The recovery will, however, be subject to
2
a cross-claim for damages.
The forfeiture of a deposit or part payment differs from the
payment of a penal sum only in respect of the time at which they
become payable - the former before the breach of contract has occurred
and the latter after the breach - and where a deposit which ought
to have been paid, but has not, is claimed after the breach the dis-
3
tinction is even less real. The forfeiture of a deposit or part
payment can, like the payment of a penal sum, operate in terrorem
of a party, and may also, and indeed frequently does, have no relation
to the damage actually incurred by the innocent party as a result of
the breach. The forfeited deposit or part payment may therefore
be as "extravagant, exorbitant and unconscionable" as any penalty.
Despite similarities in nature and effect between deposits and penal
clauses the courts have for many years considered the equitable
jurisdiction established in respect of penal clauses as irrelevant,
even by analogy, to the forfeiture of deposits. The formal origin
of this harsh approach to deposits is generally stated to be Howe
4
v. Smith, but in substance it is merely a manifestation of the
Howe v. Smith. (1884) 27 Ch.D. 89.
2
See Dies v. British and International Mining and Finance Corpor¬
ation /l93^/l K.B. 724, 744. Also Hinton v. Snarkes (1868)
L.R. 3 C.P. 161, 165.
^ See Hinton v. Sparkes (1868) L.R. 3 C.P. 161; Dewar v. Mintoft
/l912/ 2 K.B. 373; Lowe v. Hope 719697 3 All E.R. 605.
4 (1884) 27 Ch.D. 89.
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principle of freedom of contract. There are, nevertheless, a few
cases in which it seems as if the law as to penal clauses has been
applied to the forfeiture of deposits. In Public Works Commi ssioners
v. Hills"*" a contract for the construction of a railroad provided
that a security deposit of £50,000 should be forfeited if the
contractors failed to complete the work on time. The Privy Council
was of the opinion that the forfeiture clause was penal and therefore
that the deposit should be repaid to the contractors. If the law
in respect of penal clauses is to be applied to a provision for the
forfeiture of a deposit such a forfeiture would of course be enforced
where the sum deposited is not grossly disproportionate to the
2
greatest possible loss that could flow from the breach. The cases
where the law as to penalties have been applied to deposits are,
however, exceptions and "the continued distinction between penalties
and deposits remain curious and unjustified.
Judicial intervention has occurred most frequently in con¬
tracts of sale by instalments where the purchaser, as a result of
default in a single instalment stands to forfeit all the money already
paid, irrespective of the loss incurred by the seller. It has been
firmly established through a series of judgments that in such a
case the courts can at least relieve a purchaser who is willing and
able to perform by granting him an extension of time for payment or
by ordering the seller to repay the forfeited instalments in a case
1 /19067 A.C. 368.
o
_
Pye v. British Automobile Commercial Syndicate Ltd. J_1906/ 1
K.B. 425.
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where the purchaser was willing and able to perform but where
specific performance could for some valid reason not be decreed."*"
The development of a general jurisdiction of relief has been serious¬
ly hampered by certain judges interpreting those decisions that have
come out in favour of relief from forfeiture in the most restrictive
2
way possible. Notwithstanding this tendency, there are passages
in the judgments which suggest a wider perspective, for example
by treating part payments as akin to penal clauses.
Whether any relief other than an extension of the time for
payment will be given is uncertain. There are, however, strong
3
dicta in Stockloser v. Johnson that equity will provide relief on
a much wider basis. In that case the buyer of quarrying machinery
brought an action against the seller for repayment of the already
paid instalments, alleging that their retention amounted to a
penalty from which he was entitled to be relieved. The Court of
Appeal (Somervell, Denning and Romer L.JJ.) unanimously refused
relief, Somervell and Denning L.JJ. on the ground that it was not
in the circumstances unconscionable that the seller retained the sum.
Romer L.J. on the other hand, maintained that equity had never
interfered with contracts merely because they were improvident.
"*"
See generally, Jh.re Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co., Ex:narte Hulse
(1875)8 Ch.D.10 ; Kilmer v. British Columbia Orchard Lands, Ltd.
2191^7 A.C. 319; Steedman v. Drinkle 7l9l67 1 A.C. 275; Mussen"
v. Van Piemen's Land Co. /1932.7 Ch. 238.
^
Especially Farwell J. in Mussen v. Van Piemen's Land Co. /l93.27
Ch.238.
5 Zl9547l Q.B. 476.
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There is, in my judgment, nothing inequitable per se in
a vendor, whose conduct is not open to criticism in other
respects, insisting upon his contractual right to retain
instalments of purchase money already paid.
His Lordship declared that before rescission a court will intervene
only to give a purchaser in default who is willing and able to proceed
with the contract, an extension of time for payment and after re¬
scission the defaulting party will receive no relief -unless there
was fraud, sharp practice or some other unconscionable conduct on
2
the part of the seller. Romer L.J. did not explain what he meant
by "sharp practice" or "unconscionable conduct", but from his general
view of the law it seems clear that these terms refer exclusively
to defects in the bargaining process and not to any substantive
features of the contract.
The majority of the court thought that both equity and the
earlier caselaw indicated a wider jurisdiction than that intimated
by Romer L.J. Denning L.J. specifically declared that while a
readiness and willingness to perform the contract is necessary for
specific performance or relief from forfeiture of leases, it is not
3
a prerequisite for relief from forfeiture of sums paid. Denning
L.J. also drew a distinction between the principles relevant in this
case and those that operate to relieve a party from paying a penalty.
In the latter case relief is granted because the court will not
sanction an act of oppression. Here the seller only wishes to keep







extortion or oppression, but as part of the purchase price."'" A
party will only be allowed to recover money paid, irrespective of
whether it was a "part payment" or a "deposit", if two conditions are
fulfilled:
/F7irst. the forfeiture clause must be of a penal nature,
in this sense, that the sum forfeited must be out of all
proportion to the damage, and, secondly, it must be -un¬
conscionable for the seller to retain the money... 7l7n
a proper case there is an equity of restitution which a
party in default does not lose simply because he is not
able and willing to perform the contract. Nay, that is the
very reason he needs the equity. The equity operates, not
because of the plaintiff's default, but because it is in
the particular case unconscionable for the seller to retain
the money. In short, he ought not unjustly to enrich
himself at the plaintiff's expense. The equity of restit¬
ution is to be tested, I think, not at the time of the ^
contract but by the conditions existing when it is invoked.
Whether equity is to give relief depends upon all the circumstances
of a particular case and is not to be decided by looking only at the
contract terms.
The central theme of the majority judgments, namely that a
clause stipulating for the forfeiture of monies paid, may be declared
invalid if it is inequitable in the circumstances, has been widely
welcomed. Yet the judg.ments, especially that of Denning L.J.,
raise a number of questions which they do nothing to resolve. It
is clear from the judgment of Denning L.J. that a gross imbalance
between the sum forfeited and the damage incurred, although a cardinal
factor, is not in itself sufficient to render the forfeiture clause
inequitable - the retention of the instalments or deposit must also






the retention unconscionable, we are not told. It is possible that
this requirement relates not to substantive unconscionability but to
unfairness in the exercise of the right to retain the money. Perhaps
the retention must be "oppressive" as penalties are supposed to be.
But why is a penalty described as oppressive only because of a gross
disproportion between the penal sum and the damage, and a forfeiture
of money paid, under similar circumstances, not? Despite his Lord¬
ship's assertions it is doubtful whether the distinction between
penalties and forfeitures of money paid is real. It is also inter¬
esting to note that the only examples given by Denning L.J. of situ¬
ations where the courts would declare a forfeiture clause inequitable
are merely cases where there was great disparity between the amount
of the instalments and the damage, without more."'" It is in fact
extremely doubtful whether in this field the requirement of "unconscion¬
ability" adds in any significant way anything to the requirement of
penality. It seems nothing more than a ritual incantantion that
contracts cannot be refused enforcement only because of an unequal
exchange of values. This view of the law is reinforced by the
decision in the case. There is no indication in the judgments
that there was any gross disparity between the sum forfeited by the
buyer and the damage suffered by the seller. Denning L.J. accepted
the assertion by the jui ge a quo that the forfeiture clause was penal,
but the latter only regarded it as such because it was not liquidate
2




See the judgment of Somervell L.J. 483-
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no substantial reasons for their finding that the forfeiture clause
was equitable. Under these circumstances there must be a strong
suspicion that this was done merely because there was no great
disproportion between the values exchanged.
The law as espoused by Denning and Somervell, L.Jj. in
the Stockloser case was not followed in Calbraith v. Mitchenall
Estates Ltd."^" where Sachs J. refused to allow recovery of instalments
paid under a contract of hire despite the fact that he described the
terms of the contract as "hideously harsh". His Lordship instead
accepted the views of Romer L.J. in the Stockloser case as more in
accordance with established authority. Sachs J. was also impressed
by "the difficulties which would face a court if there had to be
2
some substitution of terms."
Many of the situations discussed above will now be covered
by the provisions of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. For example, in
terms of section 100(l) a debtor under a regulated hire-purchase (or
regulated conditional sale) agreement who has prematurely terminated
the agreement will now be liable to pay the difference between the
sums already paid or payable by him and one-half of the total price.
And section 100(3) gives the court the power to order payment of a
smaller sum if that would be equal to the loss of the creditor.
The refusal of the courts to grant relief from the unfair
forfeiture of a deposit was criticised by the Law Commission in its
1 /1961/ 3 W.L.R. 454.
2 ZI9647 2 All E.R. 653, 658.
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Working Paper on the subject. The Commission suggested instead
that forfeiture of a deposit should only be allowed where it is a
"genuine pre-estimate" of the loss likely to be caused by a breach."*"
But as they realized that such a rule would, in most cases, lead to the
invalidation of the right to forfeit a deposit, forfeiture clauses
in land transactions were specifically excluded from the scope of the
proposal.2
Equity's Doctrine against Forfeitures - Summary
Prom an early time forfeiture and penal clauses, stipulating
for the loss or payment of a certain sum in the event of non¬
performance of a party's promises, functioned as forms of security.
The sums so required to be paid by the promisor were often much
greater than the loss which non-performance would have caused the
promisee. The courts, influenced by the standard of fair exchange
which had filtered through from the usury laws, soon began to give
relief from such forfeiture and penal clauses on account of the
unequal exchange which they stipulated for. Whenever the promisee
could be sufficiently compensated for the loss occasioned by the
promisor's breach the forfeiture clause was struck down.
Inevitably specific rules began to develop in each area
where the general principle against forfeitures was applied. These
rules were, especially during the nineteenth century often applied




in such a mechanistic and rigid manner that otherwise fair contract
provisions were struck down.
Lately, a more flexible approach on the part of the courts
has become discernible, especially in the areas of mortgages and
leases. The fairness of the forfeiture clause is still regarded as
of paramount importance, but the fairness can only be judged with
reference to all the surrounding circumstances.
The principle that a penal clause would not be allowed to
stand unless fair was also a principle which Scots law had adopted
in consequence of the influence of the usury laws. Until the late
nineteenth century it was generally accepted that a penal sum could
be modified so as to accord more closely with the loss which was
likely to be caused by a breach. In respect of the forfeiture of
monies paid Scots law has largely followed English law. The rules
in respect of the equity of redemption and forfeiture of leases are,
because of differences between Scots law and English law not
relevant to the former.
(b) Specific Performance
Specific performance is a discretionary equitable remedy
and the principle is well established that a court will grant it
only where it is fair and just to do so."'" The discretion vested in
the courts is not arbitrary, but is said to be exercised in accordance
See for example the statement by Lord Hardwicke L.C. in Buxton v.
Lister (1746) 3 Atk.383, 386 that "/n7othing is more established
in this court, than that every agreement in respect of which
specific performance is decreed, ought to be certain, fair, and
just in all its parts."
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with settled principles. The decision to withhold or decree specific
performance may only be made after all the circumstances of the case
have been taken into account.
Specific performance may be refused where it will cause hard¬
ship to the debtor or if the contract itself is unfair or has been
unfairly obtained. The unfairness must be present when the contract
is concluded. The court will not, for example, withhold specific
performance merely because a seller, initially well satisfied with
her bargain, later discovered that she could have got more for the
2
sale of her property. It is furthermore said that the unfairness
3
need not be so serious as to constitute equitable fraud: a court
may refuse specific performance and at the same time not set the
4
contract aside, but leave the creditor free to claim damages at law.
In Day v. Newman the court expressed this idea as follows:
I think there are no grounds on which I can set the contract
aside; for neither side have a right to complain of a
bargain made so deliberately as this was. The party has
no right to ask the Court to prevent the consequences of his
own solemn act; but on the other hand, most certainly this
is too hard a bargain for the Court to assist in.5
This is a curious distinction: in the first place, except
where there is some circumstance which renders specific performance,
1
Lamare v. Dixon (1873) L.R. 6 H.L. 414, 423; Conlon v. Murray
/19587 N.I. 17, 25.
Collier v. Brown (1788) 1 Cox 428, 431. Also Western v. Russell
(1814) 3 V. & B. 188.
^ Young v. Clerk (1720) Pr. Ch. 538; Kemeys v. Hansard (1815) Coop.G.125.
^
Hick v. Phillips (l72l) Pr. Ch.575; Savage v. Taylor (1736) Cas.t.T.
234; Mortlock v. Buller (1804) 10 Ves. 292.
5 (1788) 2 Cox 77, 83.
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but not the payment of damages, unduly hard on the debtor, one would
expect a contract which is adjudged to be too unfair in its terms
to perform specifically to be similarly too unfair to provide a
basis for a claim of damages; secondly, it is doubtful whether
there are in fact many circumstances which will provide a ground for
refusing specific performance and not at the same time amount to
equitable fraud, especially as equitable fraud was purposely never
clearly defined lest ways should be found to circumvent it.
The rule that specific performance may be refused without
also setting the contract aside, but leaving the creditor to claim
damages for breach at common law, has been severely criticised by
1 2
commentators. According to Atiyah it dates from a period when
the amount of damages which would be awarded for breach was in the
discretion of the common law jury. The result was that if a debtor
complained that he had contracted to pay an excessive price the jury
3
would mitigate damages to accord more closely with a fair exchange.
As the circumstances which earlier justified the rule have since
disappeared it has become an anachronism.
A distinction between the circumstances which lead to a refusal of
specific performance and those which constitute equitable fraud will only be
See, for example, R.A. Newman, Renaissance of Good Faith in
contracting in Anglo-American Law (1969) 54 Cornell L. Rev. 553>
and the writers there cited.
^
Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract. 148-149.
•z
Atiyah, op., cit.. cites James v. Morgan (I665) 1 Lev. Ill and
Thornborow v. Whitacre (1704) 2 Ld. Ray II64 in support. These
cases are in fact often described as dealing essentially with
the question of damages.
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justified if specific performance were refused solely because the
terms of a contract were unfair or the consideration inadequate.
But the attitude of the courts toward the question whether inadequacy
of consideration is a ground for refusing specific performance has
been ambivalent. On the one hand there is a large number of cases
in which it has been stated that inadequacy by itself is not a
sufficient reason for withholding specific performance and that
where contracts are freely concluded they will not be interfered
with."'" On the other hand there is the declaration by Lord Eldon L.C.
in Coles v. Trecothick that inadequacy of consideration will, by
itself, constitute a bar to specific performance where it "is such
as shocks the conscience, and amounts in itself to conclusive and
2
decisive evidence of fraud in the transaction." It will, however,
be strange if, in such a case, the courts merely deny specific
performance without also setting the contract aside on the ground of
fraud.
Despite the many assertions to the contrary it is clear that
some degree of inadequacy of consideration per se will lead to a
3
refusal of specific performance. But what degree of inadequacy
4
will be sufficient is uncertain. In Abbot v. Sworder a person sold
his farm worth £3,500 to his solicitor for £5,000. Although Knight
4
See Keen v. Stuckely (l72l) Gil. 155, where the Lords were divided
on the question; Copis v. Middleton (1818) 2 Madd. 410; Western
v. Russell (1814) 3 V. & B. 188.
2 (1804) 9 Ves. 234. Also Morse v. Royal (1806) 12 Ves. 355.
^
Young v. Clerk (1720) Pr.Ch. 538, 540; White v. Damon (1802) 7
Ves. 30;
4 (1852) 4 De G. & S. 448.
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Bruce V.C. recognised that mere excess of price could be a sufficient
ground for refusing specific performance he did not think that it
would have that effect in this case as the solicitor "must be supposed
to have been not incapable of attending to his own interests.""*' In
2
Vaughan v. Thomas a contract for the purchase of an annuity worth
nine years' purchase for a sum equal to five years' purchase was
labelled "a very unconscientious bargain" and specific performance
refused.
The truth, however, is that the inadequacy of consideration
seldom stands alone - where there exists striking inadequacy of con¬
sideration the courts will more often than not find an accompanying
factor which will, in conjunction with the inadequacy, justify refusal
of specific performance. Such additional factors may of course take
various forms. It may, for example, be that the creditor obtained
3
the contract by "surprise", or as a result of ignorance as to the
4
value of goods on the part of the debtor. Specific performance
will also be refused where the creditor took unfair advantage of the
5
debtor as a result of their unequal bargaining position. Such




(1783) 1 Bro. C.C. 556.
5 Walters v. Morgan (1861) 3 D.F. & J. 718.
^
Young v. Clerk (1720) Pr. Ch. 538; Hick v. Phillips (l72l) Pr. Ch.
575; Falcke v. Gray (1859) 4 Drew. 651.
^
Conlon v. Murray /19587n.I.17; Buckley v. Irwin /l9607 n.I. 98,
in which the court not only refused specific performance, but also
set the contract aside notwithstanding the fact that the latter
was not claimed in the pleadings.
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1 2
distress or habits of intoxication of the debtor.
On the other hand, specific performance may also be refused
on the ground of inadequacy of consideration where the character
of the parties to the transaction is quite unimpeached. In Mortlock
v. Euller an estate worth £33>000 was sold for £26,000 as a result
of negligence on the part of the sellers' agent. Lord Eldon refused
specific performance although he was not prepared to set the trans¬
action aside.
Specific performance may, furthermore, be refused where it
would create hardship to the debtor which is out of proportion to
the benefit which specific performance would have for the creditor.
The courts often use this rule to deny enforcement of a contract on
the basis of inadequacy of consideration. In Hick v. Phillips,4 where,
•because of a misconception about the value of the land which he had bought,
the debtor was obliged to pay more than the true value, the court said
that the hardship to the debtor which prevented the granting of
specific performance arose from the fact that an "over value" was
being required from the debtor.
4
Kemeys v. Hansard (1815) Coop. G. 125; Falcke v. Gray (1859)
4 Drew 651.
2
Bell v. Howard (1742) 9 Mod. 302.
5 (1804) 10 Ves. 292.
4 (1721) Pr. Ch. 575.
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(c) Equitable or Constructive Fraud"*"
The various manifestations of fraud were set out hy
Lord Hardwicke L.C. in the leading case of Earl of Chesterfield v.
Janssen:2
This court has an undoubted jurisdiction to relieve against
every species of fraud. 1. Then fraud, which is dolus
malus, may be actual, arising from facts and circumstances
of imposition; which is the plainest case. 2. It may
be apparent from the intrinsic nature and subject of the
bargain itself; such as no man in his senses and not under
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and
fair man would accept on the other; which are unequitable
and unconscientious bargains. A 3d kind of fraud is, which
may be presumed from the circumstances and condition of
the parties contracting ... it is wisely established in
this court to prevent taking surreptitious advantage of
the weakness or necessity of another: which knowingly to
do is equally against the conscience as to take advantage
of his ignorance: a person is equally unable to judge for
himself in one as the other. A 4th kind of fraud may be
collected or inferred ... from the nature and circumstances
of the transaction, as being an imposition and deceit on ^
the other persons not parties to the fraudulent agreement...
The last head of fraud, on which there has been relief, is
that, which infects catching bargains with heirs, revers¬
ioners, or expectants, in the life of the father, &c.,
against which relief always extended. These have been
generally mixed cases, compounded of all or several species
of fraud; there being sometimes proof of actual fraud,
which is always decisive. There is always fraud presumed
or inferred from the circumstances or conditions of the
parties contracting; weakness on one side, usury on the
other, or extortion or advantage taken of that weakness.
There has been always an appearance of fraud from the
nature of the bargain.5
See generally, Sheridan, Fraud in Equity.
2 (1751) 2 Ves. 125.
Actual fraud falls outside the scope of this study: see Introduc¬
tion.
^
Frauds on third parties will not be discussed in this study. This
type of fraud referred mainly to abuses which were common in
the eighteenth century but have now either fallen into disuse or
are held void as being against public policy. The most important
of these were marriage brokage contracts: see Keeton and Sheridan,
Equity. 352-353.
5 (1751) 2 Ves. 125, 155-157.
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The perception of equity's jurisdiction against unfair con¬
tracts"'" in terms of fraud first gained wide circulation in the
eighteenth century. Despite the existence of some cases in which
fraud was invoked as a basis for the decision, the reports of cases
before the middle of the eighteenth century are generally brief and
uninformative as to the grounds on which the courts proceed and it
is doubtful whether one can postulate any single uniform principle
on which relief was granted other than that the transactions in¬
volved were regarded either as evasions of the usury statutes then
2
in force or as contrary to the spirit of the usury laws.
The practice of basing the jurisdiction on fraud has persisted
for a long time and examples can be found even in the twentieth
century where fraud is still ritualistically invoked by the courts
as a ground for relieving a party from an unfair contract. Despite
the surprising tendency of the courts in the late nineteenth century
to base their decisions more directly on the inequality between the
parties, coupled with the unfairness of the exchange, the initial
subsumption under fraud left its imprint on the outward aspects of
the jurisdiction, not least on the terminology employed by the judges.
It is thus necessary to look briefly at the general nature of equit¬
able fraud and its implications for the jurisdiction developed by the
""
Although most of the cases reviewed involve contracts in which there
is an exchange of values there are some in which the transaction in
question takes the form of gifts and voluntary conveyances. To
include these the term "contract" as used here will refer
to all consensual transactions.
2
Bellot, The Legal Principles and Practice of Bargains with Money¬
lenders , 111.
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Chancery courts against unfair contracts, before embarking on a more
detailed study of the various manifestations of fraud.
Equitable or constructive fraud was the vehicle by means of
which the Chancery courts effected a compromise between competing
values, on the one hand the principle that relief should be given
from a contract which violated the standard of fair exchange and,on
the other, the "classical" principle that where a contract was freely
consented to it should be enforced no matter how substantively unfair
it is. The conflict between these two principles was, of course,
symptomatic of an even deeper doctrinal clash between the view that
contractual liability depended upon substantial justice and the
classical theory of contract which proclaimed that the entire con¬
tract, as well as contractual liability,derived from the intention
of the parties. Although the latter conception had by the beginning
of the nineteenth century become generally accepted, it, and the
liberal individualism from which it sprung, did not suddenly burst
upon the scene then. The transition from the earlier conception
of contract to the classical model took place throughout the eight¬
eenth century and even in the late seventeenth century notions which
were later to become cardinal principles of freedom of contract,
could be found. Neither was there a smooth and gradual movement
from one doctrine to the other: the eighteenth century, and for
that matter also the late seventeenth century, are full of conflict¬
ing judicial dicta about the relevance of unfairness in contracts.
Throughout this period the notion that contracts
should be fair and the idea that all contracts freely assented, to should
be enforced, existed uneasily side by side. The law in respect of
unfair contracts was therefore a mixture of ideas taken
70
from both competing theories. Nevertheless, it was clear that
throughout the eighteenth century the consensualism that was to
earmark the classical theory of contract, was steadily gaining ground.
The practice of setting aside unfair bargains arose because
the Chancery courts, still greatly influenced at the end of the
seventeenth century by the standards of contractual fairness set
by the concept of usury, disapproved of a grossly unequal exchange.
However, even then, judges were astute enough to realize that to give
relief from contracts on the sole ground of inadequacy of consider¬
ation would be harmful to the growing commercial activity that was
taking place at the time. In addition the courts, from the start
of the equitable jurisdiction, refused relief from an unfair bargain
which was the result of mere folly or extravagance on the part of
the party claiming such relief. A bad bargain which had been
voluntarily entered into by a party who suffered from no bargaining
handicap which the court regarded as relevant,was not set aside.
Of one such transaction Lord Nottingham L.C., after having admitted
that the terms were harsh, said:
Nevertheless, there being no surprise or circumvention
of the plaintiff, but these being voluntary foolish
bargains of his own making, I saw no reason for the
Chancery to interpose. •'•
And in 1741 Lord Hardwicke L.C. expressed the principle thus:
It is not sufficient to set aside an agreement in this court
to suggest weakness and indiscretion in one of the parties
who has engaged in it: for supposing it to be in fact a
very hard and unconscionable bargain, if a person will
"*■
Pawlett v. Pleydell (1679) Selden Society, Vol. 79. Case 935.
Yet Lord Nottingham did persuade the parties to a compromise.
enter into it with his eyes open, equity will not relieve
him upon this footing only, unless he can shew fraud in
the party contracting with him, or some undue means made
use of to draw him into such an agreement. ^
These cases illustrate that a party who was free from any
of the bargaining handicaps which Chancery recognised and who
entered into the contract without regard to the level of exchange
stipulated in it, would receive no assistance from the courts if he
later sought to have the contract set aside. When, therefore, a
person so contracting is for reasons of expediency described in
this work as having entered into a contract "freely and with
appreciation of the level of exchange stipulated in the contract",
or "wittingly and willingly", it must not be taken to imply merely
that misrepresentation, duress or mistake was absent. The Chancery
courts when referring to a person having concluded a contract "freely"
meant thereby not only that misrepresentation, duress or mistake was
absent, but also that the party did not suffer from any of the
bargaining handicaps which will be examined later in this section.
Neither must the phrases be taken to imply that where the courts
did intervene they did so because a party made the agreement
"involuntarily" or that his consent was defective. The truth is
that in this context the courts seldom focussed on the quality of
consent as such, primarily because there w.as no need to do so in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This was so despite the fact
that in the nineteenth century the problem of undue influence came
1
Willis v. Jernegan (l74l) 2 Atk. 251-252.
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to be discussed largely in terms of whether the party's will had been
free. The modern practice to relieve from agreements only where
a party's consent was defective developed as a result of the rise
of freedom of contract. The Chancery courts, on the other hand,
recognised that some contractual parties were, because of their
peculiar circumstances, liable to be imposed upon and they were
therefore prepared to grant relief to such parties where it was found
that they had in fact been imposed upon. Chancery intervened
because they generally disapproved of unfair bargains and more
specifically because of a protective policy towards certain contract¬
ual parties. It was therefore unnecessary to postulate defective
consent as a prerequisite for judicial intervention.
In order to prove "imposition" it was initially required in
some cases that misconduct on the part of the defendant be shown.
Soon, however, imposition came to be inferred from the fact that an
unfair bargain had been concluded with a party who was economically
weak, necessitous or generally unable to protect himself in the
process of contracting. This practice was followed in equity
throughout the first half of the eighteenth century. Although the
need to prove imposition by showing sharp practice or misconduct on
the part of the defendant had been dispensed with,the term itself
was retained.
In Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen^Lord Hardwicke consolidated
the various branches of equity's jurisdiction against unfair contracts
1 (1751) 2 Yes. 125.
73
under the head of equitable fraud. The nature of the jurisdiction,
however, remained unchanged. Although Lord Hardwicke used the phrase
"taking advantage of" instead of the term "imposition" it was clear
that fraud could be found even where the conduct of the party who
benefited from the contract was morally blameless. It was simply
presumed from the inequality of the bargain coupled with the in¬
equality between the parties,that the stronger had taken advantage
of the weaker and therefore that the bargain was tainted by fraud.
Restating the jurisdiction in terms of fraud did not mean
that thenceforth the courts were to approach the problem of unfair
contracts through the quality of a party's consent. "Fraud",
as Lord Chancellor Selborne made clear in Earl of Avlesford v.
Morris. "does not here mean deceit or circumvention; it means an
unconscientious use of the power arising out of /the/ circumstances
and conditions /of the parties contracting/""*" All those transact¬
ions "in which the Court is of the opinion that it is unconscient¬
ious for a person to avail himself of the legal advantage which he
2
has obtained" were regarded as tainted by equitable fraud.
The formulation of the jurisdiction in terms of fraud gave the
Chancery judges the opportunity to intervene in unfair contracts
without the danger of being condemned as the destroyers of bargains.
"*" (1873) L.R.8 Ch. App. 484, 491; See also the discussion of
constructive fraud by Lord Haldane L.C. in Nocton v. Lord
Ashburton 71914/ A.C. 932.
^
Torrance v. Bolton (1872) L.R.8 Ch.App. 118, 124.
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Equitable fraud was thus an enormously important weapon in
Chancery's armoury against unfair contracts. It was purposely
undefined and unlimited lest "the jurisdiction ... be cramped,
and perpetually eluded by new schemes which the fertility of man's
invention would contrive.""*"
It is now necessary to look more specifically and in greater
detail at the various manifestations of equitable fraud as set out
by Lord Hardwicke in Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen.
(i) Fraud which is apparent from the nature and subject of the
contract itself
We have seen that mere inadequacy of consideration was not
a sufficient ground for setting aside a contract in the Chancery
2
courts. But such a principle did not stand unqualified: it
meant only that not any inadequacy of consideration would serve as
a basis for relief from a contract. If the inadequacy was gross
it would give rise to a presumption of fraud. Lord Chancellor
Hardwicke recognised this when he said in Earl of Chesterfield v.
Janssen that there was a type of fraud which might be apparent from
the intrinsic nature and subject of the agreement itself, "such as
no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one
3




Lord Hardwicke in a letter to Lord Kames: Yorke, Life of Lord
Chancellor Hardwicke. 11,550, 554 as cited by Yale, Nottingham's
Chancery Cases, 73 Selden Society, xci.
Ante. 21.
(1751) 2 Ves. 125, 155.
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In Drought v. Eustace^Lord Chancellor Hart summed up the true nature
of this practice as follows:
... /l7nadequacy of price is not of itself sufficient, but
the Court has got at it by indirect means - it has been
astute, as it is said to infer fraud from inadequacy, so
as to raise it indirectly into a ground for relief.
Lord Hardwicke's formulation did not fall on deaf ears and
3
in Gwynne v. Heaton, Lord Thurlow L.C., after first stating that
7a7n inadequate consideration is not alone sufficient to
vitiate the contract; although in order to do so, the
consideration must be inadequate; where it is sold for
a sum grossly inadequate, the Court has never suffered it
to stand,^
continued in the same vein as Lord Hardwicke L.C.:
To set aside a conveyance, there must be an inequality
so strong, gross, and manifest, that it must be impossible
to state it to a man of common sense, without producing an
exclamation at the inequality of it.5
His Lordship, however, added the following proviso:
If parties are of full age, treating upon equal terms with¬
out imposition, and there is an inequality, even if it is
a gross one, the Court in general has not set it aside.^
7
In Heathcote v. Paignon the same Lord Chancellor drew a
distinction between mere inadequacy of consideration, which is in¬
sufficient as a ground for setting aside a transaction, and the
evidence which arose from such inadequacy.
1 (1828) 1 Mol. 328.
^
Ibid., 335. See also Note, (1935) 55 Col.L.Rev. 1090.






7 (1787) 2 Bro. C.C. 167.
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If there is such inadequacy as to show that the person did
not understand the bargain he made, or was so oppressed
that he was glad to make it, knowing its inadequacy, it
will shew a command over him which may amount to fraud.
If the transaction be such as marks overreaching on one
side, and imbecility on the other, it puts the parties
in such a situation, as to shew that it could not have
taken place without superior powers on the one side over
the other.1
2
In Griffith v. Spratley, Eyre L.C.B. agreed with the
principle set out in Heathcote v. Paignon but again reiterated the
view that inadequacy of consideration would not be a good enough
reason for relieving a person who had wittingly and willingly
entered into the agreement. But
/w7hen you see distress on the one side and money on the
other, and a wish on the one side to press that distress
into a submission to his own terms, inadequacy of price
goes a great way in warranting the court to infer from
this, that some sort of fraud was used to draw the other
party into the bargain.
The foregoing cases generally stress that fraud will only
be presumed where the parties are unequal and the consideration is
4
grossly inadequate. However, in Gibson v. Jeyes Lord Eldon L.C.
drew a distinction between the situation where the inadequacy is so
great that by itself it is evidence of fraud and lesser inadequacy
which will constitute fraud only in conjunction with inequality
in the positions of the parties. Whether inadequacy is by itself
sufficient reason for setting aside the agreement will depend upon
1
Ibid.. 175.
2 (1787) 1 Cox 383.
5 Ibid.. 389.
4 (1801) 6 Ves. 266.
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whether it is "so gross as to shock the conscience of any man, who
heard the terms.Lord Eldon followed up this new departure by
maintaining in an obiter dictum in Coles v. Trecothick that inade¬
quacy of consideration can be so gross as to amount "in itself to
2
conclusive and decisive evidence of fraud."
Courts have, in subsequent cases,made obiter statements to
the effect that while "mere" undervalue was only evidence of fraud
and required "additional circumstances" before fraud would have been
3
proven, gross undervalue was conclusive proof of fraud.
It is perhaps significant that these utterances remained
merely obiter and that in the more modern cases there is no trace
of a similar principle. Apart from the fact that such a principle
would have been difficult to defend within a system of freedom of
contract, the absence of any ratio decidendi supporting it showed
that in the vast majority of cases where gross inadequacy of con¬
sideration was to be found there were also additional impeaching
factors present which took the cases outside the narrow confines of
that principle. It is difficult to think of cases where, in
contracts for consideration, a person would conclude a grossly unfair
contract which could not, in part at least, be explained by some
bargaining handicap such as necessity, distress or weakness.
1
Ibid.. 273-
2 (1804) 9 Ves. 234, 246.
^ Stilwell v. Wilkins (l82l) Jac. 280, 282; Summers v. Griffiths
(l866) 35 Beav. 27, 33; Clark v. Mainas (1862) 4 Be G., F.& J.
401, 403; Butler v. Miller (1867) I.R. 1 Eq. 195, 211; Davies
v. Cooper. (1840) 5 My. & Cr. 270, 277.
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The cases surveyed are, however, important in the way they highlight
the importance of inadequacy of consideration within the equitable
doctrine of fraud.
(ii) Catching Bargains with Expectant Heirs"*"
■The jurisdiction against catching bargains with expectant
heirs was the oldest of the branches of equitable fraud. It
first came to he applied extensively in the late seventeenth century,
but there are indications that it went hack to the Court of Star
2
Chamber and was ultimately derived from the Senatus Consulturn
Macedonianum. The aim of the latter was to prevent spendthrifty
children "loaded with debts for borrowed moneys, which they used
'X
in extravagance, /from plotting/ against their parents' lives."
The scope of this jurisdiction, both as regards the category
of "expectant heir" and the type of agreement involved, eventually
came to be very wide. It comprised sales, charges, leases and
mortgages of reversions, remainders or of "any future interest,
vested or contingent, in real or personal property, and /included/
4
a bare hope to inherit or receive some benefit." Equity's scrutiny
See generally, J.P. Dawson, Economic Duress - An Essay in
Perspective (1947) 45 Mich.L.Rev. 253, 267-276. Also the thorough
survey of the relevant material in Sheridan, Fraud in Equity,
132-145.
^
Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen (l75l) 2 Ves. 125, 139; Davis v.
Duke of Marlborough (1819) 2 Swan. 108, 170 per Lord Eldon L.C.
3
Justinxan, Institutes, IV, 7.7. as cited by Bellot, og. cit. 110
^
Sheridan, pp. cit., 134. See, for example, Nott v. Hill (l683)
1 Ver. 167 - Transfer of a remainder in tail worth £800 in return
for £30 cash and £20 annuity set aside; Twisleton v. Griffith
(1716) 1 P.Wms. 310 - Transfer set aside of a remainder in tail
worth £150 p.a. in return for only £1050 given by defendant,
although plaintiff's father who held the life estate was old and
sickly and died within two years of the conclusion of the agreement;
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also extended to post-obit bonds by which a person who was lent
a sum of money undertook to repay a larger amount, usually double
the amount of the loan, but frequently much more, if he survived a
specified person from whom he stood to inherit. Instances of
judicial intervention pre-dating even those cases were provided by
2 34sales of goods and the granting of annuities or rent-charges
Baugh v. Price (1752) 1 Wils. K.B. 320 - Court set aside an agree¬
ment by plaintiff to convey an estate in fee simple worth £3*000
but subject to the estate for his father's life, for £1,500 and
a house worth £200; Crowe v. Ballard (1790) 1 Ves. 215 - A legacy
of a £1,000 payable on the death of a lady aged sixty-nine sold
for £310. Court set aside the sale; Evans v. Peacock (1809)
16 Ves. 512 - Plaintiff agreed to convey within a month of the
death of his father several estates, the value of which was
calculated as being between £700 and £2040, in consideration of
£500 paid to him. The court set aside the transaction.
The courts regularly set aside post-obit bonds, decreeing that the
plaintiff should be liable only for the amount actually advanced
plus interest. Contra: Batty v. Lloyd (1682) 1 Ver. 141; Barny
v. Beak (1682) 2 Ch.Ca.136. See, however, the following cases
where relief was given: Barney v. Tyson (1684) 2 Vent. 359;
Berney v. Pitt (l686)2 Ver. 14 - Plaintiff borrowed £2,000 and
agreed to pay £5,000 if he survived his father, else nothing;
Wiseman v. Beak (l690)2 Ver. 121; Curwyn v. Milner (l73l) 3 P.
Wms. 292 n. - £500 lent on condition that £1,000 be repaid;
Osmond v. Fitzroy (l73l) 3 P.Wms 129; Evans v. Chesshire (1803)
Ves. Sen. Supp.300 - £300 borrowed on condition that £600 be
repaid; Marsack v. Reeves (l82l) 6 Madd. 108.
2
Waller v. Dalt (1676) 1 Ch.Ca.276; Draper v. Dean (1679) Rep.t.F.
439; Berney v, Fairclough (l680)2 Swan. 139n.; Bill v. Price
(l687) 1 Ver. 467; Lamplugh v. Smith (1688) 2 Ver. 77; Witley
v. Price (1688) 2 Ver. 78; Freeman v.■Bishop (1740) Barn C. 15;
See also Barker v. Vansommer (1782) 1 Bro.C.C. 149, 151 where Lord
Thurlow L.C. stated that if the transaction was an ordinary sale
of goods,the court would not intervene, but as it was "an advance¬
ment of goods, instead of money, to supply /the buyer's/ necessities"
the buyer-plaintiff is liable only for the amount that he
eventually obtained by reselling the goods.
^ See Henley v. Axe (1786) 2 Bro.C.C. 17 in which Lord Chancellor
Thurlow upheld the agreement. Also Pawlett v. Pleydell (l679)
79 Selden Society, 739.
^ Earl of Ardglasse v. Muschamp (1684) 1 Ver. 237; Gwynne v. Heaton
(1778) 1 Bro.C.C. 1; Wardle v. Carter (1835) 7 Sim. 490.
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involving expectant heirs, which merely served as cloaks for loans
of money at exorbitant rates of return. This again indicates the
extent to which the jurisdiction against unfair contracts was formed
and developed by analogy to the usury laws.
Initially this doctrine of relief had a limited objective,
the protection of the landowning class against its own prodigality
and dissipation. The expectant heir who needed cash urgently was,
because of his inability to provide security for a loan and the
uncertainty of his financial prospects, precluded from obtaining
money at a reasonable rate of interest. He was thus thrown back
onto frequently unscrupulous money-lenders who were only too eager
to fulfil his immediate needs. The cost of raising money from
these sources was generally extremely high and the caselaw paints
a vivid picture of desperate heirs who, in an attempt to finance
past or future extravagances, had ensnared themselves in this way.
The Court of Chancery was not prepared to countenance this state of
affairs and when the judges were called upon to adjudicate in the
confrontation between expectant heirs and their supposed benefactors,
they came out unequivocally on the side of the former. Their
motive in taking this stance was to discourage prodigality and to
prevent the ruin of "ancient families" as a result of the dispers¬
ion of their property and wealth which would inevitably have followed
from holding the expectant heirs bound by their greatly disadvantag -
eous agreements."'" The rule which thus arose in respect of
See the statement by Lord Chancellor Talbot in Cole v. Gibbons
(1734) 3 P.Wms. 290, 293; see also Earl of Portmore v. Taylor
(1831) 4 Sim. 182, 213.
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transactions with expectant heirs dealing in anticipation of their
expectancies, was clear: they would be set aside or modified unless
they were substantively fair, that is unless they involved no great
disparity between the values exchanged. The possibility, alluded
to by counsel for the defendant in a number of cases, that courts
could, by too strict an insistence on the standard of equivalence,
deprive the necessitous heir of his last remaining source of
financial relief, left the courts undeterred."''
Although the wisdom of an objective so narrow and so
peculiarly related to a particular social class was not questioned
2
at the time, the need for a wider principle was clearly felt. A
ready vehicle by means of which such an extension could be effected
was provided by the economic necessity and weakness with which the
heir who entered into these transactions was generally afflicted.
And as soon as the necessity of the heir came to be regarded as a
crucial element in the formula on which relief was based, the earlier
notion that the doctrine pertained to young heirs only, fell out
3
of favour. A small number of cases during the latter part of the
seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century
referred, in addition to the economic necessity of the heir, to his
^
Such a possibility was in fact welcomed by Lord Cowper L.C. in
Twisleton v. Griffith (1716) 1 P.Wms. 310, 313-
p
Some doubts were expressed in a few later cases. See, for
example, Shelly v. hash (1818) Madd. 232, 236.
*2
As early as Wiseman v. Beak (1690) 2 Ver. 121 relief was granted
to an heir who was nearly 40 years old and described by counsel
for the defendant as a man of the world. Although the majority
of plaintiffs in these cases were young that was not a sine qua non
for relief.
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inexperience or ignorance as factors underlying the doctrine of
relief
Despite an insistence "by Lord Nottingham on a showing of
sharp practice on the part of the defendant as a prerequisite for
2
relief this requirement soon disappeared. Lord Jeffreys who
succeeded Lord Nottingham as Chancellor showed himself to be far
more favourably disposed towards giving relief than his predecessor.
Harbouring a strong bias in favour of the noble families of the time
he proceeded to give relief wherever the expectant heir could show
that the contract was unfair. This attitude was followed by the
Lords Commissioners who succeed Lord Jeffreys and was to remain
the approach followed by the Chancery courts until Lord Hardwicke's
3
exposition of the law in Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen.
The test which had been developed by the Chancery courts and
applied in the vast majority of caseg was objective: relief was
dependant only upon a finding that one of the parties to the
agreement was a necessitous and destitute heir contracting in
anticipation of his expectancy, and that the heir would receive an
4
inadequate consideration in return for his own performance. Such
In Herne v. Meeres (1687) 1 Ver. 465 it seems as if considerations
of actual fraud also tainted the bargain. See also Osmond v.
Fitzroy (l73l) 3 P.Wms. 129 - breach of trust; Could v. Okeden
(1731) 4 Bro. P.C.198; Cole v. Gibbons (1734) 3 P.Wms.290.
^
See, for example, Pawlett v. Pleydell (1679)79 Selden Society 739.
3 (1751) 2 Ves. 125.
^
In Gwynne v. Heaton (1778) 1 Bro.C.C.I, 10, Lord Thurlow L.C.
commented on Curwyn v. Milner (l73l) 3 P.Wms. 292n. saying that
it was a case perfectly free from fraud. And in Berney v. Pitt
(1686) 2 Ver. 14, 15-16 Jeffreys L.C. said that although there
was no evidence "of any practice used by the defendant ... to
draw the plaintiff into this security; yet in respect merely to
the unconscionableness of the bargain" relief should be granted.
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an objective approach was in full accord with the policy of the courts,
the aim of which was not to ensure that consent to an unfair con¬
tract should be unimpeachable, but rather to discourage and if pos¬
sible to prevent inequitable agreements with a certain class of con¬
tracting party altogether. By doing so the courts clearly recognised
the reality of the situation, which was that in most cases the heir
entered into a grossly unequal bargain, not because he was unaware
or ignorant of the effect of his actions, but because he was com¬
pelled to do so by his dire financial circumstances. To such an
objective approach considerations of usury, although formally ex¬
cluded by the contingency on which the heir's counterperformance
usually depended, were obviously of greater relevance than fraud
with its emphasis on the propriety of consent."'" The appositeness
to the present doctrine of the principles of usury becomes even
clearer when viewed against the background of the general unwilling¬
ness of the courts to take into account the risk which was involved
to the defendant who,in almost every case, stood to lose his entire
return if the contingency on which repayment depended - usually the
2
expectant heir outliving the testator - was not realized. That
the transactions were often extremely hazardous to the defendant
was seldom taken into account. Where the risk was considered it was
This was especially true of the cases dealing with attempts to
raise money by purchases of goods with the view of reselling them.
See the cases cited on page 79 , note 2.
In a few exceptional cases the risk was taken into account. See
Barry v. Beak (1682) 2 Ch.Ca. 136; Hobson v. Trevor (1723) 2 P.Wms.
191; Nichols v. Gould (1752) 2 Ves. 422. But in Benyon v. Fitch
(1866)35 Beav. 570, the risk involved was expressly disregarded.
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generally only to show that by insuring the life of the expectant
all risk had been excluded."'" With the most important distinction
between these transactions with heirs and usurious moneylending
transactions generally disregarded by the courts it was logical that
ideas should filter through from the doctrine of usury.
A comprehensive restatement in terms of fraud came in the
leading case of Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen. a case involving
a post-obit bond, where Lord Hardwicke L.C. discussed these "catching
bargains with heirs, reversioners, or expectants, in the life of the
2
father ..., against which relief always extended." According to
his Lordship that jurisdiction was based on fraud which was always
inferred from "the circumstances or conditions of the parties con¬
tracting: weakness on one side, usury on the other, or advantage
3
taken of that weakness." It is thus clear that despite postulating
fraud, albeit equitable fraud, as the basis of relief the doctrine
had not changed substantively. That it was felt necessary at that
time to describe the basis of intervention as fraud does, however,
shows the increasing sensitivity in Chancery towards the growing
importance of consensus in the concept of contract.
As Lord Hardwicke indicated, fraud would be presumed from
the fact that the plaintiff, when he concluded the contract, had
been suffering from a bargaining handicap, coupled with the fact that
^
See for example Evans v. Chesshire (1803) Ves. Sen. Supp. 300;
Evans v. Peacock (1809) 16 Ves. 512.
2 (1751) 2 Ves. 125, 157.
5 Ibid.
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the transaction was in itself unfair. The unfairness of the contract
was generally sufficient to show that the plaintiff's weakness had
been taken advantage of by the defendant."'" This presumption was,
however, rebuttable - the defendant could still show that the
plaintiff, although weak, had assented to the contract freely and
while understanding the level of exchange involved. This was, of
course, an unlikely event and in most cases where an heir had agreed
to a highly disadvantageous bargain it was simply accepted that he
2
had been taken advantage of.
While it was the economic necessity of the heir which
rendered him vulnerable and thus worthy of judicial protection it
happened quite often that there was no thorough investigation of
the heir's economic circumstances. If the bargain was disadvantag¬
eous and the plaintiff an expectant heir it was often assumed that
he must have been in economic difficulty. Where additional evidence
The following statement by Sir John Leach V.C. in Marsack v.
Reeves (l82l) 6 Madd. 108, 109 showed clearly that "taking advan¬
tage of a necessitous heir" meant no more than that the defendant
had given inadequate consideration: "It has long been a settled
principle of Courts of Equity that those who deal with persons
who have no present property, and only expectations from persons
living, possess so much advantage over those with whom they deal
that this Court will not permit a party so dealing to recover,
unless he has given the actual value of the thing which he has
purchased."
See the dictum by Lord Eldon L.C. in Underhill v. Horwood (1804)
10 Ves. 209, 219 that "... if the terms are so extremely in¬
adequate as to satisfy the conscience of the Court by the amount
of the inadequacy, that there must have been imposition, or
that species of pressure upon distress, which in the view of this
Court amounts to oppression..." then relief would be granted.
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showing that the heir was liable to be imposed upon, such as reck¬
lessness, improvidence, or unsteadiness, (often caused by heavy
drinking), was present that was, of course, seized upon by the courts
as proof,in conjunction with the disparity in the values exchanged,
that the heir had indeed been the victim of fraud. But such
evidence merely strengthened the finding of the court and was by no
means necessary for it. In Ryle v. Swindells, for example, the
court reinforced its decision that a sale at an undervalue should
be set aside, by stating that
/t/he general condition of this man, which is represented
to have been that of extreme indigence, ignorance, imbecil¬
ity of intellect, and habitual inebriety was such as should
render him an object of the protection of the Court. I
think that no man capable of dealing for his own interests,
could have acceded to that stipulation.^
Furthermore the fact that it was often the plaintiff/heir who had
been hawking around his expectancy and who had stipulated the terms
of the agreement was either regarded as of no consequence or as
2
indicative only of the economic necessity of the heir.
The objective approach followed by the courts was also not
disproved by those decisions which refused to set aside a subsequent
3
agreement confirming the first. In Cole v. Gibbons, Lord Chancellor
Talbot denied relief from the sale of a contingent legacy, because
it was confirmed by the heir after the legacy had become due.. His
Lordship stated that if everything had depended upon the first
1 (1824) M'Cl.519, 526.
See, for example, Evans v. Peacock (1809) 16 Ves. 512; Bowes v.
Heaps (1814) 5 V.& B. 117 > 119 where Sir William Grant M.R. said:
"It is not every bargain which necessity may induce one man to
offer that another is at liberty to accept."
3 (1734) 3 P.Wms. 290.
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assignment he would, have set it aside "as heing an -unreasonable
advantage made of a necessitous man; but seeing the /plaintiff/
was afterwards fully apprised of every thing ... and since not the
least fraud or surprize had appeared on the part of the defendant""'"
the court could not intervene. As the bargaining handicap attach¬
ing to the plaintiff at the time of the assignment had, as a result
of the legacy subsequently having become due, been removed by the
time of the confirmation, fraud could not be presumed any more.
The position at the end of the eighteenth century can be
summarised by saying that relief was given to an expectant heir
who, in anticipation of his expectancy, had concluded an unfair
contract in respect of his expectancy. This situation continued
2
well into the nineteenth century. Protection had to some extent
become an incident of status. Sir George Jessel M.R. reflected the
true practice of the courts when he said:
The point to be considered is, was this a hard bargain?
The doctrine has nothing to do with fraud ... It has been
laid down in case after case that the Court, wherever there
is a dealing of this kind, looks at the reasonableness of
the bargain, and if it is what is called a hard bargain,
sets it aside.3
Ibid., 294. The same effect was given to a subsequent confirm¬
ation in Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen (l75l) 2 Ves. 125, but
in Baugh v. Price (1752) 1 Wils. K.B.J20, Baron Smythe refused to
give effect to a confirmation on the ground that the heir was not
fully apprised of the facts when he made the confirmation.
See hewton v. Hunt (1832) 5 Sim.511 where an agreement was set
aside despite the fact that throughout the negotiations the plain¬
tiff had the advice and assistance of an experienced solicitor;
Davies v. Cooner (1840) 5 My. & Cr. 270; Edwards v. Burt
(1852) 2 De G.M. & G. 55; St. Albyn v. Harding (1859) 27 Beav.ll;
Bromley v. Smith (1859) 26 Beav. 644.
^
Benyon v. Cook (1875) L.R.10 Ch.App. 389, 391.
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The nineteenth century brought about significant changes
in relation to the determination of the fairness or adequacy of
consideration. At an early stage a practice developed to transfer
the burden of proving substantive fairness on to the defendant."'"
This procedural handicap could in itself be extremely hazardous to
the defendant. As the adequacy of consideration could not, in
theory at least, be determined with the benefit of hindsight, but
depended upon circumstances prevailing at the time of the conclusion
of the contract the defendant could be prevented from discharging
the burden of proof merely because the lapse of time between the
conclusion of the transaction and the bringing of the action for
2
relief had led to a loss of relevant evidence. The defendant's
predicament was also worsened by the fact, frequently acknowledged
by the courts, but seldom employed in the defendant's favour, that
it was often extremely difficult to determine the value of a con¬
tingent future interest. In the main,the courts, in accordance
with their view that the expectant heir was particularly deserving
of judicial protection, preferred to err in his favour.
The courts' determination to protect their charge was also
evident from their strict application of the requirement of adequacy
3
of consideration. In Underhill v. Horwood Lord Eldon L.C.
required that the "real" value of the annuity should have been given.
^
Gowland v. De Faria (1810) 17 Ves. 20.
See, for example, Salter v. Bradshaw (1858) 26 Beav. 161.
5 (1804) 10 Ves. 209.
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This was something different from the market value: "/t7he market
1 2
price may be under the value." And in Gowland v. De Faria , Sir
William Grant M.R. maintained that the defendant had to show that
"full" value, which was interpreted as the actuarial value, had
3
been given. The only situation where the actuarial value-standard
was not adhered to was where the reversionary interest was bought
4
at a public auction.
5
It was suggested by Lord Brougham L.C. in King v. Hamlet
that
the extraordinary protection given in the general case must
be withdrawn, if it shall appear that the transaction was
known to the father or other person standing in loco parentis.
However that notion was frequently attacked in later cases and in
Talbot v. Staniforth^ the Vice-Chancellor said that it only meant
that where the heir acted with the best protection and advice avail¬
able he might be presumed to have got a fair market price, but that
no further inference would be drawn from that fact.
1
Ibid.. 220.
2 (1810) 17 Ves. 20.
^
See also Ryle v. Swindells (1824) M'Cl. 519; Hincksman v. Smith
(1827) 3 Russ. 433.
^
Shelly v. Nash (1818) Madd. 232. In Fox v. Wright (l82l) 6 Madd.
Ill, Sir John Leach V.C. held that a sale of post-obit bonds
without reserve at an auction did not necessarily fall within the
rule in Shelly v. Nash as it should have been clear that the heir
was in distress and needed money so much that he undertook with
the bidders not to take such precautions by which every provident
seller at an auction protects himself against an inadequate price.
5 (1834) 2 My. & K. 456, 474.
6
(1861) 1 J. & H. 484.
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This extremely strict attitude held sway for a while until
it became evident to the courts that a value which was unrealizeable
in practice was unacceptable as a standard of adequate consideration,
and as a result, a shift occurred in favour of the market price.
Where the market price was difficult to establish the courts accepted
2
two-thirds of the actuarial value as an acceptable yardstick.
At the same time that the standard of adequacy was relaxed a
tendency grew up to require the most rigorous adherence to that
yardstick, and especially during the late 1850s and 1860s the most
slender difference between the market value and the amount actually
advanced to the expectant heir was a sufficient cause to set aside
the transaction. The defendant had to show that he gave the "just"
value, or paid a "fair, sufficient and full price" - giving "sub-
3
stantial value" was not enough.
Such over-enthusiasm by the courts eventually moved the
legislature to pass the Sales of Reversions Act 1867, which in
section 1 provided that
Wo purchase, made bona fide and without Fraud or unfair
Dealing, of any Reversionary Interest in Real or Personal
Estate shall hereafter be opened or set aside merely on the
Ground of Undervalue.4
1
Headon v. Rosher (1825)M'C1. & Yo. 89; Potts v. Curtis (1832)
Yo. 543; Earl of Aldborough v. Trye (1840) 7 C.& F. 436.
^
Potts v. Curtis (1832) Yo. 543.
^ In Edwards v. Browne (1845) 2 Coll. 100, the sale of a reversion¬
ary interest worth between £1,950 and £2,800, but sold for £1,700
was set aside; Foster v. Roberts (l86l) 29 Beav. 467 - The bona
fide purchase of a reversionary interest worth £400 for £370 set
aside; Jones v. Ricketts (1862) 31 Beav. 130 - A purchase of a
reversionary interest for £200 was set aside on the sole ground
that the purchaser had paid £38 less than its real value.
^
The Sales of Reversions Act, 1867, has been replaced by the Law
of Property Act 1925, section 174.
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This provision not only had a limited scope, but it was also,
consistent with its language, very narrowly construed to pertain
only to those transactions where undervalue was the only ground of
2
relief. The Act could thus not prevent the giving of relief where
"necessity" or "oppression" etc. was hauled in as an additional ground.
3
In Earl of Aylesford v. Morris. Lord Selborne L.C. in an
obiter dictum reviewed the effect of that Act and the abolition of
the usury laws upon the jurisdiction relating to transactions with
heirs. His Lordship said:
The usury laws proved to be an inconvenient fetter upon
the liberty of commercial transactions; and the arbitrary
rule of equity as to sales of reversions was an impediment
to fair and reasonable, as well as to unconscionable,
bargains. Both have been abolished by the Legislature;
but the abolition of the usury laws still leaves the
nature of the bargain capable of being a note of fraud in
the estimation of this Court; and the Act as to sales of
reversions ... is carefully limited to purchases made
bona fide and without fraud or unfair dealing, and leaves
under-value still a material element in cases in which it
is not the sole equitable ground for relief. These changes
in the law have in no degree whatever altered the onus
probandi in those cases, which, according to the
language of Lord Hardwicke, raise 'from the circumstances
or conditions of the parties contracting - weakness on one
side, usury on the other, or extortion, or advantage taken
of that weakness' - a presumption of fraud. Fraud does
not here mean deceit or circumvention; it means an un¬
conscientious use of the power arising out of these circum¬
stances and conditions; and when the relative position of
the parties is such as prima facie to raise this presumption,
the transaction cannot stand unless the person claiming the
benefit of it is able to repel the presumption by contrary
evidence, proving it in point of fact fair, just, and
reasonable.^
As the Act referred only to reversionary interests some transact¬
ions which also fell within the scope of this jurisdiction, such
as those relating to post-obit bonds, were not affected.
^
See Miller v. Cook (1870) L.R. 10 Eq.641; Tyler v. Yates (l87l)
L.R.Ch.App. 665; In re Slater's Trusts (1879) 11 Ch.D.227.




Lord Selborne's reasoning was accepted in some later cases
but the question whether inadequacy of consideration could per se
be proof of unfair dealing continued to plague the courts. In
2
O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke the majority of the House of Lords declined
to intervene in the transaction despite the undervalue because
there was no fraud and the agreement was made in good faith. On
3the other hand, in Brenchley v. Higgins it was suggested in an
obiter dictum that undervalue alone may amount to evidence of un¬
fair dealing so as to take a cause out of the limitation imposed
by the Sales of Reversions Act.
Where it was the expectant heir who came to the Chancery
Courts for relief and the court decided that it was a proper case
for intervention the transaction was generally set aside and the
heir made liable only for the amount which he had actually received
plus interest at a rate determined by the court. In a small number
of cases, however, it was not the heir, but his counterparty who
came to court claiming specific performance of the agreement and
in such a case the courts could, of course, refuse this by employing
4
the usual tests of fairness required for specific performance.
1
Benyon v. Cook (1875) L.R. 10 Ch.App. 389, 392; O'Rorke v. Boling-
broke (1877) 2 App.Cas. 814.
2 (1877) 2 App.Cas. 814.
3 (1900) 12 Digest 140.
^
See for example Beckley v. Newland (1723) 2 P.Wms. 182;
Harwood v. Tooke (1812) 2 Sim. 192; Hobson v. Trevor (1723)
2 P.Wms. 191.
93
(iii) Taking Advantage of Weakness and Necessity"*"
The jurisdiction against catching bargains with expectant
heirs was the oldest of the various branches of equitable fraud.
Co-existing and closely intertwined with it was another kind of
fraud which according to Lord Hardwicke
may be presumed from the circumstances and condition
of the parties contracting ... /I7t is wisely established
in this court to prevent taking surreptitious advantage
of the weakness and necessity of another: which knowingly
to do is equally against the conscience as to take advant¬
age of his ignorance: a person is equally unable to judge
for himself in one as the other.^
3
In the later case of Nevill v. Snelling, Denman J., in
setting aside on equitable terms certain moneylending transactions
which stipulated for an exorbitant rate of interest, characterised
the jurisdiction as follows:
The real question in every case seems to me to be the same
as that which arose in the case of the expectant heirs and
reversioners before the special doctrine in their favour
was established - that is to say, whether the dealings
have been fair, and whether undue advantage has been taken
by the money lender of the weakness or necessities of the
person raising the money. Sometimes extreme old age has
been taken advantage of, and the transaction set aside.
Sometimes great distress. Sometimes infancy has been
imposed upon, and transactions, though ratified at the full
age, have been set aside because of the original vice with
which they were tainted. In every case the Court has to
look at all the circumstances. In some cases may result
the conclusion that there exists mere inadequacy of price,
or exorbitance of interest charged, in which case the trans¬
action will not be interfered with. But in others taking
the whole history together, it may present so many features
of unconscientiousness, extortion, and unfair dealing on the
See generally, Sheridan, Fraud in Equity, 73-86.
^
Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen (l75l) 2 Ves. 125> 155-156.
3 (1880) 15 Ch.D. 679.
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one side and weakness on the other, as to compel the Court
to exercise its equitable jurisdiction, at all events so
far as to restrain the profits of the money lender within
fair and reasonable bounds."'"
The types of transaction to which this branch of equitable
fraud has been applied are numerous and include sales and purchases
2 3
of land or interests in land, of shares in sailors' prizemoney ,
4 5
of shares in estates, moneylending transactions, lease agreements,
7 8
a conveyance of interests in premises, mortgage agreements,
9 10
assignations, and voluntary settlements and conveyances. The
courts have been particularly strict where the latter type of trans¬
actions have been involved and in Phillips v. Mullings"^ it was
intimated that a voluntary settlement will be set aside unless it
can be shown that all its provisions are proper and usual, and if
there are unusual provisions, that they were brought to the notice




Slator v. Nolan (1876) I.R.ll Eq. 367; Butler v. Miller (1867)
I.R. 1 Eq.195; Baker v. Monk (I864) 4 De G.J. & S. 388.
^
How v. Weldon & Edwards (1754) 2 Ves. 516; Baldwin & Alder v.
Rochford (1748) 1 Wils. K.B. 229.
^
Sturge v. Sturge (1849) 12 Beav. 229; Wood v. Abrey (1818)
3 Madd.417.
5
Nevill v. Snelling (1880) 15 Ch.D.679; Stanhope v. Cope (l74l)
2 Atk. 231; Rich v. Sydenham (l67l) 1 Ch.Ca. 202.
^
Willan v. Willan (1814) 2 Dow 274.
^
Creswell v. Potter /I978/ 1 W.L.R. 255; Backhouse v. Backhouse
/I9787 1 W.L.R. 243.
^
Pord v. Olden (I867) 3 L.R. Eq. 461; Cockell v. Taylor (1852) 15
Beav. 103.
^
Maskeen v. Cole (1733) 2 Madd. 421n. - assignation of conditional
legacy; M'Diarmid v. M'Diarmid (1828) 3 Bli.N.S.374; Selby v.
Jackson (1844) 6 Beav. 192.
Blachford v. Christian (1829) 1 Kn.73; Grealish v. Murphy (1946)
I.R. 35; Forshaw v. Welsby (i860) 30 Beav. 243.
11 (1871) 7 L.R.Ch.App. 244.
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The relation between the two main branches of equity's
jurisdiction against fraud, the doctrine against catching bargains
with heirs and that against taking unfair advantage of weakness and
necessity, was a close one, and although it cannot be said that the
latter developed solely out of the former, it is nevertheless true
that the insights which were gained from the jurisdiction against
catching bargains with heirs were instrumental in the rapid develop¬
ment of the latter. It has been noted before that although the
protection of heirs arose initially because of narrow class-based
objectives the fact that a contracting heir often suffered from
mental or physical disability or was commercially inexperienced,
poor or under economic pressure soon came to be regarded as equally
compelling reasons why the courts should intervene to give such parties
relief from disadvantageous contracts. This enlarged perspective
had a profound effect on equity's jurisdiction; not only was the
protected class of expectant heir widened as a result, but the courts
also began to relieve where no heir was involved and where the only
impeaching factor apart from the unfairness of the transaction, lay
in the inequality between the parties. Initially the causes of
inequality of which the courts took note was of the more obvious
kind, like mental weakness or disease. But as the courts became
more confident about the propriety of intervening on the basis of
inequality between the parties, the variety of causes of inequality
of which cognisance was taken increased and came to include such
factors as social and economic deprivation.
In order to constitute fraud in the sense in which the term
96
is used here it was necessary to show firstly, that at the time of
the conclusion of the contract the disadvantaged party was suffering
from a specific bargaining handicap which rendered him particularly
vulnerable to imposition by the defendant and secondly, that this
inequality between the parties had in fact been taken advantage of
by the defendant. A host of terms other than "taking advantage of"
was used by the courts to convey the same meaning, for example "oppress",
"exploit", "coerce", "contrive" or "overreach". Just as was the
case under equity's jurisdiction against catching bargains with heirs
the requirement that advantage had been taken of the plaintiff's
handicap was here inferred from the unfairness of the transaction:
where a party who, because of his particular handicap, was liable
to be taken advantage of concluded an unfair contract with a stronger
party, the unfairness was generally sufficient to show that he had in
fact been taken advantage of. The function of the terms such as
"imposition" was merely to provide a causal link between the dis¬
advantage attaching to the plaintiff and the unfairness of the con¬
tract. The 3aw has been reluctant to set aside contracts solely
because of inadequacy of consideration and at the same time bargain¬
ing handicaps such as those that were regarded as relevant in this
jurisdiction were never recognised to be in themselves a cause for
giving relief from a transaction. It was therefore necessary to
combine these two factors so as to form a ground for relief which
did not rest solely on the one or the other.
It was not necessary that the disadvantage or bargaining
handicap of the weaker party be caused or aggravated by the stronger.
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Where, however, the latter did ensnare the weaker, the courts were
all the more ready to grant relief."'" Although it has seldom been
positively stated that the exploiter had to be aware of the plaintiff's
2
weakness and had to appreciate that the contract was unfair,
these facts were usually assumed by the courts and the better
view would be that they were indeed necessary prerequisites for
relief. The cases in which it was said that relief would be given
even if the stronger party was ignorant of the weaker person's
3
disadvantage and of the unfairness, were few.
Wot only did the courts infer fraud from only the inequality
between the parties plus the unfairness of the bargain, but in the
nineteenth century the tendency developed to place on the stronger
party the burden, once the other had proved his bargaining handicap,
4to show that the transaction was fair.
As I have indicated equitable fraud here meant that advan¬
tage had been taken of an inequality between the parties to the con¬
tract. In order to establish the scope of the doctrine it is thus
necessary to determine which characteristics or factors could, in
the view of the courts, indicate that such an inequality existed.
""
Nevill v. Snelling (1880) 15 Ch.D. 679j 696 and the cases there
cited.
2
Except in those cases where an unfair contract had been concluded
with a person who suffered from mental impairment. See nost p.99.
3
See the obiter dictum by Sargent L.J. in York Glass Co.Ltd. v.
Jubb (1925) 134 L.T. 36, 43.
^
Baker v. Monk (I864) 4 Be G. J. & S. 388, 391; Creswell v. Potter
/I97871 W.L.R. 255; Longmate v. Ledger (i860) 2 Giff. 157.
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It is neither possible nor desirable to give an exhaustive list
of the types of weakness which, if taken advantage of, would lead
to a finding of fraud. The question whether a party merited
judicial protection depended upon the disparity of bargaining strength
between the parties rather than upon the specific weakness of one
party. In Slater v. Nolan the Master of the Rolls expressed the
idea as follows:
I take the law of the Court to be that if two persons -
no matter whether a confidential relation exists between
them or not - stand in such a relation to each other that one
can take an undue advantage of the other, whether by reason
of distress or recklessness or wildness or want of care,
and where the facts show that one party has taken undue
advantage of the other, by reason of the circumstances I
have mentioned - a transaction resting upon such uncon¬
scionable dealing will not be allowed to stand: and there
are several cases which show, even where no confidential
relation exists, that, where parties are not on equal terms,
the party who gets a benefit cannot hold it without proving
that everything has been right and fair and reasonable
on his part.-'-
The following classification of factors which the courts
have recognised as leading to inequality between the parties is
thus arbitrary and made solely to facilitate the subsequent discuss¬
ion. The factors which cause an impairment of bargaining power
can be broadly divided into three groups: firstly, a weakening of
the body and/or the mind. Included are mental impairment, intoxi¬
cation, illness or old age; secondly, the inferior social position
or status of a party. Within this category fall poor, illiterate
and uneducated people, the young, and generally those who are under¬
privileged; thirdly, economic necessity and distress. These three
1 (1876) I.R.ll Eq. 367, 386-387.
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categories are not exclusive of each other and frequently a variety
of factors from the different categories concur in one party.
(iiia) Impaired Bargaining; Power arising from a Weakening of
Body and Mind
1. Mental Weakness
At common law the mental disorder of a contracting party
had no effect on the validity of an agreement unless the party could
show that because of his mental incompetence he did not understand
what he was doing and also that the other party to the agreement was
aware of his disorder."'" Mere mental weakness did not affect the
validity of an agreement. Equity on the other hand, gave relief
from an unfair contract on the ground of equitable fraud if one
party suffered from an enfeeblement of the mind even though it may
not have affected his legal capacity, and if such weakness had been
2
taken advantage of . In Harrod v. Harrod, Page Wood V.C. declared
that "if there be no unsoundness but mere dullness of mind, the
3
question becomes entirely one of fraud." The Chancery courts did
not, for the purposes of establishing fraud, distinguish between
4
various degrees of mental weakness.
""
Imperial Loan Co. Ltd., v. Stone (1892) 1 Q.B. 599. This refers
only to mentally disordered people who are not "patients" in terms
of the Mental Health Act 1959. As to the validity at common law
of contracts concluded by mentally disordered people see also Chitty
on Contracts, sections 535-541; W.G.H.Cook, Mental Deficiency and
the English Law of Contract (l92l) 21 Col.L.Rev.424; M.Brown, Can
the Insane Contract? (1933) H Can.Bar Rev. 600.
^
Sheridan, op. cit., 75-78; Browne v. Joddrell (1827) M. & M. 105»
106; Dane v. Viscountess Kirkwall (1858) 8C. & P. 679.
3 (1854) 1 K. & J. 4, 7.
^
Sheridan, c>]d. cit. , 76.
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It is a question of fact whether mental impairment exists
in a particular case. The courts have seldom undertaken an exhaust¬
ive inquiry to determine whether mental weakness existed at the time
that the contract was concluded. The evidence produced is often
of an anecdotal nature or based on the subjective impressions of
1 2
other persons and proof of some eccentricities on the part of the
complainent will usually suffice to establish mental impairment.
Equity has not been, and is not, concerned with the
contractual capacity of a party - it rather aims to protect a
certain class of person who, because of the impairment of his
mental faculties, is regarded as being particularly susceptible to
3
imposition. Alternatively, it is often stated that such a party
is given protection because he is incapable of managing his affairs
4
prudently.
In order to constitute fraud it is necessary to show that
the party suffering from mental impairment had been taken advantage
of or had been imposed upon. This will usually be presumed if
the contract is itself unfair and the defendant was aware of the
plaintiff's weakness. M.D. Green has found that in American law -
Gibson v. Jeyes (l80l) 6 Ves. 266 - woman of old age whose mind
had suffered as a result of the shock her health had received;
Blachford v. Christian (1829) 1 Kn. 73 - aged 74 and in state of
declining physical and mental state; Grealish v. Murphy /l946/
I.R. 35.
2
Longmate v. Ledger (i860) 2 Giff. 157 - so strange and eccentric
that any person who contracted with him would have to show that
contract was fair; Berrnet v. Vade (1742) 9 Mod.312 - believed
that after amputation his toes would grow again.
^
See, for example, Stanhope v. Tonne (1720) 1 Bro.P.C.157, 164;
Baxter v. Earl of Portsmouth (1826) 5 B. & C. 170, 172.
^
See, for example, Gibson v. Jeyes (l80l) 6 Ves. 266, 273; Ball
v. Mannin (1829) 3 Bli.N.S. 1, 12.
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and a careful reading of the caselaw shows that the same is true
of English law - the "abnormality" of the transaction in question
is the major consideration upon which the courts proceed in deciding
whether relief should be given from the transaction."'" The presump¬
tion has been further loaded against the defendant by the tendency
in some cases to throw on the latter the burden of establishing
that "no unfair advantage had been taken of /the plaintiff's/
2
weakness and that he had paid a fair price."
Inequality in the exchange is a relevant consideration
not only to the question of whether the plaintiff was imposed upon
or taken advantage of. It may also be of evidentiary value in
deciding whether the plaintiff did in fact suffer from mental
impairment. If the transaction was grossly unfair it can point
3
to some mental weakness in the plaintiff.
It would be expected from the requirement of imposition
that a mentally impaired party would not be relieved from his con¬
tractual obligations if the defendant was unaware of the impairment
4
and that was indeed the position adopted in a number of cases.
Yet, in York Glass Co. Ltd., v. Jubb, Sargent L.J. declared:
M.D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed
Major Premise (1944) 53 Yale L.J. 271.
^
Longmate v. Ledger (i860) 2 Giff. 157, 164- Also Selby v.
Jackson (1844) 6 Beav. 192, 202.
^ See Green ojd. cit., 304-305.
^ Imperial Loan Co. Ltd. v. Stone (1892) 1 Q.B. 599, 601; Ball v.
Mannin (1829) 3 Bli.N.S.I, 12; Selby v. Jackson (1844) 6 Beav.
192, 199.
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I have looked through a number of cases and I have
not found a single case in which "'a contract has in fact
been binding except where the contract was an ordinary-
reasonable contract."-
His Lordship maintained that his mind was
entirely open on the question whether the fairness of the
bargain is an essential element to the enforceability of
the bargain against a person who was in fact a lunatic
although not known to be such by the other contracting
party.2
In the above quoted case of Harrod v. Harrod, Page Wood V.C.,
when referring to fraud arising from a contract concluded by a
person dull in mind also, declared that "... it is a fraud to induce
3
any person to enter into a contract which she does not understand."
This proposition seems correct. Generally a contract will only
be allowed to stand if the party is capable of -understanding the
4
general purport of a contract when it is explained to him, but
this is a flexible standard and at times the courts have required a
5
high degree of understanding. In Anderson v. Ellsworth for example,
the court set aside a voluntary deed in terms of which an old and
mentally infirm lady conveyed all her property to the defendant.
Despite her weakness she was found capable of transacting business.
The deed and its effects were furthermore fully explained to her
and she understood that she was donating all her belongings to the
1
(1925) 134 L.T. %, 43.
2
Ibid.. 44.
3 (1854) II. & J. 4, 7.
^
Gibbons v. Wright (1954) 91 C.L.R. 423, 483 per Dixon C.J.
5 (1861) 3 Giff. 154.
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defendant. However, the court held that she did not appreciate
the fact that she was immediately divesting herself of all her
property and as this was highly improvident the transaction was set
aside.
Mere non-understanding which cannot be traced to a dis¬
advantage attaching to the party is not a sufficient ground for
judicial intervention, but is ordinarily dealt with under mistake.
Nevertheless, in Phillipson v. Kerry"^ a voluntary deed, executed
by a person who was not of unsound mind, was set aside because
she did not fully understand the nature and effect of the transaction.
2. Intoxication
A person who is in such an extreme state of intoxication
2
that he is deprived of all reason has "no agreeing mind" and is
3
thus incapable of entering into a valid contract. Drunkenness
of a lesser degree does not affect the validity of an agreement at
common law but may in equity lead to relief being given to the
intoxicated person on the ground of fraud.
Even in equity, however, a state of intoxication is not by
itself a sufficient ground either for setting aside an agreement
4
or for refusing it specific performance. This is especially true
1
(1863) 32 Beav. 628.
2
Pitt v. Smith (l81l) 3 Camp. 33, 34.
^ Cooke v. Clavworth (l81l) 18 Ves. 12, 17.
^
Johnson v. Medlicott (1734) 3 P.Wms. 130n.; Cory v. Cory (1747)
1 Ves. 19; Cooke v. Clavworth (l81l) 18 Ves. 12, 16; Blomley
v. Rvan (1956) 99 C.L. R. 362, 403-405.
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where the contract is a fair and reasonable one."'" The courts have
in fact been very careful not to create the impression that a person
can escape his contractual obligations merely by claiming that he
was drunk at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Where,
2
however, the drunkenness was contrived by the counterparty or the
intoxicated person taken advantage of by leading him into an un¬
fair contract, then he might he a proper object for relief in
equity.
•z
In the Australian case of Blomley v. Ryan the court (McTiernan
and Fullagar JJ., and Kitto J. dissenting) made a thorough survey
of the law relating to the effect of intoxication on the validity
of agreements. The question which the court had to answer was
whether a sale, unfair in respect of the price, and one-sided and
oppressive with regard to the general terms, made by an old,
dissolute and habitually drunken person, could be set aside on these
grounds. McTiernan J. held that these facts constituted equitable
fraud,
the essence of /which/ is that advantage was taken of weak¬
ness, ignorance and other disabilities on the side of the
respondent and the contract was derived from such behaviour
and ... is an unfair bargain.4
And for the purposes of establishing equitable fraud no distinction
was to be drawn between intoxication and any other disabilities by
4
Cory v. Cory (1747) 1 Ves. 19.
2
See Say v. Barwick (1812) IV. & B. 195.




which parties may be affected: they all have the "common character¬
istic ..• that they have the effect of placing one party at a
serious disadvantage vis-a-vis the other""'" Having thus establish¬
ed that the effect of drunkenness on the validity of agreements,
rather than being a separate rubric, formed part of a wider juris¬
diction in terms of which judicial protection is given to all parties
suffering from impaired bargaining power, McTiernan J. expressed
full accord with the statement by Lord Selborne L.C. that
/w7hen the relative position of the parties is such
as -prima facie to raise /the presumption of fraud/, the
transaction cannot stand -unless the person claiming the
benefit of it is able to repel the presumption by contrary
evidence, proving it to have been in point of fact fair,
just, and reasonable.2
His Lordship continued:
This principle of relief is not limited to transactions
with expectants. 'It has been extended to all cases in
which the parties to a contract have not met upon equal
terms'"3
Unlike lunacy or mental incompetency which is generally a
continual state,^ even an alcoholic has moments of sobriety. It
Ibid., 405 per Fullagar J. See also M'Diarmid v. M'Diarmid (1828)
3 Bli.N.S. 374.
^
Earl of Aylesford v. Morris (1873) L.R. 8 Ch.App. 484, 491 cited
in Blomley v. Ryan (1956) 99 C.L.R. 362, 386.
^ Blomley v. Ryan (1956) 99 C.L.R. 362, 386 per McTiernan J.
citing from White and Tudor's Equity Cases 7th ed. (1897) vol. 1,
p.313.
^
See, however, Selby v. Jackson (1844) 6 Beav. 192 where the court
refused to set aside two deeds despite the fact that they were
executed by the plaintiff while he was in a lunatic asylum. It
was, however, proved that he understood the nature and effect
of the documents and that they were perfectly fair.
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is consequently not always possible to trace a contract to an
actual state of intoxication. In Dunnage v. White4 where an heir
who had habits of intoxication, surrendered an unimpeachable title
when sober, the court made no attempt to connect the general
incapacitating habits of the heir with the execution of the deed,
but maintained that
/s/uch habits, though not constituting an absolute
incapacity, lay a ground for strict examination, whether
the instrument contains in itself evidence that advan¬
tage was taken.2
Sir Thomas Plumer M.R. held that although there was no undue
influence, the fact that the heir was ignorant of his rights, dis¬
solute and illiterate and that there was a great inequivalence in
3
the values exchanged sufficiently showed that the heir was im¬
posed upon and that therefore the transaction could not stand.
3. Illness and other bodily disabilities
The considerations which lead to the setting aside of un¬
fair bargains entered into by parties who suffer from a weakening
of the bodily faculties are similar to those which operate in
respect of the classes of mental weakness and intoxication.
The courts do not look favourably upon transactions conclud-
4ed by people on their deathbed. In Willan v. Willan an agreement,
1 (1818) 1 Swan 137.
2
Ibid.. 150.
^ See also M'Diarmid v. M'Diarmid (1828) 3 Bli. U.S. 374; Dunnage v.
White (1818) 1 Swan 137. "
4 (1814) 2 Dow 274.
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unfair -with, regard to both the consideration and the provisions in
respect of renewal, was set aside, having been obtained from a
person who was on his deathbed and "in such a state of bodily and
mental imbecility as rendered him incapable of transacting business
which required deliberation and reflection."^ Lord Redesdale asked
whether, even if there had been no evidence of imbecility,
such an agreement, made under such circumstances, would
not be set aside on the ground of surprise and mis¬
apprehension. 2
3
And in Forshaw v. Welsby the court set aside an irrevocable settle¬
ment on his family, made by a person in extremis. Sir John Romilly
M.R. held that despite the fact that no undue influence or pressure
was used by the relations an agreement which could function as
improvidently as this one would not be allowed to stand unless the
person making the settlement was able to form a "cool and uncontrolled
4
judgment with respect to his position." In most of the transactions
involving gifts or settlements for which no consideration is given in
return the unfairness lies in the fact that the donor or person making
the settlement divests himself permanently of the whole or a large
portion of his property. Consequently, where the disposition con¬
tains a power of revocation, that will generally be sufficient to








See, for example, Anderson v. Ellsworth (l86l) 3 Giff. 154.
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advantage of. A disposition will, however, be set aside, not¬
withstanding the inclusion of a revocation clause, where such power
is likely to be useless, as for example, where the transaction is
concluded a few hours before the death of the person making the gift
or the settlement."'"
The courts also take account of lesser physical defects
2 3
such as deafness and infirmity caused by old age.
In Longmate v. Ledger an old man of feeble intellect sold
his property at a great undervalue to one of his creditors. Sir
John Stuart V.C. declared:
By the settled doctrine of this Court, in order to have a
valid contract or conveyance of property there must be a
reasonable degree of equality between the contracting
parties. In this case it is established by the evidence
that the property was sold for a price greatly below the
value. This circumstance, of itself, might not be
sufficient to invalidate the transaction. But when there
is the additional fact that the vendor was a man advanced
in years and known to be of a weak and eccentric disposit¬
ion, and at the time of the sale was without the assistance
of a disinterested legal adviser, there exists on the whole
case such an inequality between the contracting parties
that it is to my mind impossible for the Court to recog¬
nise the claim of the Defendant to hold his property under
the contract, except as a security for the payment of the
monies which have actually been advanced.^
The old man was so peculiar, the Vice-Chancellor continued, that any¬
one contracting with him would have to show that he had not taken
unfair advantage of his weakness and that he had been paid a fair
price. Mere old age is, however, not sufficient to show that a
4
See Fane v. Duke of Devonshire (1718) 6 Bro.P.C.137.
2
Ferres v. Ferres (1708) 2 Eq. Ca.Ab.695; Torrance v. Bolton
(1872) 8 L.R.Ch.App. 118.
^ Anderson v. Ellsworth (l86l) 3 Giff. 154; M'Diarmid v. M'Diarmid
(1828) 3 Bli.N.S. 374; Longmate v. Lodger (i860) 2 Giff. 157; Blach-
ford v. Christian (1829) 1 Kn.73; Grealish v. Murphy /l9467l.R.35:
Blomley v. Ryan (1956) 99 C.L.R.362.




person is unable to protect his interests and is consequently a
target for imposition. Old age is, therefore, generally used as
evidence of impaired bargaining power in conjunction with other
examples of personal inequality such as mental impairment or intoxi¬
cation. In these cases the test used to determine whether
a party's bargaining power was in fact impaired by his disability
was to ask whether he or she understood the nature and effect of the
transaction.
In the cases concerning agreements obtained by medical
doctors or dentists from ill patients in return for professional
care the courts have been even more ready to grant relief. In
2
Popham v. Brooke Sir John Leach M.R. declared that even if the patient
had understood the nature and effect of the transaction the court
would not have countenanced an agreement where the defendant was
aware that the patient would not live long and thus knew that the
consideration which he would be giving in return was grossly
inadequate. And in Dent v. Bennett, Lord Cottenham L.C. said:
... when I find an agreement, so extravagant in its provis¬
ions, secretly obtained by a medical attendant from his
patient, of a very advanced age, and carefully concealed
from his professional advisers and all other persons, and
have it proved that the habits, views, and intentions of
the testator were wholly inconsistent with those provisions,
I cannot but come to the conclusion that the medical attend¬
ant did obtain it by some dominion exercised over his patient.
How it was effected, whether by direct fraud, or by what
other means, the Defendant has, by the secrecy of the trans¬
action, prevented my having any direct testimony. By
that he cannot profit.3
^
Lewis v. Pead (1789) 1 Ves. 19.
2 (1828) 5 Russ. 8.
^ (1839) 4 My. & Cr. 269, 277. See also Allen v. Davies (1850)
4 De G. & S. 133.
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These cases will now probably fall within the category where undue
influence is presumed from the relationship of the parties.
Similar considerations apply where the defendant, aware
that the plaintiff is dying, buys a reversionary interest from him
for an amount which, because of the fact that the plaintiff is
dying and that he is not, as he himself believes, a good life, is
grossly below the true value in the circumstances."*"
(iiib) Impaired bargaining -power caused by inferior social status
or position of one party
Courts have also given relief where unfair advantage had
been taken of a bargaining weakness which resulted from a person's
status, material circumstances or lack of education. More specific¬
ally, it has been recognised that a disparity in bargaining strength
might be caused by poverty, illiteracy or a general lack of education
and that the young, sailors and generally the underprivileged,should
be given judicial protection.
It may seem curious today to regard being a sailor as a
mark of bargaining weakness. Yet, in.the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries courts frequently adopted a paternalistic attitude
2
towards sailors. In How v. Weldon and Edwards, Sir Thomas Clarke
M.R. maintained that sailors should be regarded in the same light
as heirs because they are "a race of men, loose and unthinking, who
3
will almost for nothing part with what they have acquired." And
"*"
Davies v. Cooper (1840) 5 My. & Cr. 270.
2 (1754) 2 Ves. 516.
^
Ibid., 518. Also Baldwin & Alder v. Rochford (1748) 1 Wils. K.B.
229; Taylour v. Rochfort (l75l) 2 Ves. 281.
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in Stilwell v. Wilkens4 a purchase at great undervalue was set aside
because it was "procured from a person who could not possibly judge
for himself; the young man was a common sailor, lately come ashore,
2
and much pressed for money."
Although a sailor was regarded as per se at a disadvantage
vis-a-vis his counterparty that fact was not in itself a sufficient
3
ground for relief. In Griffith v. Spratley a "sailor in distressed
4
circumstances and oppressed by his creditors" sold his interest in
an estate to a "broker living on the estate, and understanding the
5
value of it." Yet Eyre L.C.B. refused relief because the undervalue
complained of was so small that it was impossible "to infer an undue
advantage (which implies intention) taken of the necessities of a
man, such as to authorize the Court to relieve on the ground of fraud
and imposition."^
The cases in which sailors as a group were given special
protection were few and they generally also provide evidence that
the sailor was financially distressed or that he entered into the
contract under economic necessity, so that the cases could equally
have proceeded on these grounds. Although the policy of singling













the cases were important in that they indicated the willingness of
the courts to extend their protection not only to individuals, but
to a whole class of people, if they thought that they were by nature
unable to take care of their interests or that they were liable to
be imposed upon.
Similar protection was given to the young. In Nevill v.
Snelling^a young man began borrowing money at an exorbitant rate of
interest from a moneylender when he was still a minor. The trans¬
actions continued after he had reached majority. The plaintiff
was not an expectant heir of the type which fell within the scope
of the previously examined branch of fraud, but had general expect¬
ations from a wealthy father. Nevertheless, Denman J., in setting
aside the transactions except insofar as they should stand as security
for the sums actually advanced plus 5 per cent interest, stated that
there was little difference in principle between the transactions in
that case and the catching bargains with heirs from which equity
habitually relieved.His Lordship admitted that it did not follow
... because the transactions may have been most usurious,
that they ought to be set aside, or that the Defendant
ought to be deprived of the bargain into which he may have
led a foolish and improvident young man, provided it really
was a bargain understood by both parties, and entered into
under such circumstances as to shew mere folly and extrava¬
gance on the one side, and mere usury on the other.2
But relief could be given
upon the general principles of Equity, which lay it down
that unfair and unconscionable dealings with a person
whose position renders him too weak to resist rapacity,
and avarice, and unfair dealing ... ought to be repressed.
1





However, the majority of cases in this category has been
concerned with weakness arising from such factors as poverty and
1 2
humbleness of position , illiteracy or general lack of education .
The relevance to modern law of some of these factors has recently
3
been examined in two cases, Creswell v. Potter and Backhouse v.
4
Backhouse. In Creswell v. Potter, a wife who was in the process of
getting a divorce executed a deed of release and conveyed, at a con¬
siderable undervalue, her interest in premises of which she and her
husband were joint tenants, to her husband. The wife subsequently
brought an action, claiming that the release should be set aside.
Megarry J., in granting the wife's request, accepted as a correct expos-
5ition of the law, Kay J.'s statement in Fry v. Lane that
J_t/he circumstances of poverty and ignorance of the vendor,
and absence of independent advice, throw upon the purchaser,
when the transaction is impeached, the onus of proving,
in Lord Selborne's words, that the purchase was 'fair, just,
and reasonable'
See, for example, Clarkson v. Hanway (1723) 2 P.Wms. 203; Proof
v. Hines (1735) Cas. Temp. Talb. Ill; Taylour v. Rochfort (l75l)
2 Ves. 281; Evans v. Llewellin (1787) 1 Cox C.C.333; Griffith v.
Spratley (1787) 1 Cox 383; Baker v. Monk (I864) 4 De G.F. & J.401;
Cockell v. Taylor (1852) 15 Beav. 103; Clark v. Malpas (1862) 4
De G.F. & J. 401; Prees v. Coke (l87l) 6 L.R.Ch.App. 645; Fry v.
Lane (1888) 40 Ch.D.312.
p
See, for example, Proof v. Hines (1735) Cas.Temp. Talb.Ill;
Garvey v. McMinn (1846) 9 Ir.Eq. 526; Clark v. Malpas (1862)
4 De. G.F. & J. 401.
3 /I9787 1 W.L.R. 255.
4 /I9787 1 W.L.R. 243-
5 /I9787 1 W.L.R. 255, 257.
^
(1888) 40 Ch.D. 312, 322. The statement by Lord Selborne L.C.
was made in Earl of Aylesford v. Morris (1873) 8 Ch.App. 484, 491.
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As social conditions today were different from those prevailing when
Fry v. Lane was decided Megarry J. suggested that "member of the lower
income group"4 now be substituted for "poor" and "less highly educated"
take the place of "ignorant". However, these were not the only
circumstances which would invoke the aid of equity: "circumstances
3of oppression or abuse of confidence" might also be sufficient.
Megarry J. furthermore accepted that the wife, who was a
Post Office telephonist, with slender means and little savings, fell
within the category of the less highly educated. And although he
did not doubt her skill as a telephonist, he thought that in the
context of property transactions generally, and the execution of
conveyancing documents in particular, she could properly be described
4
as "ignorant". It is therefore clear that it is not necessary to
prove an all-pervading ignorance - it is merely required that the
plaintiff be inexperienced in the context of the particular trans¬
action.
5
In Backhouse v. Backhouse the court had to deal with a
similar problem and although the issue was eventually decided on
other grounds, Balcombe J. accepted the principles set out in Creswell
v. Potter. In addition, his Lordship stated that emotional strain
g
might also be considered as a mark of inequality.











Why do the poor, the humble and other similarly disadvantaged
parties merit protection? Initially it was said that the courts
intervened because such people were less able to protect themselves
against oppression or imposition.^" In the second half of the nine¬
teenth century the focus of the courts was transferred from the
specific weakness of the party to the unequal positions of the con¬
tracting parties or to the disparity in bargaining strength between
2
them. In substance there was no difference between the earlier
and the later approaches, except that the latter indicated a wider
perspective on the part of the courts. Central to both was the
notion that where there existed between the parties a great disparity
in the respective levels of knowledge, judgment, experience and general
commercial sophistication, the party in the inferior position was, in
the view of the courts, more liable to be taken advantage of. Such
parties were regarded as at a disadvantage vis-a-vis more affluent
and commercially experienced parties with regard to both understanding
the nature and effect of the trasaction and the negotiation of the
terms.
It is clear that in this area, just as in the category
dealing with a party's bodily and mental weakness, a lack of under¬
standing or ignorance of the issues involved and the inequality be¬
tween the parties were closely interrelated and were jointly caused
by the plaintiff's general station in life. The plaintiff's lack
of understanding or ignorance usually took the form of an ignorance
Proof v. Hines (1735) Cas.Temp.Talb. Ill; Evans v. Llewellin (1787)
1 Cox, C.C.333.
2
Baker v. Monk (I864) 4 De G.J. & S.388; Howley v. Cook (1873) I.R.8
Eq. 570; Fry v. Lane (1888) 40 Ch.D.312; Slater v. Nolan (1876)
I.R.ll Eq.367; Earl of Aylesford v. Morris (1873) L.R.8 Ch.Ann.484;
Nevill v. Snelling; (1880) 15 Ch.D.679; O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke
(1877) 2 App.Cas.814.
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about his existing rights or about the effect of the transaction
which he concluded."'" The central question was thus the extent to
which a plaintiff so afflicted would be allowed to rely on his
ignorance in an action for relief from an unfair contract,
2
The case of Evans v. hlewellin illustrates the length to
which the courts have been prepared to go in protecting the humble
and underprivileged who act in ignorance and inexperience from un¬
fair bargains. Plaintiff, a person "in mean circumstances", re¬
ceived two hundred guineas for the sale of his property of which the
actual value was £1,700. The defendant informed the plaintiff of
this fact and asked him to take some time considering the deal and
discuss it with friends. He refused and insisted on executing it
immediately. Sir Lloyd Kenyon M.R., in relieving plaintiff from the
agreement, laid great stress upon the fact that he was poor and unaware
of his rights and said that
the party was taken by surprise; he had not sufficient
time to act with caution; and therefore though there was
no actual fraud, it is something like fraud, for an undue
advantage was taken of his situation. The cases ... all
proceed on the same general principle, and establish this,
that if a party is in a situation, in which he is not a
free agent, and is not equal to protecting himself, this
Court will protect him.
It has to be remembered, however, that the mere fact that a party
did not understand a transaction did not necessarily lead to relief
being given by the courts. There are many cases where a person,
Hobert v. Hobert (l683) 2 Ch.Ca. 159; Preston v. Wasey (1697)
Pr. Ch. 76; Taylour v. Rochfort (l75l) 2 Ves. 281; Strachan v.
Brander (1759) 1 Ed. 303; Evans v. Llewellin (1787) 1 Cox C.C.333;
Sturge v. Sturge (1849) 12 Beav. 229; Summers v. Griffiths (1866)
35 Beav. 27; Fry v. Lane (1888) 40 Ch.D. 312; Howley v. Cook
(1873) I.R.8 Eq. 570.
2 (1787) 1 Cox C.C. 333.
5 Ibid., 340.
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while not suffering from a bargaining handicap which places him at a
disadvantage vis-a-vis his counterparty, is induced into a contract
which he does not understand. Unless the courts regarded his
insufficiency of understanding as in itself a mark of inequality
between the parties, the problem was dealt with under the prin¬
ciples of mistake and not equitable fraud.
(iiic) Impaired bargaining power resulting from economic necessity
and distress
There have also been cases which support the view that
where a necessitous or financially distressed party concluded a
contract and such necessity was exploited so that the counterparty
gained an unfair advantage, the courts would intervene to set aside
the contract. Chancery courts often referred to contracts of this
nature as "oppressive" bargains."*"
2
In Pickett v. Loggon, Lord Chancellor Eldon was not pre¬
pared to state affirmatively whether a contract by which a "valuable
property had been acquired" for a sum that was
very inadequate, ... would have been reached by the doctrine
of this Court; protecting, upon public principles, persons
in distress; who, ... acting under the influence of that
distress, though with knowledge of the circumstances, are
to have the same protection, as if they were entirely ig¬
norant: being compelled by hard necessity.3
Lord Eldon's approach was over-cautious. Necessity and economic
distress had by that time long been recognised as evidence of
"*"
See, for example, Lawley v. Hooper (1745) 3 Atk. 278, 279.
2 (1807) 14 Ves. 215.
5 Ibid.. 240.
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inequality between the parties, and as early as 1745 Lord Hardwicke
had declared that "wherever /the Chancery courts/ have found the
least tincture of fraud in any of these oppressive bargains, relief
hath always been given."4
The nineteenth century provided many cases where a party's
necessity or distress was a factor which induced the courts to
2
relieve from an unfair contract. In Wood v. Abrey two reversioners
had sold an estate worth £1,600 for £400. Sir John Leach V.C.,
after stating that inadequacy of price was not in itself a sufficient
basis for relief, said:
But a Court of Equity will inquire whether the parties
really did meet on equal terms; and if it be found that
the vendor was in distressed circumstances, and that
advantage was taken of that distress, it will avoid the
contract.^
The grounds upon which the courts proceed was clearly stated in the
4
important case of Barret v. Hartley. The plaintiff had filed a
bill to set aside a memorandum stipulating for a large sum to be
paid to the defendant as a bonus for acting as trustee and for
advancing certain monies to the plaintiff and his father. The
plaintiff averred that the bonus was not owed and that the memo¬
randum was only agreed to because of their financial distress. Sir
John Stuart V.C., in setting aside the memorandum, held:
4
Lawley v. Hooper (1745) 3 Atk.278, 279. See also Maskeen v. Cole
(1733) 2 Madd. 421n. where the court asserted that had the very
necessitous plaintiff not subsequently confirmed the contract,
relief would have been given; Stanhope v. Cope (l74l) 2 Atk. 231.
2 (1818) 3 Madd. 417.
3 Ibid.. 423.
4 (1866) L.R.2 Eq. 789.
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In order to render a contract, or an agreement of any kind,
binding, there must be the assent of both parties to the
agreement under such circumstances as to shew that there
was no pressure - no influence existing of a kind to make
the assent an imperfect assent, or an assent which, under
other circumstances, would have been refused. If the
assent to the agreement is not an assent given under such
circumstances as that both parties are on an equal footing,
and the agreement one perfectly free from any influence
or pressure, in the eye of this Court, it is not an assent
sufficient to constitute an agreement.^
The Yice-Chancellor added that although the usury laws had been
repealed that only meant that the courts would now employ the
established principles of equity to prevent the exaction of any
2
advantage from a man under grievous necessity and want of money.
The necessity or distress complained of has generally been
of a financial nature. This explains the fact that so many of the
relevant cases involved moneylending transactions, clothed as con-
3 4tracts of sale, or other transfers in return for cash. It was not
necessary to show that the plaintiff was generally poor, although
that would, of course, often have been the case.
In the previous category financial need and poverty were
indicative of the fact that a party was likely to be commercially




Ibid.. 795. See also Ford v. Olden (1867) L.R.3. Eq. 46I; Butler
v. Miller (I867) I.R. 1 Eq. 195.
^
See, for example, Pickett v. Loggon (1807) 14 Ves. 215; Butler
v. Miller (1867) I.R. 1 Eq. 195; Lawley v. Hooper (1745) 3 Atk. 278;
Wood v. Abrey (1818) 3 Madd. 417.
^
See, for example, Maskeen v. Cole (1733) 2 Madd. 421n; Stanhope
v. Cope (l74l) 2 Atk. 231; Ramsbottom v. Parker (l82l) 6 Madd.
5.
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or to protect himself in the bargaining process. Here financial
necessity or distress was regarded as evidence that a party was
compelled to enter into a contract even if he realized that the terms
were harsh or oppressive. Some commentators have construed the
fact that an unfair advantage has been taken of a person in dire
financial need as an example of economic duress, the duress consist¬
ing in the defendant's refusal to contract on fair terms.^ Such a
formulation involves a considerable obfuscation of the actual pro¬
cesses of the court. The courts have given relief in these cases
not because of economic duress exerted by the defendant, but because
the plaintiff's financial need compelled him to enter into the unfair
agreement. Although the dividing line between the two interpretations
of equity's jurisdiction is thin, it is suggested that a formulation in
terms of equitable fraud gives a more accurate reflection of the con¬
siderations of which the courts took account and should thus be accepted
at the expense of a formulation in terms of economic duress.
Although "necessity" occurred mostly in economic form that
was not the only type of necessity or distress of which the courts
took note. A party's geographical position, for example the fact
that he concluded the contract while he was in prison, has also been
recognised as a factor which showed up the inequality between the
2
parties. A person might also, in addition to his financial need,
^
See, for example, J. Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure II (l942)
20N.C.L. Rev. 341, 356-361.
O
Lawley v. Hooper (l745) 5 Atk. 278; Barnard v. Flint (1796)
3 Anst. 734n.
121
suffer from one of the bargaining handicaps already examined. Such
a fact would, of course,have rendered judicial protection even more imp¬
erative .
The courts have never made a serious attempt to define the
economic need or distress which was required for judicial inter¬
vention and in most of the cases they have regarded their task as
complete once they had stated that a plaintiff was "necessitous"
or "distressed". Nevertheless, it does not seem as if it was
necessary to prove that unless the plaintiff concluded the contract
he would have faced economic ruin - a temporary shortage of cash
with which to pay pressing creditors often appeared to constitute
sufficient "necessity". The transactions were frequently attempts
to capitalise assets in order to pay gaming creditors."1"
"Necessity" could also be found where the purpose for which
money was needed was regarded as proper by the courts. In Cockell
2
v. Taylor, a man who needed money for the purpose of prosecuting a
claim in a fund borrowed £1,000 from a solicitor. One of the terms
of the transaction was that he should buy a plot from the latter for
£6,000 - this sum turned out to be ten times more than the value of
the land. In order to complete the deal the borrower mortgaged
his claim in the fund for £6,000. Sir John Romilly M.R. declared
that the inadequacy of the consideration coupled with the circumstances
that this was the only way in which the necessary money could be
1
Stanhope v. Cone (l74l) 2 Atk. 231.
2 (1852) 15 Beav. 103.
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raised, and that the "borrower was almost illiterate, were sufficient
reasons to set aside the transaction - "I am of opinion that this was
a transaction in which advantage was taken of the necessities of the
plaintiff.
It was not necessary to show that the pressure to enter into
the particular contract originated from the defendant. The mere
fact that he exploited an already existing urgent need was sufficient
reason to set the agreement aside.
In this jurisdiction, unlike the cases involving economic
duress, there has been no attempt to determine whether the necessi¬
tous party had an alternative means of alleviating his need.
2
Indeed, in Gwynne v. Heaton. where a young married man who needed
money urgently, entered into a disadvantageous bargain, the fact
that he had hawked around his reversionary interest was regarded as
relevant only in showing that he was in extreme necessity, and in
3
Earl of Avlesford v. Morris, relief was given notwithstanding the
fact that it was the plaintiff who had made the offer.
Standard of Substantive Fairness
The question when a contract would be so unfair that a
party would be relieved from it depended upon the type of contract
involved. A distinction has to be drawn between those that involved
1
Ibid.. 116.
2 (1778) 1 Bro. C.C.I.
5 (1875) L.R.8 Ch.App. 484.
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an exchange of values between the parties and voluntary dispositions or
settlements. In both cases, however, the contract had to be unfair
at its conclusion. It would have been of no avail to a party if a
perfectly fair transaction later became unfair."'"
Where the transaction involved an exchange, such as a purchase
and sale, moneylending, or a lease, the fairness was generally tested
2
by comparing the value of the respective performances.
In evaluating the object of a sale the courts generally accepted
3the market value - where that was available - as the proper yardstick.
They,quite realistically, were not prepared to place a value upon the
subject-matter which was unattainable. Nevertheless, the measurement
of the value was objective. The courts took into account neither
sentimental value nor facts such as that a party had been unsuccessfully
4
hawking around his interests at a certain price. The process was,
on the whole, unsophisticated - although professional evaluators might
have differed about the market value of a particular interest or
property the courts accepted that there was a market value and not
different ones depending upon the characteristics of the seller or
5
purchaser or the circumstances surrounding the transaction. At the
same time it must be recognised that the courts, by basing their eval¬
uation on the market price, took some account of commercial reality.
^
Mortimer v. Capper (1782) 1 Bro. C.C.156; Ramsbottom v. Parker (l82l)
6 Madd. 5.
^
See, for example, Creswell v. Potter /19787 1 W.L.R.255; M'Diarmid
v. M'Diarmid (1828)3 Bli.N.S. 374.
■z
See, for example, Garvev v. McMinn (1846) Ir. Eq. 526; Slator v. Nolan
(1876) I.R.367; Cockell v. Taylor (1852)15 Beav. 103.
Earl of Aylesford v. Morris (1873) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 484.
^ Cf. the statement by the Lord Keeper in Batty v. Lloyd (l682) 1 Vern.
141 that necessitous people must necessarily sell cheaper than others.
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The question when the disparity between the value of the res¬
pective performances was so great as to justify relief was wholly in
the discretion of the courts and it was therefore impossible to lay down
any clear guidelines. It was obviously not necessary that the dis¬
parity be so great as "to shock the conscience" as that would in
itself have led to an inference of fraud."'"
The risk incurred by the benefiting party was of course a
factor that could influence the decision as to whether a disparity in
exchange was justified or not. As was the case under catching bargains
2
with expectant heirs, the courts here took little account of risk.
That could partly be due to the fact that as the contracts involved were
generally not "futures" agreements there was little risk to be run.
Risk was a greater factor in moneylending and mortgage transactions,
but even there it played a very minor role although the courts were not
3
unmindful of it. However, when it was taken into account it was
generally done negatively - to show that because a claim was well
4
secured there was no risk.
Risk was, however, a factor which could not be monetized easily
and to determine the importance of risk in the exchange it was necessary
to look at the transaction as a whole. There are some indications
that where the disparity in bargaining strength between the parties was
great a small disparity in values exchanged would be sufficient for
relief, and vice versa. On the whole, however, the contracts re-
Gibson v. Jeyes (l80l) 6 Ves. 266, 273-
2
See, however, Gibson v. Jeyes. supra.
^ See Cockell v. Tavlor (1852) 15 Beav. 103; Nevill v. Snelling (1880)
15 Ch.D. 679.
^
Baldwin and Alder v. Rochford (1748) 1 Wils. K.B. 229.
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lieved from exhibited gross disparity, often to the rate of 2 to 1,
1
or more.
Although most of the cases during this era were concerned with
the level of exchange, that was not the only area in which unfair¬
ness could lie. A later case which concerned moneylending, Howley v.
2
Cook, also placed great emphasis on other terms which were "unprecedented"
and oppressive to the borrower.
In transactions which did not involve an exchange of values
such as voluntary dispositions the standard of fairness was, of course,
3
different. In Phillips v. Mullings, Lord Hatherley L.C. expressed
the opinion that the validity of those agreements depended upon the facts
peculiar to each of them. Nevertheless, it was clear from the caselaw
that the courts regarded any unusual or abnormal terms with grave
suspicion and would set aside any contract containing them unless they
were convinced that the person making the donation was aware of the
4terms and understood them when he executed the transaction. What
was "unusual" or "abnormal" depended on the mores of the community at
the time. A deed which divested the donor of all his property leaving
himself and his dependants destitute or which, without apparent reason,
settled all his property on people other than the natural objects of his
5
bounty, was not easily countenanced.
^
Wood v. Abrev (1818) 5 Madd. 417 - buyer paid only a quarter of the
value; Cockell v. Taylor (1852) 15 Beav. 103 - buyer paid ten times
more than the value. In Butler v. Miller (1867) I.R. 1 Eq. 195 Lord Walsh
M.R. said that in most cases a sale at half-price would usually be
regarded as unfair in the sense here meant.
(1873) I.R. 8 Eq. 570. One of the terms of which the court disap¬
proved stipulated that the moneylender could sell certain property
which served as security for the loan without notifying the borrower.
5 (1871) 7 L.R. Ch.App. 244.
^
Ibid.; Coutts v. Acworth (I869) 8 L.R. Eq. 558; Fhillinson v. Kerry




When it was found that a weak and necessitous party had been
taken advantage of the court set aside the contract. Where the
transaction in question was a financing or moneylending agreement it
was usually only set aside upon payment of the actual sum advanced,
plus interest generally at 5 per cent, and if it was a sale of
property which had already been transferred it was returned to the
plaintiff who had to reimburse the defendant for any money spent on the
property. Where there was any misconduct or unfair dealing on the part
of the defendant he had to pay the costs of the action, otherwise this
was usually borne by the plaintiff. The courts were, on the whole,
disinclined to reform contracts which they found to be unfair because,
as Lord Eldon correctly observed in Pickett v. Loggon,'*" the parties
would probably never have concluded the agreement had the terms
been different.
(iv) Undue Influence
The power of the courts to set aside a transaction on the ground
of undue influence constitutes one of the most important exceptions
to the principle of freedom of contract. Undue influence was firmly
established as an independent ground for striking down a contract in
2
Huguenin v. Baselev , but the principles on which it was based were
3
recognised as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century. In
1 (1807) 14 Ves. 215, 242.
2 (1807) 14 Ves. 273-
rz
Kingsland v. Barnewell (1706) 4 Bro. P.O. 154; Osmond v. Fitzroy
(1731) 3 P.Wms. 129; Bennet v. Vade (1742) 9 Mod. 312; Morris v.
Burroughs (1737) 1 Atk. 398.
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the earlier cases it was apparently regarded as a species of the
previously discussed branch of equitable fraud.
There is, in fact, a close relationship between fraud which is
inferred from the fact that advantage has been taken of a party's
weakness and undue influence, especially if in the latter case the
disadvantaged party also suffered from a bargaining handicap which would
have led to inequality between the contractual parties."'" The dis¬
tinction between the two lies in the fact that undue influence can only
be found where one party occupies a position of confidence or influ-
v. 2
ence vis-a-vis the other. The essence of both remedies lies in the
fact that relief will only be granted where an unfair advantage was
taken of the situation - in the one case, of the inequality between the
parties and in the other, of the relation of influence which existed
between them. As in the case of fraud between unequal parties, undue
influence can be found irrespective of whether the contract involved was
3
"a gift, a purchase at an undervalue, and a sale at an excessive price."
4
Undue influence has never been clearly defined. The result is
that the term has been used in different senses, to include not only
See generally, M.D. Green, Fraud, Undue Influence and Mental
Incompetency (1943) 43 Col. L. Rev. 176.
2
Ibid., 180. See also W.H.D. Winder, Undue Influence and Coercion
(1939) 3 Mod. L. Rev. 97, 98.
^ Tufton v. Sperni (l952) T.L.R. 516, 526 per Jenkins L.J.
^
Re Erocklehurst /l9787 1 All E.R. 767, 783 per Bridge L.J.
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the exercise of influence but also compulsion. However, Winder
has convincingly argued that the term undue influence implies affection
and attachment and not coercion. A person acting under undue in¬
fluence assents to a contract because he wishes to gratify the desires
2
of another, not because he is coerced into giving his assent.
The courts distinguish between two classes of influence:
(a) If, at the time of, or shortly before, the conclusion of the
contract there existed between the parties a special confidential
relationship by reason of which the one party necessarily had influence
over the other, a presumption is raised that the gift or contractual
advantage was induced by the exercise of undue influence and the court
will set aside the contract unless it is proved that it was "the
spontaneous act of the donor acting under circumstances which enabled
him to exercise an independent will and which justifies the Court in
holding that the gift was the result of a free exercise of the donor's
3will." A court may thus set aside a contract even though there is no
proof of actual undue influence. The court interposes not on the
4
ground of any wrongful act by the defendant but because of public policy.
A presumption of undue influence is raised because the one party is by
reason of the general confidence which is reposed in him by the other,
5
in a position to take an unfair advantage of that other and because
4
Winder, _opu cit. There is, furthermore, a difference in the meanings
given to undue influence in probate and equity. In the former the
influence must "amount to force and coercion destroying free agency -
it must not be the influence of affection and attachment": Williams v.
Goude (1828) 1 Hag. Ecc. 577,581 per Sir John Nicoll.
2
Williams v. Goude (1828) 1 Hag. Ecc. 577, 581.




Treitel, Law of Contract, 309.
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proof of undue influence in respect of the contract in question may¬
be difficult where influence necessarily exists."'" Where the relationship
between the parties is such that undue influence is presumed the contract
will only be allowed to stand if there is proof of the removal of that
influence.2
The presumption can be rebutted by showing that the plaintiff
was assisted in the transaction by an independent and competent
3 4
adviser although that is by no means the only way. In some cases
the standard which this advice must attain has been set very high.
5
In Bullock v. Lloyds Bank Ltd.. for example, Vaisey J. said that a
settlement of certain property on trustees by a father on behalf of
his daughter would be upheld
if executed under the advice of a competent adviser capable
of surveying the whole field with an absolutely independent
outlook, and who explains to the intending settlor, first,
that she could do exactly as she pleased, and, secondly,
that the scheme put before her was not one to be accepted
or rejected out of hand but to be discussed, point by point,
with a full understanding of the various alternative
possibilities.6
The courts seem to be particularly strict where donations are con¬
cerned and they require very clear evidence that the donor formed
7
his intention freely and not under the influence of the donee. Where
1
Re Craig /l97l7 Ch. 95, 104.
2
Ibid.. 105.
5 Allcard v. Skinner (1887) 36 Ch.D. 145, 190.
4
Inche Noriah v. Shaik Allie Bin Omar 719297 A.C. 127, 135.




Wright v. Carter IJ90^7 1 Ch. 27, 50.
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a donor had no independent advice, but the amount of the gift was
small, the transaction will not necessarily be set aside."'" "But
if the gift is so large as not to be reasonably accounted for on the
ground of friendship, relationship, charity, or other ordinary motives
on which ordinary men act, the burden is upon the donee to support the
2
gift." This does not, however, mean that the character and attitudes
3of the donor can be ignored.
The presumption can also be rebutted by showing that in a trans¬
action for consideration the bargain was a fair one.^ Indeed, where
a solicitor contracts with a client the bargain will be set aside on
5
the ground merely of -undervalue.
Transactions between the following people have been adjudged
to give rise to a presumption of undue influence: parent and child,^
T 8
solicitor and client, doctor and patient, spiritual adviser and
9 10
follower, trustee and beneficiary. However, no limitation has
been placed on the types of relations which might fall within this
category - in fact the courts have been "careful not to fetter this
useful jurisdiction by defining the exact limits of its exercise.
1
Allcard v. Skinner (1887) 36 Ch.D. 145, 185.
2
Ibid.. per Lindley L.J.
5 Re Brocklehurst /IQ787 1 All E.R. 767, 783.
^
Wright v. Carter /I9037 1 Ch. 27, 54-55; Kingsland v. Barnewell
(1706) 4 Bro. P.O. 154.
pr
Edwards v. Mevrick (1842) 2 Hare 60, 70; Wright v. Carter /I90^7
1 Ch. 27.
Bullock v. Lloyds Bank Ltd. /.195^/ Ch. 317.
7
Edwards v. Mevrick (1842) 2 Hare 60.
8
Re Craig /I97l7 Ch. 95.
9 Allcard v. Skinner (1887) 36 Ch.D. 145.
10
Flowright v. Lambert (1885) 52 L.T. 646.
Tate v. Williamson (1866) 2 Ch.App.55,6l per Lord Chelmsford L.C.
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The evidentiary advantage of bringing one's case within this class
of relationship is clear and any plaintiff is free to attempt to
bring his case within its ambit. A relation of that class will be
found "/w7herever two persons stand in such a relation that, while
it continues, confidence is necessarily reposed by one, and the in¬
fluence which naturally grows out of that confidence is possessed
1 2
by the other." In Tufton v. Soerni, Jenkins L.J. warned that one
should not work backwards from the fact of an unconscionable bargain
and construct a fiduciary relationship between the parties through
which to set it aside, but that, it seems, is precisely what has happened
in some cases where the relationship between the parties was not
one of those from which the presumption would ordinarily have arisen.
In Re Craig, Ungoed-Thomas J. said:
what has to be proved to raise the presumption of undue
influence is first a gift so substantial (or doubtless
otherwise of such a nature) that it cannot prima facie
be reasonably accounted for on the ground of the ordinary
motives on which ordinary men act.3
The fact that the fairness of a contract plays a major role in
determining whether a relation is of a type that gives rise to a
presumption of undue influence may also be a reason why the courts
have found it so difficult and been so unwilling to lay down clear




2 (1952) T.L.R. 516, 530.
3 /I97l7 Ch. 95, 104.
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(b) Where there is no special confidential relationship between
the parties the plaintiff may yet bring evidence to show that the
defendant was in a position of influence over him, which he used
unduly to induce the plaintiff to enter into a contract which he
would not otherwise have concluded. Policy does not dictate that
one party should have no influence over the other, only that such
influence should not be abused. There are no hard and fast rules
as to the way in which undue influence may be proven. One commen¬
tator has concluded that undue influence is generally inferred from
a combination of some of the following factors:"''
(i) The plaintiff was particularly susceptible to undue
2 3
influence, for example, where he was young, old, physically or
4 5
mentally weak, drunk and in need of money, credulous and unbusiness¬
like . ^
(ii) The opportunity to exercise undue influence existed,
for example, where the facts indicate that the plaintiff was
7
dependent upon the defendant.
(iii) Factors which indicate a disposition towards exercising
undue influence such as that the defendant initiated the contract.
1
Note, (1941) 41 Col.L.Rev. 707, 717-721.
O
Osmond v. Fitzrov (l73l) 3 P.Wms. 129 - plaintiff just come of age.
^ Griffiths v. Robins (1818) 3 Madd. 191 - plaintiff eighty four and
almost blind.
^
Ibid.; Bennet v. Vade (1742) 9 Mod. 312.
5 Wright v. Long (1898) 14 T.L.R. 516.
^
Tufton v. Sperni (1952) T.L.R. 516.
n
Osmond v. Fitzrov (l73l) 3 P.Wms. - plaintiff entrusted to defen¬
dants care; Kingsland v. Barnewell (1706) 4 Bro. P.C. 154 - def¬
endant the manager and standing counsel of plaintiff; Taylor v.
Obee (1816) 3 Pr. 83 - defendant was friend of plaintiff's late
husband.
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(iv) Factors showing that the contract was in fact the result
of undue influence. Here the fairness or normality of the contract
is of great importance, hut other factors such as the presence of
independent advisers and the secrecy in which the transaction was
shrouded are taken into consideration.
The dividing line between this class of case and that where
undue influence is presumed is very thin and many of the factors
mentioned above may also lead to a finding that a special confidential
relationship existed between the parties.
While the jurisdiction against unfair contracts concluded by
unequal parties waned in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
undue influence secured an important position as a ground on which
relief from contractual obligations could be granted. The reason
for this lay in the fact that undue influence, frequently portrayed
as being concerned almost exclusively with the propriety of a party's
consent, was more compatible with a theory of contract which professed
to be interested not in the fairness of a contract but only in the
quality of a person's consent to it. In reality, of course, the
picture was vastly different. The principles underlying undue in¬
fluence arose during a time when the Chancery courts regarded control
of the fairness of contracts as a legitimate and indeed desirable
practice.
Although the doctrine of undue influence is often discussed
solely in terms of whether a party exercised a free will its effect
remains the enforcement of a standard of substantive fairness, if
only because the question whether there has been undue influence
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is frequently answered by reference to the contract itself. As
early as 1807 it was recognised by Lord Eldon L.C. that the contract
itself was the best evidence of whether there was undue influence
or not."'" The courts have often used the yardstick of whether an
honest and fair man would have acted with his property in the manner
in which the person allegedly subjected to the influence had done.
A fair contract has, therefore, frequently been equated with the
actions of a fair and normal person and an unfair contract as the
result of undue influence.
What is regarded as a fair contract will depend, as it did
under the other branches of equitable fraud, on the mores of the
community. A grossly unequal bargain has always been viewed as
unfair or at least abnormal. This was generally true even during
the height of nineteenth century laissez-faire and has become even
more so today. Where gifts are concerned it is more difficult to
lay down objective standards of fairness. Although the "normality"
of the transaction plays a role here as well it is probably true to
say that the courts will require stronger evidence in such a case
that the donor exercised a "free will" than they do in the case of
a contract for consideration.
Summary: Equitable fraud
The doctrine which in the eighteenth century became known
as equitable fraud arose in the Chancery courts during the latter
part of the seventeenth century. Although the doctrine eventually
Huguenin v. Easeley (1807) 14 Ves. 273,296.
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consisted of various branches,judicial intervention was initially
motivated by narrow class-based objectives: relief was given to
expectant heirs who had concluded unfair bargains in anticipation of
their expectancies. Soon, however, the scope of Chancery's inter¬
vention was extended to all weak and necessitous parties who had
been imposed upon. fraud was inferred from the weakness of one
party coupled with the unfairness of the contract.
Equitable fraud was not greatly affected by the rise of
freedom of contract, if anything it came to be applied more widely
and the standard of fairness required was enforced more strictly in
the nineteenth century. Rather than emphasize the specific weakness
from which a party suffered, such as mental impairment or economic
need, the courts began to describe as fraud all cases where a
inferior bargaining position had been taken advantage of.
Early in the nineteenth century the courts held that a party
who had dealt with an expectant heir and who was resisting cancell¬
ation of the agreement had to prove its fairness. This practice
of transferring the burden of proof was in the late nineteenth cent¬
ury adopted in all cases where the parties had been bargaining from
unequal positions.
Equitable fraud was not primarily concerned with whether a
party had consented to a contract. Chancery's role was a regulat¬
ive one. It did not interfere merely because the consideration
was inadequate although where the inadequacy was gross the courts
were prepared to infer fraud. Chancery intervened in order to
prevent the weaker party being exploited by the stronger and relief
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was given in spite of the weaker person's consent to the bargain and
not because of a defective consent.
The only branch of equitable fraud which has continued to
be applied widely in the twentieth century is undue influence.
Although applied in a number of cases in modern times, the rest of
the doctrine fell into obscurity soon after the fusion between common
law and equity. In recent years it has, however, been resurrected -
in a few cases in its original form, but mainly as one of the main
foundations of the doctrine of inequality of bargaining power.""
This doctrine is discussed at a later stage.
(d) Contracts concluded under pressure
The case most frequently cited in this field is Williams v.
3
Bayley. Bankers, who had discovered that a son had forged his
father's name as indorser on certain promissory notes, insisted on
a settlement to which the father was to be a party. The latter,
fearful as a result of a warning by the bankers that they had the
power to have the son prosecuted for forgery, executed a mortgage on
his property in favour of the bank and in return the notes were
delivered up to him. Although there was never any direct threat
by the bankers that they would prosecute the son, the House of Lords
was, nevertheless, of the opinion that there had been an implied
threat and that consequently the transaction could not stand.
1
See Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundv 719757 1 Q.B. 326, 336-339-
2
See generally W.H.D. Winder, Undue Influence and Coercion (1939)
3 Mod. L. Rev. 97, 110-119.
3 (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 200.
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According to Lord Westbury
/a7 contract to give security for the debt of another ...
is, above all things, a contract that should be based upon
the free and voluntary agency of the individual who enters
into it. But it is clear that the power of considering
whether he ought to do it or not, whether it is prudent to
do it or not, is altogether taken away from a father who is
brought into the situation of either refusing, and leaving
his son in that perilous condition, or taking on himself
the amount of that civil obligation.!
Lord Cranworth L.C., who was also of the opinion that the contract
should be set aside, referred to "this doctrine of pressure" and
said:
JUt is not pressure in the sense in which a Court of
equity sets aside transactions on account of pressure, if
the pressure is merely this: 'If you do not do such or
such an act I shall reserve all my legal rights, whether
against yourself, or against your son.'2
There must be an implied threat of prosecution. In a separate
concurring speech Lord Chelmsford maintained that as "the agreement
/had been/ extorted from the father by undue pressure" it had to
be struck down. "/f7he case", his Lordship said, "comes within the
principles on which a Court of equity proceeds in setting aside an
agreement where there is inequality between the parties, and one
of them takes unfair advantage of the situation of the other, and
4
uses undue influence to force an agreement from him."
It is clear that Lord Chelmsford did not use the term "-un¬








"the fears of the father were stimulated and operated on to an
extent to deprive him of free agency, and to extort an agreement
from him for the benefit of the bankers""'" and as Winder convincing¬
ly argued, undue influence "operates although there is true consent
and even eagerness in the transaction, without anything in the nature
2 3
of force." Nevertheless, the tendency on the part of the courts
4
and commentators to describe this equitable doctrine of pressure
as a manifestation of undue influence has persisted. Saimond even
5
called it "undue influence between strangers" in a passage quoted
with apparent approval by Porter J. in Mutual Finance, Ltd. v. John
g
Wetton & Sons, Ltd. His Lordship maintained that the right to
avoid a contract was not limited to situations where duress was
present, but depended upon "the much wider relief given on principles
originally evolved in the Chancery courts under the name undue
7influence."
However, the equitable doctrine of pressure is closer in
character to common law duress than it is to undue influence, which
requires the existence of a confidential relationship between the
parties. And not only is the means of inducement under the






See, for example, Mutual Finance, Ltd. v. John Wetton & Sons Ltd.
/I93l7 2 K.B. 389.
4
See, for example, Treitel, Law of Contract, 271.
5
Saimond on Contracts, 259-




influence, but as Winder indicated, the effect of the inducement on
the party also differs. The nature and effect of pressure was
explained by Stuart V.C. in Bayley v. Williams as follows:
Where a power of operating on a man's fears exists, and
he enters into a contract -unwillingly and under the
influence of that power, its existence constitutes
pressure.^
There is thus a strong case for rejecting the terminology of
Salmond and others who describe this doctrine as a form of undue
influence.
The equitable doctrine enunciated in Williams v. Bailey
has been applied in later cases and it is important to establish
the scope of the protection which it affords. In the passage
mentioned above Salmond asked:
What forms of coercion, oppression, or compulsion amount
to undue influence invalidating a contract as between
strangers between whom there exists no fiduciary relation?
How is the line to be now drawn between those forms of
coercion or persuasion which are permissible and those
which the law recognizes as unlawful and as a ground of
contractual invalidity? To this question it is
impossible, as the authorities at present stand, to give
any definite or confident reply. In the case already
cited of Kaufman v. Gerson^ it is suggested that the
line should be drawn by reference to general consider¬
ations of public policy, the question in each case being:
■' Is the coercion or persuasion by which this contract was
procured of such a nature that the enforcement of a con¬
tract so obtained would be contrary to public policy?'
Just as a contract may be invalid because it is contrary
to public policy in its substance or its purposes, so it
may be invalid because it is contrary to public policy
in respect of the coercive method of its procurement. ^
1
(1864) 4 Giff. 538, 661.
2 /I90i7 1 K.B. 591.
3 Cited in /I93jJ 2 K.B. 389, 394-395.
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And in Ellis v. Barker, Lord Romilly M.R. circumscribed
the doctrine as follows:
Coercion takes an infinite number of forms, but it may
properly be thus defined: the moment that the person who
influences the other does so by the threat of taking away
from that other something he then possesses, or of prevent¬
ing him from obtaining an advantage he would otherwise have
obtained, then it becomes coercion and it ceases to be
persuasion or consideration.^
Lord Romilly's definition of operative coercion was a wide one and
encompassed pressure other than that constituted by a threat of
criminal prosecution. There were, nevertheless, a few cases
2
which might support such a view. In Ormes v. Eeadel a builder,
urgently needing money to pay his employees who had threatened to
stop work unless they were paid their wages, was forced to conclude
a contract with a debtor who maintained that he would not otherwise
pay his debts. Stuart T.C. set aside the agreement and said:
Where an agreement, hard and inequitable in itself, has
been exacted under circumstances of pressure on the part
of the person who exacts it, this court will set it aside.
4
Wheeler v. Sargeant similarly showed that pressure, even though
it was not the result of a threat of criminal prosecution might be
sufficient to set aside a transaction. In that case the court
allowed recovery of money paid by a beneficiary to an executor in
return for a gratuitous promise. Romer J. held that although
1
(1870) 40 L.J. Ch. 603, 607.
^ (i860) 2 Giff. 166, reversed in 2 De G.F. & J. 333, but on other
grounds.
3 Ibid.. 174.
4 /I8927 68 L.T. 180.
141
there were no threats of any kind by the defendant, I
think there was pressure in fact on his part, though not
appearing in any form of words employed by him. His
very position gave him the opportunity of putting pressure
on the beneficiaries ... I think that this document was
signed by the plaintiff partly from the fear that if he did
not sign it, it would be worse for him, owing to the
defendant's position.l
This was a very wide interpretation of equity's power of protection
and corresponded more closely with the approach in those cases,
discussed before, where the mere facts that the parties stood in
unequal positions and the contract was unfair, were sufficient grounds
for relief. Although Romer J. found that there was pressure in fact,
the possibility exists that where the courts do not require evidence
of any direct threat, but are prepared to infer it from the inequal¬
ity of the parties' bargaining positions,the two jurisdictions may run
into each other. However, unless the courts are prepared to hold,
as a matter of general principle, that wherever parties who are
unequal conclude an unfair contract, the weaker will be relieved
from the bargain, it is better to keep the jurisdictions apart, as
they cover different fact situations. The jurisdiction against
equitable fraud operates where the stronger party obtains an unfair
advantage by exploiting an already existing bargaining handicap of
another. In the case of the doctrine of pressure, on the other
hand, relief is given because one party by exerting pressure on the
other caused a bargaining handicap in the latter from which he ought
to be free. Nevertheless, it has to be conceded that the dividing




Despite the cases reviewed above the type of pressure which
has come before the courts was most frequently caused by a threat of
criminal prosecution. A mere warning that criminal proceedings
may be started is not enough - there must be a threat that criminal
proceedings will be initiated unless the contract is concluded. In
2
Barnes v. Richards , for example, a resignation and release of
salary by an employee who could not explain certain errors in the
accounts was not cancelled as there was no threat to prosecute him.
It is not, however, always necessary that the threat of criminal
prosecution should be express. Even an implied threat will
suffice so long as it is clear that the contract is entered into in
order to prevent prosecution. As Porter J. said in Mutual Finance
Ltd. v. John Wetton & Sons Ltd.: "If the known object was to
prevent the prosecution of his brother for whatever reason, that, I
3
think, is enough."
It is, furthermore, not essential for a contract to be set
aside that the person against whom the threat of criminal prosecution
is made should be the contractual party himself or a relative of his.
The central question is whether a party entered into a contract in
order to prevent the threatened prosecution and so long as that
causal link exists there is no need to limit the jurisdiction of the
court. As Porter J. said in the Mutual Finance case,
See for example, Collins v. Hare (1828) 1 D. &_C1. 139; Seear v.
Cohen (l88l) 45 L.T. 589; Kaufman v. Gerson /l9QA/ 1 K.B. 591.
2 (1902) 71 L.J.K.B. 341.
3 Zl93l/ 2 K.B. 389, 396.
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A7t is not necessary to determine the exact bounds beyond
which the doctrine would not be applied, but I should
myself be inclined to say that it extended to any case
where the persons entering into the undertaking were in
substance influenced by the desire to prevent the prose¬
cution or possibility of prosecution of the person impli¬
cated, and were known and intended to have been so influ¬
enced. 1
An agreement induced by threats of criminal prosecution
may also be set aside on the ground that it stifles a prosecution
for an offence. In that case the party seeking relief from the
agreement must show not only that the conclusion of the contract
prevented the criminal prosecution but that it was an implied or
express term of the agreement that there should be no criminal
proceedings.^
Unlike the common law courts which continued throughout the
nineteenth century to define relievable duress in a very limited
way, equity relieved from transactions even where a contract was
entered into or a payment made under a threat which was not unlawful.
The courts clearly felt that threats which might normally be
perfectly legal could become unacceptable when used oppressively,
that is when the pressure was exerted solely for the purpose of
inducing a party into a contract which he was otherwise unwilling to
conclude or into making a payment which was not due. Although
there were a few cases involving other forms of compulsion they were




Chitty on Contracts, section 434.
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courts were called upon to deal with were threats of criminal
prosecution. There can be little doubt that the courts' decision
to intervene was motivated to a considerable extent by the fact that
obligations had been undertaken under pressure in return for which
no or only an inadequate consideration was given. To be given
relief it was necessary only to establish a causal link between
the pressure and the undertaking of the obligation.
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5 - DURESS
Any doctrine which attempts to deal with the problem of
contracts procured by pressure poses two questions: firstly, which
types of pressure are improper or illegitimate, and secondly, which
facts will be sufficient to establish that the pressure was a."'" reason
for the party concluding the contract?
The question as to which type of pressure is improper was
answered restrictively by the traditional doctrine of duress. The
2
doctrine arose at common law as an adjunct of criminal and tort law
and in accordance with these origins the types of pressure which were
regarded as legally relevant were limited to those which were indep¬
endently wrongful, in particular actual or threatened violence
against the person and unlawful imprisonment. A party who wished
to avoid a contract on the ground of duress also had to show that
the duress was of such intensity as to overcome a man of constant
firmness. During the nineteenth century the standard of constant
firmness was rejected and a new subjective test, requiring the court
to establish in every case whether the pressure was such as to over-
3
come that particular person, instituted in its place. Apart from
Barton v. Armstrong /I9767 A.C. 104, 119 per Lord Cross of Chelsea:
"/The coerced party/is entitled to relief even though he might
well have entered into the contract if /the defendant/ had uttered
no threats to induce him to do so."
2
See generally J.P. Dawson, Economic Duress - An Essay in Perspect¬
ive (1947) 45 Mich. L.Rev. 253, 254-255; Goff and Jones, The Law
of Restitution, 163-168.
3 Scott v. Sebright (1886) 12 P.D. 21, 24.
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that relaxation the traditional doctrine of duress remained more or
less unchanged for centuries. It was indeed a primitive tool
giving only limited protection to a coerced party.
The position was somewhat alleviated by equity which, as
we have seen, extended the ambit of relief considerably, mainly by
holding that an improper use of the legal process could amount to a
ground for relief."'" After the fusion of law and equity the wider
jurisdiction of the latter prevailed. In addition, the past few
years have witnessed a cautious affirmation that duress in English
2
law might include some instances of economic coercion. The law
under the influence of equity, has developed from the old
common law conception of duress - threat to life and limb -
and it has arrived at the modern generalisation expressed ^
by Holmes J. - 'subjected to an improper motive for action.'
The recognition that economic coercion might constitute relievable
duress was the culmination of a long development which originated
in the eighteenth century and earlier.
The narrow common law definition of duress belied the fact
that coercion aimed at the economic interests of a party was fre¬
quently encountered in the eighteenth century. At that time,
however, problems of duress arose mainly in respect of executed
""
Duke de Cadaval v. Collins (1886) 4 Ad. & E. 858.
2
Post. 160 jrt seq.
rz.
_
Barton v. Armstrong /l976/ A.C. 104, 121 per Lord Wilberforce and
Lord Simon of Glaisdale, dissenting but on other grounds. The
statement by Holmes J., accepted also by the majority of the Privy
Council, was made in Fairbanks v. Snow 15 N.E. 596, 598 (1887).
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contracts. The courts held that where a party had made a payment
in consequence of such coercion he could recover the amount by means
of the action for money had and received. In Moses v. Macfarlan.
Lord Mansfield declared that such an action would lie "for money
got through imposition, (express, or implied;) or extortion; or
2
oppression." The fact that executed rather than executory con¬
tracts were the rule in the eighteenth century and that the issue
of duress arose almost exclusively in respect of claims for the
recovery of money paid in consequence of duress of goods or of un¬
lawful demands made by a person or body who was in a monopolistic
position, meant that at that time the common law, in effect, recog¬
nised economic duress and gave relief where it occurred. The various
manifestations of "economic duress" of which the courts took note
can be classified as follows:
(a)"Duress of Goods"
The development of the doctrine known as duress of goods -
the unlawful detention or threatened detention of goods - began in
3
the early eighteenth century with Astley v. Reynolds. In that case
the defendant pledgee refused to deliver plate which was deposited
with him as security for a loan unless the plaintiff pledgor paid
a sum far in excess of the legal interest on the loan. The court
allowed recovery of the surplus over and above the legal rate of
interest in an action for money had and received and said:
Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, 434-435.
2 (1760) 2 Burr. 1005, 1012.
3 (1731) 2 Str. 915.
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/r/his is a payment by compulsion; the plaintiff might have
such an immediate want of his goods, that an action of
trover would not do his business: where the rule volenti
non fit injuria is applied, it must be where the party had
his freedom of exercising his will, which this man had not:
we must take it he paid the money relying on his legal
remedy to get it back again.1
The doctrine initiated in Astley v, Reynolds was subsequently
confirmed and applied in a number of cases which involved goods as
2 3
varied as a wagonload of hams, title deeds to property, insurance
4 5 6
policies, an aeroplane, and a ship held -under lien.
Apart from the fact that the object of duress in these cases
related to an economic interest rather than to the person of the
threatened party the divergence from traditional doctrine was not
as extreme as it would seem at first sight. Not only was the type
of duress relatively crude and limited in character, but the assoc¬
iation with tort law was retained in that the duress exercised was
also independently wrongful. The action for money had and received
was thus merely an additional remedy, existing next to the damage
7
remedy already available to the injured party. However, the devel¬
opment of this jurisdiction involved an implicit recognition that
the situation where money was paid under duress of goods raised





Irving v. Wilson (l79l) 4 T.R. 485.
^ Pratt v. Vizard (1833) 5 B. & Ad. 808; Oates v. Hudson (l85l) 6 Ex.
346; Fraser v. Pendlebury (l86l) 31 L.J.C.P. 1.
^
Shaw v. Woodcock (1827) 7 B. & C. 73-
^
T.D. Keegan Ltd. v. Palmer /l96l/ 2 LI. Rep. 449.
^
Somes v. British Emuire Shinning Co. (i860) 9 H.L. Cas.338.
7
See generally Dawson, ojd. cit.
149
In order to succeed in an action for money had and received
the plaintiff merely had to show that he had paid the money in order
to redeem goods which belonged to him or to which he had a right of
1 2
possession, and which had been illegally detained by the defendant.
Although the court in Astley v. Reynolds also referred to the fact
that the payment was compelled and that consequently the plaintiff
did not have the freedom to exercise his will, the early cases focus
almost exclusively on the wrongfulness of the detention and auto¬
matically assume that where money had been paid to retrieve goods
3
wrongfully detained such payment would be "involuntary". In
addition, no specific degree of coercion had to be proved - it was
sufficient if the money had been paid in the circumstances mentioned
above. The mere fact that the detention was illegal and the payment
so clearly unjust was thought sufficient to dispense with any
exhaustive inquiry as to the effect of coercion on the plaintiff.
It was, however, inevitable that with the greater emphasis
being placed on the consensual aspects of contracts generally the
requirement of "involuntariness", of whether the payment was in fact
compelled by the threat, should gain in importance. Proof of
involuntariness was necessary in order to distinguish payment made
1
Fell v. Whittaker (1871) L.R. 7 Q.B. 120.
^
See, for example, Valpy v. Manley (1845) 1 C.B. 594, 603.
^
See, for example. Irving v. Wilson (l79l) 4 T.R. 485> 486 per Lord
Kenyon C.J.: "/T7he defendants took the money under circumstances
which could by no possibility justify them, and therefore this
could not be called a voluntary payment"; Shaw v. Woodcock (1827)
7 B. & C. 73, 84; Oates v. Hudson (l85l) 6 Ex. 346. "Involuntary
payment" here bore a specialised meaning and entailed a showing
that the payment was made because of the duress and not willingly
in spite of it.
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under compulsion from payment made voluntarily as a settlement or a
compromise."'" But again this requirement was liberally interpreted
by the courts. The question of involuntariness was closely inter¬
twined with the question of whether a tort ramedy would provide
sufficient protection. It was far more time consuming to rely on
one's tort remedy than it was to pay the amount claimed immediately
with the intention of recovering it at a later stage by means of the
action for money had and received. Where, therefore, the plaintiff
needed his goods urgently it was usually assumed by the court that
the slower tort remedy would be an inadequate remedy and, following
2
from that, that the plaintiff had paid involuntarily. Payment
under duress could also be inferred from the fact that the plaintiff
3
had paid the amount under protest, while reserving his legal rights.
Such protest was not, however, essential to prove that the plaintiff
had acted under coercion. On the whole, there was little inquiry
into the probable effect on the plaintiff of not getting his goods
back immediately. It was mostly taken for granted that he would
suffer economic injury and thus that the exercise of coercion had
left him with no choice but to comply with the demand made by the
4
coercing party. It was thus clear that duress of goods, far from
remaining a mere alternative remedy, was gaining a wider application
See as to the meaning of a "compromise" Mason v. The State of hew
South Wales (1959) 102 C.L.R. 108, 143.
2
See, for example, the Pigott case cited in Cartwright v. Rowley
(1799) 2 Esp. 723; Valuv v. Manlev (1845) 1 C.B. 594, 603;
Ashmole v. Wainwright (1842) 2 Q.B. 837.
3 Maskell v. Horner /I9157 3 K.B. 106, 120-121.
^
Dawson .op. pit., 257-258.
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and greater independence. "Relatively narrow, but within its limits
distinctly favorable to relief, the law of 'duress of goods' provides
the starting point, the central type-case, of economic duress.""'"
Although it was thus a well established principle that paymeht
made under duress of goods could be recovered, the case of Skeate v.
2
Beale is usually cited as authority for the proposition that duress
of goods does not affect the validity of an agreement to -pay money,
because in terms of the common law doctrine only duress of person
could serve as a defence to a contract. The refusal to assign an
invalidating effect to duress of goods could be explained by the
fact that the nineteenth century courts applied, without modification,
principles which had been developed in respect of executed contracts
3
to executory contracts.
But a more fundamental reason for the reluctance of the common
law to extend the scope of duress beyond threats to the person by
also taking account of the variety of economic pressures which could
be exerted in order to extract a promise, lay in the classical
theory of contract. That theory was firmly rooted in the market
economy and it therefore precluded the treatment of economic pressure,
which was intrinsic to the market structure, as a factor which vitiated
4
consent. Duress therefore, remained confined to the cruder forms
of coercion and the doctrine disregarded the most important manifest-
1
Ibid.. 256.
^ (l84l) 11 Ad. & E. 983. Also Sumner v. Ferryman (1708) 11 Mod. 201;
Atlee v. Backhouse (1838) 3M.& W. 633- Cf. J. Beatson, Duress as
a Vitiating Factor in Contract (1974) C.L.J. 97.
3
Atiyah, _op. cit.. 434-436.
^
Ibid., 436; Dawson _op>. cit., 266.
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ation of coercion in the market economy, economic pressure. And. be¬
cause the legitimation of economic pressure largely obviated the need
to resort to duress of the person as a means of procuring a promise,
the common law doctrine of duress lost most of its relevance.
The paradoxical rule in Skeate v. Beale, although never
accepted without criticism,"'" was instrumental in delaying for more
than a century the development of a coherent doctrine of economic
2
duress. However, in the recent case of The Siboen arid the Sibotre,
3
Kerr J. criticised the authority of Skeate v. Beale and declared
that in his opinion English law was not as limited as this and that
"the true question is ultimately whether or not the agreement in
4
question is to be regarded as having been concluded voluntarily."
5
In the subsequent case of The Atlantic Baron, Mocatta J. quoted
with approval Kerr J.'s criticism of the so-called rule in Skeate v.
Beale and maintained that where "economic duress" led to a contract
for consideration such a contract was voidable.^ In Fao On v.
7
Lau Yiu the Privy Council seems to have held the view that the rule
in Skeate v. Beale was good law, but that there was nothing contrary
4
Hills v. Street (1828) 5 Bing. 37 and Tamvaco v. Simpson (1866)
L.R.I C.P. 363 provided some evidence for the proposition that
money paid under a contract might be recovered.
^ /l976j 1 LI. Rep. 293» discussed by Beatson (1976) 92 L.Q.R.496.
3
Kerr J. apparently accepted the suggestion that the dictum in whifoh
Lord Denman set out the so-called rule of Skeate v. Beale was obiter.
Lord Denman himself referred in Wakefield v. Newton (1844) 6 Q.B. 276
to cases such as Skeate v. Beale as "that class where the parties
have come to a voluntary settlement of their concerns, and have
chosen to pay what is found due."
4
Ibid.. 335.
^ North Ocean Shipping Co.Ltd. v. Hyundai Construction Co. Ltd. /l978J
3 All E.R.1170, discussed by J. Adams (1979) 42 Mod.L.Rev. 557.
6
Ibid.. 1182.
7 ZI9727 3 All E.R. 65, 79.
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to principle in now recognising economic duress as a factor which could
render a contract voidable.
As a result of the restrictive effect of Skeate v. Beale the
courts have been compelled to approach the problem of economic
coercion in a roundabout way through the doctrine of consideration.
It has been said that if in return for a variation in the existing
contract, the party who desired it, undertook to perform no more than
what he already owed under the contract there would be no considerat-
1 2
ion to support the new contract. In D. & C. Builders v. Rees,
for example, Lord Denning M.R. and Danckwerts L.J. held that a settle¬
ment of a claim made under economic pressure was invalid because it
was not supported by consideration or, alternatively, that there was no
true accord because "no person can insist on a settlement procured by
3
intimidation." Reviewing that case in The Siboen and the Sibotre,
Kerr J. explained the judgment as being based on duress and declared
that it would have been no different had there been nominal but legally
4
sufficient consideration. This is a highly commendable approach:
despite the fact that the courts in the process of finding consideration
or not have probably been greatly influenced by the fairness of the
5
modifying agreement, the pre-existing duty rule, as this technique
was sometimes called, might ultimately operate arbitrarily and was
thus an unsuitable instrument with which to combat unfair agreements
4
Stilk v. Myrick (1809) 2 Camp. 317.
^ /l966/ 2 Q.B.617, discussed by W.R. Cornish in (1966) 29 Mod.L.Rev.428.
3
Ibid., 625 per Lord Denning M.R.
4 /I9767 1 LI.Rep.293, 336.
5
Adams, op.. cit.. 559.
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exacted, under economic coercion.
The question of whether a promise to perform or the perform¬
ance of a pre-existing contractual obligation could be valid con¬
sideration for an agreement was extensively discussed and answered in
the affirmative in Fao On v. Lau Yiu.^" Nevertheless, the Board was
of the opinion that such a contract could still be avoided if it was
procured by economic duress. It refused, however, to entertain the
idea that in the absence of duress, public policy could invalidate
that consideration if there had been a threat to repudiate a pre¬
existing contractual duty or unfair use of a dominant bargaining pos¬
ition.
(b) Unlawful threats by a -person or body in a monopolistic position
Towards the middle of the nineteenth century a different line
of cases began to appear concerning excessive demands made by a person
or body who is in a monopolistic position and where the plaintiff
complied with the demand because he was unable to satisfy his needs
2
elsewhere. The most important examples were provided by overcharges
3
by common carriers. From the earliest stage this jurisdiction tended
to overlap with the duress of goods cases as the demand for an ex¬
cessive freight rate often occurred at a time when the plaintiff's goods
4
were already in the possession of the carrier.
^ /l972? 3 All E.R.65, 76-78. See also the discussion of the rule by
Mocatta J. in The Atlantic Baron /T978/ 3 All E.R.1170.
2
Goff and Jones, op_. cit., 174.
*2
The first case was Parker v. Great Western Railway Co. (1844)
7 M.& G. 253, in which the court ordered repayment of the excess
freight charges which had been collected by the company. In that
case there was no duress of goods, but in Ashmole v. Wainwright (1842)
2 Q.B. 837 a carrier who had refused to deliver goods until excessive
charges had been paid was ordered to repay such excess to the plaintiff.
4
Dawson, op.. cit.. 258.
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Just as in the previous ventures into the sphere of economic
duress, the courts' foray into this particular field did not involve a
major movement in policy, for the common law had already enforced upon
the common carrier an obligation
to accept and carry all goods delivered to him for carriage
according to his profession (unless he had some reasonable excuse
for not doing so) on being paid a reasonable compensation for
so doing; and if the carrier refused to accept such goods, an
action lay against him for so refusing; and if the customer,
in order to induce the carrier to perform his duty, paid, under
protest, a larger sum than was reasonable, he might recover back
the surplus beyond what the carrier was entitled to receive
in an action for money had and received as being money extorted
from him.-'-
Although the plaintiff generally paid the charges demanded under
2
protest this was not a necessary requirement. Instead, the courts
emphasized the inequality of the parties and, drawing on the analogy
of the colore officii cases, inferred from the fact that the plaintiff
was, vis-a-vis the monopolistic carrier, in an inferior bargaining
3
position, that the payment was made as a result of coercion. The
inference that payment was made "involuntarily" was further strengthened
by the circumstance that the plaintiff's economic existence may have.
depended upon using the facilities of the carriers, and as the latter
were frequently monopolies the plaintiff had no choice but to submit
4to the demands. Involuntariness could be inferred even where it was
merely a commercial necessity that the plaintiff use the carriers.
In the United States this jurisdiction has been expanded to
^
Great Western Railway v. Sutton (I868-I869) L.R. 4 H.L.226, 237 per
Blackburn J.
2
J. Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure I (1942) 20 N.C.L. Rev. 237,
244.
3
Dawson pp. cit., 259; Dalzell op,, cit.. 244-246.
^
Dawson, pp. cit., 260; Dalzell, pp. cit., 244-246.
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include unlawful threats made by all public utility companies. Both
12
Dawson and Dalzell referred to many cases in which the courts have
held that where a public utility company threatened to withhold the
supply of gas, water or electricity or other service unless an
excessive payment was made and the plaintiff, compelled by immediate
commercial needs, met this demand, then such excess was recoverable as
having been paid under compulsion in the legal sense. The payment by
the plaintiff was held to be involuntary on the following consider¬
ations:
To make the payment a voluntary one, the parties should
stand upon an equal footing ... But where one has the
advantage of the other, where delay or a resort to the law is
indifferent to the one but may produce serious loss and injury
to the other, it is unconscionable to press such advantage to
the obtaining of unjust demands. That is extortion.^
A similar principle was applied in South of Scotland Elec-
4
tricity Board v. British Oxygen Co. Ltd. where the respondents
were supplied with high voltage electricity by the appellants. As
electricity at high voltage was cheaper to produce than at low voltage
the respondents were charged at a lower tariff level than consumers
of low voltage electricity. Nevertheless, the respondents complained
that despite the different tariffs the differential between them was
insufficient to reflect the difference in production cost between high
and low voltage electricity, and that there was therefore "undue
Dawson, ojd. cit., 259.-
2
Dalzell, op.. cit.. 243-246.
^ Beckwith v. Guy Frisbie & Sons, 32 Vt. 559 (i860) as cited by
Dalzell, pp. cit.. 245.
4 Zl95^7 1 W.L.R. 587.
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discrimination" against consumers in the position of the respondents.
Such discrimination, the respondents averred, was contrary to statute.4
Respondents also claimed restitution of the "overcharges" made by them.
2
The House of Lords, affirming the decision of the Court of Session ,
held that there should he proof before answer as far as the averments
of "undue discrimination" was concerned, because such discrimination
could exist even though the respondents were charged a lower tariff
than consumers of low voltage electricity. In deciding whether there
was such discrimination the cost of producing high voltage electricity
was a relevant consideration. In the opinion of the House an action
for restitution of the overcharges would be available if undue dis¬
crimination was proved. In support of this view Lord Merriman
3
cited the following dictum by Willes J. in Great Western Railway Co.
A
v. Sutton:"
/W7hen a man pays more than he is bound to do by law for
the performance of a duty which the law says is owed to him
for nothing, or for less than he has paid, there is a com¬
pulsion or concussion in respect of which he is entitled to
recover the excess by condictio indebiti, or action for money
had and received.
Electricity Act 1947, section 57(8); Hydro Electric Development
(Scotland) Act 1943 > section 10A(5).
2
1958 S.C. 53.
3 Zl95^7 1 W.L.R. 587, 607.
4 (1868-1869) L.R. 4 H.L. 226, 249.
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This survey shows that the requirements for the recovery of
money paid -under duress of goods or in order to obtain the performance
of a duty, were much less stringent than those which governed trad¬
itional common law duress. In particular, the courts have been very
ready to accept the coercive qualities of the threats made and thus
to draw the conclusion that the money was paid "involuntarily". The
exaction by those types of coercion of money which was clearly not due
made those transactions obviously unfair and at least one commentator
has remarked that the severity of the duress rules might differ accord¬
ing to the fairness of the resulting transaction.""
The value of these modest judicial sorties into the sphere of
economic duress lay not so much in the new types of coercion which the
courts regarded as relevant - they were relatively unsophisticated -
but in the general recognition by the courts that economic pressure
could be as coercive as duress of the person. The steps taken in
2
The Siboen and the Sibotre and subsequent cases towards the regula¬
tion of those economic pressures which lawyers had until recently
regarded as essential concomitants of the economic structure in which
contract law is so firmly rooted was directly traceable to the "duress
of goods" and related cases. The question which now arises is the
extent to which economic pressure has been recognised as either
affecting the validity of a contract or as a ground for the recovery
of benefits conferred as a result of such pressure.
""
R.J. Sutton, Duress by Threatened Breach of Contract (1974) 20 McG.
L.J. 554, 560.
2 /1976J 1 LI. Rep. 293-
159
Economic duress in modern law
As Dalzell"'" indicated, economic pressure can take many forms.
Apart from the manifestations discussed before, there have been a few
isolated cases in which a threat to break: a contract was recognised as
2
legally relevant. In Close v. Phinns the attorney of a mortgagee
threatened to sell the mortgaged property unless his demand that he be
paid an amount additional to the mortgage sum was met. The money,
which was not due, was paid under protest and afterwards recovered in
3
an action for money had and received. In The Atlantic Baron, Mocatta
J. accepted that the payment in Close v. Phipps was made under duress,
the duress being a threatened breach of contract. In the Chancery
4
case of Ormes v. Beadel, a builder entered into a contract with a
debtor under threat that unless he did so the latter would not pay his
debts. The debtor knew that the builder needed the money urgently to
pay his employees who had said that they would otherwise stop work.
Stuart V.C. set aside the agreement and said:
Where an agreement hard and inequitable in itself, has been
exacted under circumstances of pressure on the part of the
person who exacts it, this court will set it aside.5
A long time was to pass before an English court was again called upon
to decide whether a threat to breach a contract constituted illegit¬
imate coercion.
0]D. cit.
2 (1844) 7 M. & G. 586.
3 /I9787 3 All E.R. 1170, 1178.
^ (i860) 2 Giff, 166, reversed on a different ground in (i860) 2 De
G.F. & J. 333.
5 Ibid., 174.
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In The Siboen and the Sibotre"^ two ships were time chartered
at a rate of 4.40 dollars per ton per month. The market subsequently
slumped and the cost of a charter went down to 2.80 dollars. The
charterers, desirous of getting a better deal for themselves asked for
a renegotiation of the rate. This was refused. The charterers
and their parent company then fraudulently represented that they had
no assets and would go bankrupt if the rate was not renegotiated.
They also threatened to repudiate the contract unless this was done.
The owners who had mortgaged the ships and used the charter income to
repay the mortgage feared that unless they renogiated they would lose
the charter with the result that the ships would be unused because
of the slump. They therefore succumbed to the threat. Before the
court, counsel for the owners argued that the renegotiation was voidable
for duress and submitted that the
defence of duress is made out whenever one party to a contract
threatens /whether in good faith or not/ to commit a breach
of it and the other party agrees to vary or cancel the contract
under this threat because it has no effective legal remedy in
respect of the threatened breach ... /b7uress must a fortiori
be a defence when the party threatening to break the contract
is putting forward some justification for doing so without
any bona fides.^
3
Kerr J. thought that this contention was "much too wide", apparently
because it implied that even a settlement concluded "voluntarily" in spite
of a threat, could afterwards be avoided on the ground of duress.





Yet he did say that a plea of "coercion or compulsion" would be avail¬
able to a party who had entered into a contract under the imminent
threat of having his house burnt down or a valuable picture slashed"'"
and he acknowledged the strong authority of Australian cases such as
2
T.A. Sundell & Sons Ply, Ltd. v. Emm Yannoulatos (Overseas) Pty.Ltd.
in which the court accepted that "a compulsive threat ... to refrain
3from performing merely a contractual duty" could constitute legal
duress.
The true question, Kerr J. maintained, was
whether or not the agreement in question is to be regarded
as having been concluded voluntarily ... /T/he Court
must in every case at least be satisfied that the consent of
the other party was overborne by compulsion so as to deprive
him of any animus contrahendiA
Kerr J. did not feel that in the present case the owners had contracted
involuntarily. There was no protest by the owners, and later they
sought to uphold the renegotiated charter by arbitration. The owner
was "acting under great pressure, but only commercial pressure, and not
under anything which could, in law, be regarded as a coercion of his
5
will so as to vitiate his consent." In view of the fact that protest
is not the only way of showing that a contract was concluded "involunt¬
arily" this conclusion is open to question, especially because of the char¬
terers' fraudulent representation that they had no assets and the
implication from that that an action for damages because of breach of
contract would bring but cold comfort to the owners, rendered the
1
Ibid.
2 /19567 S.R. (tf.S.W.) 323.
3 Ibid., 328.




"commercial pressure" sufficiently coercive to constitute legal duress.
In The Atlantic Baron/ shipbuilders contracted to build a
tanker for a shipping company at a price fixed in U.S. dollars. In
consequence of a devaluation of the U.S. dollar the builders, without
legal justification, demanded an increase of 10 per cent on the balance
of the purchase price. The buyers rejected the demand but subsequent¬
ly concluded an advantageous contract for the charter of the tanker
and as the builder had by then threatened to terminate the contract
unless the additional payment was made, the buyers agreed "without
prejudice to our rights" to pay the sum. The buyers later instituted
an action for recovery of the additional payment, inter alia on the
ground of duress. Mocatta J. accepted that the agreement was concluded
under duress but held that the buyers could not recover the additional
sum because they had subsequently affirmed the agreement.
In holding that the threat by the builders constituted relievable
duress Mocatta J. accepted as authority a dictum of Isaacs J. in Smith
2
v. William Charlick Ltd. to the effect that "compulsion" includes
every species of duress or conduct analogous to duress. "Compulsion",
according to Mocatta J., therefore could take the form of economic
pressure and a threat to break a contract could amount to economic
3
duress.
In Pao On v. Lau Yiu.^ the plaintiffs contracted to sell to a
public company in which the defendants had the majority shareholding
1 /I978/ 3 All E.R. 1170.
2 (1924) 34 C.L.R. 38, 56.
3 /I9787 3 All E.R. 1170, 1182.
4 U-912J 3 All E.R. 65.
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the shares of a private company whose only asset was a building. In
terms of the contract the plaintiffs were to be paid by the allotment
to them of shares in the public company. As the defendants were afraid
that sudden heavy selling of shares in their company might depress the
market and thus lead to a devaluation of their shareholding, the plain¬
tiffs had to undertake not to sell a portion of the shares allotted to
them for a certain time. The defendants, in order to protect the
plaintiffs against a drop in the value of their shares during this
period of postponement, agreed to buy back the shares at the price
which, for the purposes of the sale, they were deemed to have. The
plaintiffs suddenly realized that they had made a bad bargain, because
if the value of the shares which they were allotted rose in value
they were still bound to sell them to the defendants at their original
deemed value. The plaintiffs, therefore, threatened not to complete
the transaction unless the parties agreed on a proper indemnity. The
defendants were aware that they could claim specific performance, but
for commercial reasons decided to comply with the plaintiffs' demand.
The value of the shares in the defendants' company subsequently fell
dramatically and the plaintiffs instituted an action for the sum which
was owed to them in terms of the indemnity. The defendants' defence
was inter alia that the indemnity had been induced by economic duress
and was thus voidable.
On the facts the Privy Council had no difficulty in rejecting
that proposition. Although it agreed that commercial pressure might
constitute duress that was not in itself sufficient to render the
contract voidable. The commercial pressure had to be such that "the




From the cases examined it appears that commercial pressure,
either as a result of a threat by the defendant not to perform his
contractual obligations if his demand was not met"'" or through a threat
by him to cancel a contract if the plaintiff did not succumb to his
2
demands, might constitute legal duress. However, it will be
illegitimate pressure and thus duress only when the pressure is such
that it coerces the will of the plaintiff so as to vitiate his
3
consent.
In all three cases examined the parties had threatened to do
something which would have been unlawful. Yet, in none of the
judgments was it stated to be a requirement that the threat had to be
illegitimate in order to amount to relievable duress. The impression
is generally created that it is the coerciveness of the threat which
renders it wrongful and not which kind of threat it was. Kerr J.
even quoted with apparent approval the rhetorical question of Collins
M.R. in Kaufman v. Gerson, "/w7hat does it matter what particular form
4
of coercion is used, so long as the will is coerced?" If indeed
the position taken by the courts was that the threat itself need not
be wrongful it would seem to conflict with the dicta in Barton v.
5
Armstrong in which two steps were proposed where duress was alleged;
1
The Atlantic Baron /Iq787 3 All E.R. 1170; Pao On v. Lau Yiu 719797
3 All E.R. 63.
Q _
The Siboen and the Sibotre 1 LI. Rep. 293; D. & C, Builders
v. Rees 719667 2 Q.B. 617.
^
See, for example, Pao On v. Lau Yiu. /197973 All E.R. 65, 78.
^ (1904) 1 K.B. 591, 597, as cited in The Siboen and the Sibotre
/19767 1 LI. Rep. 293, 335.
^ /.L976/ A.C. 104, 121 per Lord Wilberforce and Lord Simon, dissenting,
but on other grounds.
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firstly, to determine whether some illegitimate means of persuasion
had been used, and secondly, to establish the relationship between the
illegitimate means used and the action taken by the party at whom the
threat was directed.
A test of duress based exclusively on the coerciveness of the
threat holds potentially important implications for the validity of
all agreements induced by economic pressure, especially in view of the
fact that economic pressure of greater or lesser intensity is an in¬
herent feature of market economies. Does such a formulation of duress
mean that a party may be freed from his contractual obligations merely
because he had to deal with a particular person or company in the
absence of anybody else supplying a particular commodity? English
law has as yet been unwilling to give relief solely on that ground,""
although it has allowed the scrutiny of some standard form contracts
2
to determine whether their terms were fair.
Commonwealth authorities have taken the view that duress can
only be found where a threat was wrongful. In Smith v. William
3
Charlick Ltd. for example, the respondents were wheat dealers who
bought their produce from the Australian Wheat Board. After allowing
an increase in the price of wheat the Board discovered that the
respondents had profited greatly by selling the old, cheaper produce
at the new higher prices and demanded from them a sum of money. In
"
Eric Gnaon Ltd. v. Petroleum Board /l942/ 1 All E.R. 980.
r\
A Schroeder Music Publishing Co, Ltd. v. Macaulay /19747 1 W.L.R.
1308, 1315-1316 per Lord Diplock.
^ (1924) 34 C.L.R. 38. See also Morton Construction Co. v. City of
Hamilton (l96l) 31 D.L.R. (2d) 323.
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addition, the Board threatened that unless their demand was met they
would not deal with the respondents in future. Since the Board was
the monopoly supplier the respondents had no choice hut to comply.
Yet the High Court of Australia dismissed respondents' claim for the
recovery of the sum paid on the ground that the Board's threat was not
wrongful. The money was paid "not in order to have that done which
the Board was legally hound to do, hut in order to induce the Board to
do that which it was under no legal obligation to do."""
Nevertheless, a case can he made out for the proposition that
in the context of duress "wrongfulness" should not he defined by
reference only to whether a threat is actionable or not. The equitable
doctrine of pressure has already provided some authority for the view
that pressure which was otherwise lawful might be wrongful if it is
used merely to induce a person to enter into a contract. A similar
approach can be found in some American cases. In discussing the
requirement of wrongfulness the New Jersey Supreme Court said in
Rubinstein v. Rubinstein that
... means in themselves lawful must not be so oppressively
used as to constitute, e.g., an abuse of legal remedies...
The act or conduct complained of need not be "unlawful" in
the technical sense of the term; it suffices if it is
'wrongful in sense that it is so oppressive under given
circumstances as to constrain one to do what his free will
would refuse...'2
In a case where the threat is not in itself unlawful the fairness of
the resulting contract may be an important consideration in deciding
whether the threat was "wrongful" so as to constitute duress.
1 (1924) 34 C.L.R. 38, 51 per Knox C.J.
2
20 N.J. 359, 367, 120 A. 2d 11, 15 (1956) as cited by Sutton,
op. cit., 583.
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Nevertheless, a duress test framed solely in terms of the
coercive quality of the threat does raise some conceptual problems,
especially by its excessive emphasis on the requirement that the
threatened party's will must be overborne by the pressure. It has
long been pointed out that duress, although it restricts a person's
choice, does not necessarily exclude volition, and conversely, that the
mere fact that relievable duress has not been found does not mean that
a party concluded a contract uninduced by any pressure."'" In Lloyds
2
Bank Ltd. v. Bundy Lord Denning M.R. indicated, quite correctly in my
view, that " one who is in extreme need may knowingly consent to a most
improvident bargain, solely to relieve the straits in which he finds
3
himself" , and he thus "avoided any reference to the will of the one
4
being 'dominated' or 'overcome' by the other." Holmes J. similarly
recognised the reality of the situation when he said:
It is always for the interest of a party under duress to
choose the lesser of two evils. But the fact that a choice
was made according to interest does not exclude duress. It
is the characteristic of duress properly so called.5
t
In view of these difficulties it would be better to require
firstly, and before any attempt is made at establishing a causal link
between the pressure exerted and the subsequent action of the pressur¬
ised party, that the threat was "wrongful" even if the term is then
See for example, Dalzell, up. cit.. 238-240; R.L. Hale, Bargaining,
Duress and Economic Liberty (1943) 43 Col.L.Rev. 603, 615-618;
Atiyah, up. cit.. 436; Dawson, _pp.. cit.. 266-267.





Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri,
248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918).
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used to include conduct which, although not unlawful, violates the
community's standards of fair conduct. If such a proposition is
accepted then the primary task of the courts will not be merely to
establish whether a threat coerced the will of the threatened party so
as to vitiate his consent, but to delimit the kinds of pressure which
are wrongful and may thus lead to a finding of duress.
In establishing whether there was
a coercion of will such that there was no true consent, it is
material to enquire whether the person alleged to have been
coerced did or did not protest; whether, at the time he was
allegedly coerced into making the contract, he did or did not
have an alternative course open to him such as an adequate
legal remedy; whether he was independently advised; and
whether after entering the contract he took steps to avoid it.'
The test used to determine whether a party's will was coerced by a
threat is subjective and the court is therefore permitted to take into
account any peculiar circumstances such as economic necessity or his
mental state which might have affected him in deciding whether or not
to meet the threatening party's demands. Such an approach has been
followed in the duress of goods cases as well as in equity's doctrine
of pressure and it would seem from The Atlantic Baron that it has been
adopted in the sphere of economic duress as well. In that case
Mocatta J. inferred "involuntariness" from the fact that, in view of
their advantageous chartering agreement, it would have been "unreason¬
able" to expect of the owners to have taken the alternative course
2
of arbitration. This was done despite the fact that the coercing
1
Pao On v. Lau Yiu 719797 3 All E.R. 65, 78.
2 /I978/ 3 All E.R. 1170, 1182-1183.
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party was unaware of the conclusion of the chartering agreement.
However, if he had been aware of, and had specifically taken advantage
of, his counterparty's difficulties to extort an unreasonable benefit
there should be little to prevent the court from holding that the
threatened party had conferred the benefit "involuntarily". In such
a case the dividing line between economic duress and equitable fraud
is very thin and it is clear from the study of economic duress made
by Dalzell that if duress is given a wide definition, many of the cases
which in this study have been dealt with -under equitable fraud can also
be explained on the basis of economic duress.
The relationship between duress and substantive fairness
In modern law, duress is generally portrayed as relating to
the quality of a person's assent to a contract. This has not always
been the case and in 1790 Powell"'" also postulated substantive unfair¬
ness as a reason for avoiding a contract entered into under duress.
Nevertheless, it is clear that relievable duress may be found irres¬
pective of whether the contract was fair or not and in transactions
where no economic elements are involved the question of substantive
unfairness will not arise.
Yet there is a close, but usually unexpressed, relation between
2
the doctrine of duress and the objective merits of the contract.
Duress, as well as the equitable doctrine of pressure, are normally
used to avoid acts by one person - payments or transfers, the assumption
Essay on the Law of Contracts and Agreements, 160-161.
See Hale, op. cit., 621-625; Dawson, op_. cit. , 282-288.
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or release of debts - for which no or an unequal return was given.
In addition, the cases indicate that recovery of money paid under
duress is usually limited to the amount which was not due. The
objective merits of a contract may also influence the requirements which
are set for a finding of duress, the strictness with which these
requirements are enforced, and the extension of the doctrine of
duress. Where the threats used to induce a contract are less overtly
wrongful, such as in the developing area of economic duress, the un¬
fairness of the contract may influence the court in finding that the
threat amounted to legal duress.
Dawson has contended that the real question in respect of
economic duress is not the wrongfulness of the coercion, but the un¬
equal exchange and whether it resulted from an unconscionable use of
2
economic power. Although there is no doubt that even American courts
3
have not gone this far there are signs that English courts are in¬
creasingly willing to use economic duress as a means of dealing with
unfair contracts arising from the use of economic pressure.
J.P. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version (1976) 89
Harv.L.Rev. 1041, 1048.
Economic Duress - An Essay in Perspective (1945) 47 Mich.L.Rev.
253, 287.
3
Section 318 of the Restatement of Contracts 2d, Tentative Draft
(1977) now provides for much greater emphasis on the fairness of
contract terms exacted under threat in deciding whether relief should
be given or not.
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6 - UNFAIR CONTRACTS IN ADMIRALTY1
It has been firmly established that salvage agreements may be
set aside if their terms are unfair. In Akerblom v. Price, Potter,
Walker & Co. Brett L.J. expressed the principle as follows:
The fundamental rule of administration of maritime law in all
courts of maritime jurisdiction is that, whenever the court
is called upon to decide between contending parties, upon
claims arising with regard to the infinite number of marine
casualties, which are generally of so urgent a character that
the parties cannot be truly said to be on equal terms as to
any agreement they may make with regard to them, the Court
will try to discover what in the widest sense of the terms
is under the particular circumstances of the particular case
fair and just between the parties. If the parties have
made no agreement, the Court will decide primarily what is
fair and just... If the parties have made an agreement,
the Court will enforce it, unless it be manifestly unfair and
unjust; but if it be manifestly unfair and unjust, the Court
will disregard it and decree what is fair and just.
In determining whether a salvage agreement is fair or not the
courts look not only at whether the salvage remuneration is exorbitant
or inadequate, but also at the relative positions of the parties at
the time of the conclusion of the contract. The courts have recog¬
nised that salvage agreements are often concluded at a time when the
circumstances of one party are such that he is more or less compelled
3
to accept any terms which the other might wish to impose upon him..
The conduct of the salvor and the surrounding circumstances will thus be mat¬
erial factors in deciding on the validity of the salvage agreement.
See generally Kennedy, Civil Salvage, 309-321.
2 (1881) 7 Q.B.D. 129, 132-133.
The Mark Lane (1890) 15 P.D. 135; The Port Caledonia and the Anna
/190.3/ P- 184.
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Where the demands of the salvor have been unfair the court will set
the agreement aside despite the fact that the degree of compulsion
would not have been sufficient to invalidate an agreement at common
law.
Salvage agreements have generally been set aside because the
remuneration stipulated was exorbitant, but the courts have held that
a stipulation prescribing a grossly inadequate remuneration might meet
2
the same fate. Whether the remuneration is exorbitant or inadequate
is determined by comparing it to the nature and value of the services
3
rendered by the salvor.
Although the courts may set aside a contract solely because
4
of a grossly unfair salvage award, they will generally not interfere
where the agreement is equitable except for the fact that the salvage
remuneration is more or less than they would have awarded had there been
no contract.
The power to strike down unfair salvage agreements rests not
only in the English courts, but also in the Court of Session, which,
5
by virtue of the Court of Session Act 1830 took over the jurisdiction
of the old Scottish Court of Admiralty.
1
The Mark Lane (1890) 15 P.D. 135, 137.
2
The Phantom (1866) L.R. 1 A. & E. 58.
3






B - SCOTS LAW
1 - USURY AND INEQUALITY OF EXCHANGE
Although the absolute medieval prohibition of usury also operated
in Scotland, the taking of interest on money loans became lawful in the
late sixteenth century, provided that the rate of interest did not
exceed a statutory maximum. Between 1587, the date of the first
important Act which allowed the taking of interest,"'" and 1854, when all
2
usury laws were abolished, the statutory maximum fluctuated between
3
10 and 5 per cent per year. Usury was defined widely in these
statutes and generally included interest received through armualrents
4
prior to the term of payment or through the use of wadsets.
In England the concept of usury had an effect far outside the
immediate scope of the usury laws. The standard of substantive fair¬
ness which the usury laws set and the considerations of protecting the
weak and financially embarrassed from exploitation, which underlay them,
were important factors in the development of Chancery's doctrines
against forfeitures, penalties and equitable fraud. Whether the
concept of usury ever gained such a wider significance in Scots law is
doubtful.
There were a few early cases in which the courts intervened,
apparently because they regarded the transactions in question as
5




17 & 18 Vict. c.90.
^ See, for example, 1587 c.35, 1633 c.21 and 12 Anne 1713 Stat.
2 c.16.
^
Mackenzie, Laws and Customesof Scotland, in Matters Criminal, 236-247.
5
1696 Mor. 9460. See also Abercrombie v. Earl of Peterborough 1745
Mor. 4894; Borthwick v. Ramsay 1697 Mor. 4981.
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for example, an assignation of a tack, granted at the same time as a
bond for borrowed money, was not labelled as direct usury
yet /the Lords/ reduced it as null, being of the
same date with the bond for borrowed money, and
acknowledged in his oath to have had no other
onerous cause but a gratuity.1
According to the reporter the Lords had been very severe on this
2
point and he referred to Nisbet v. Humbie "where they would not so
much as allow creditors to take gifts from their debtors, else this
crime of usury might be under such pretences easily evacuated and
3 4
eluded". In King v. Ker, where a cautioner claimed a certain sum
for his services the defender argued that such payment would amount
to an evasion of the usury laws and maintained that the purpose of
these laws was "to pull poor debtors out of the claws of such cormorant
harpies, and to secure them, that it shall not be in their power to
5
injure themselves by borrowing money at exorbitant rates". The
Lords apparently agreed that the cautioner's claim amounted to indirect
usury, because they declared the bond, in terms of which he was making
the claim, to be contra bonos mores and reduced it. Karnes, reviewing
this and some other cases, maintained that they supported the principle
that "every benefit taken indirectly by a creditor, for the granting of














In more modern law there are two cases concerning moneylending
where the courts gave relief, apparently on the sole basis that the
interest rates charged were colossal. In Young v. Gordon.^ an
unmarried woman borrowed £104 and gave the moneylender promissory
notes to the value of £124. When a month later, Young was unsuccess¬
fully called upon to honour the promissory notes, she was induced to
give three more notes to a total value of £250 in exchange for twenty-
four hours delay. A few days after the expiry of the final date
Gordon claimed £200. The court suspended the charge and limited
Young's obligation to the principal sum plus reasonable interest. It
described the transaction as most "iniquitous", but was otherwise not
2
very forthcoming as to the grounds for the decision. In the subse-
quent case of Gordon (Gordon's Administrator) v. Stephen, the defender
was an old, simple and timid man who had given bills totalling £198
to the moneylender, but received only £25 in return. Lord Kincairney
4
called the transaction "scandalously extortionate and extravagant"
and refused to enforce it, claiming as authority the earlier case of
Young v. Gordon and the power of the courts to modify penalties which
would otherwise "produce gross injustice". The reference to penalties,
5
which, if exorbitant, were originally modified on the ground of usury,
1 (1896) 23 R. 419.
2
Gloag on Contract. 492 suggests that the judgment was based on
fraud which was inferred from the gross inadequacy of consider¬
ation.





might he taken to mean that the court, in refusing enforcement, was
similarly motivated by considerations of usury. On the other hand,
the Moneylender Act 1900, which conferred on the court the power to
adjust "harsh and unconscionable" moneylending transactions"'" had then
just been passed and although it did not apply to the transactions in
question, it is at least probable that the court was influenced by it.
In addition, it was clear that the lesion did not stand alone - not
only was it explicitly stated in the latter case that Stephen was old,
simple and timid, but the enoimity of the lesion in the earlier case
might also be taken as evidence that Young was either extremely
necessitous or, at least, very inexperienced in financial matters.
Apart from these cases there is little evidence to indicate that
the concept of usury was given a wider role in Scots law. Both the
2
courts and the institutional writers proved unwilling to advocate relief
from a contract merely because there had been inequality in the
exchange between the parties. Stair, while conceding that the purpose
of the contracting parties was to "keep an equality in the worth and
3
value of the things, fruit, or works interchanged" and that "unjust
4
balances are an abomination to the Lord", rejected the civilian
5
doctrine of laesio enormis, and the notion that an unequal bargain
Section 1.
Moneymusk v, Lesley 1635 Mor. 4956; McLachlan v. Watson (l874)
S.L.R. 549, 550 and 551; McKirdy v. Anstruther (l839)~~l D. 855,
863; Caledonian Railway Co. v. North British Railway Co. (l88l)






I, 10, 14 citing Fairie v. Inglis 1669 Mor. 14231. See also
Karnes, op.cit., 80; Erskine IV, 1, 27; Bell, Commentaries, I. 317.
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should ex post facto lead to reparation, on the ground that as the
value of goods depended upon "necessity, utility and delectation""'" it
was not static and might change along with changing circumstances.
There could thus be no determinant of the value of goods other than
the free parties themselves. However, according to Stair an equality
2
had to be observed in respect of penalties and irritancies.
Scots law made one exception to the general principle that
inequality in the bargain was an insufficient ground for reduction.
A contract concluded by a minor was and still is, reducible at any
time within four years after he has reached majority, upon proof of
3
minority and great lesion. The requirement of enorm lesion will be
met if it is shown that there was a striking disproportion between the
4
values exchanged. In general, the burden of proving lesion is on the
5
minor, but lesion will be presumed where he made a donation or grat-
g
uitously gave up his rights. Lesion will furthermore be presumed
where a minor has squandered the price paid for a sale made by him
7
or a loan made to him.
Apart from a few exceptional cases Scots law has been unwilling
to grant relief from unfair bargains by analogy to the usury laws or





^ Stair I, 6, 44; Erskine I, 7, 34; McGuire v. Addie & Sons'
Collieries 1950 S.C. 537.
^ Robertson v. Henderson (1905) 7 F. 776.
^ Falconer v. Thomson 1792 Mor. 16380.
6
Stair I, 6, 44; Erskine I, 7, 37.
7
Ferguson v. Yuill (l835) 13 S. 886.
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given such a right, yet the Lords are not curators to all who in this
1 2
manner dispose upon their rights". Even in the time of Stair it
was realized that to relieve from bargains merely because they
stipulated for an unequal exchange would be detrimental to commerce.
It would, however, be wrong to draw the conclusion that the Scots
courts regarded the fairness of contracts as irrelevant to the question
of whether or not they should be enforced. The various ways through
which the courts have attempted to control unfair contracts will be
examined in the following chapters.




2- BONA FIDES IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT
Some writers on modern law, notably Professors T.B. Smith"'" and
2
J.J. Gow have expressed the opinion that Scots law recognises a
general standard of bona fides in contracts. This view has recently
3been echoed by the Scottish Law Commission. Gloag, in his treatise
4
on Contract, referred to the fact that contracts are construed on
the assumption of honest dealing, but was otherwise silent on the
subject. Smith, Gow and the Scottish Law Commission relied almost
exclusively on statements by the institutional writers as authority
for their views.
The concept of bona fides has played an important role in the
5
"moralization of contracts" in many jurisdictions, notably those of
g
continental Europe and could fulfil a similar function in Scots law.
A large number of rules and principles which govern the law of
7
contract can be ascribed to good faith. These individual elements
Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland, 297-298, 756, 830,
838 et seq.
2
Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland, 179 et seq. See also
by the same author, Warrandice in Sale of Goods(1963) 8 Jur.
Rev. 31, 62-64.
3





Ripert, La Regie Morale Dans les Obligations Civiles, 92-93,
as cited by R.A. Newman, The Cleft: The Similarity of Fundamental
Doctrines of Law which underlies their Conceptual formulation in
different Legal systems (1967) 18 Hastings L.J. 481, 503.
^
See generally Newman, op,cit., 502-506.
^ See R.A. Powell, Good Faith in Contracts (1956) 9 Curr. Leg. Prob. 16.
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of good faith have infiltrated into almost every aspect of contract
law: the formation and performance of contracts, the raising and
resolving of contractual disputes, and the taking of remedial action."'"
However, the aim in this chapter is to determine whether or not Scots
law ever imposed an overriding requirement of "bona fides in contracts.
In order to do so it is necessary first to examine the role of "bona
fides in Roman law, the system in which the concept of bona fides
originated.
Bona fides in Roman law
In Roman law a standard of contractual fairness was implemented
through the requirement of bona fides. A distinction was drawn between
2
iudicia stricti iuris and iudicia bonae fidei. In the former category,
the judex was confined to a strict and literal interpretation of the
formula and had no discretion to take into account outside factors.
The harshness of keeping a debtor bound to his obligations under all
circumstances was alleviated by providing him with a defence called the
exceptio doli. The exceptio had to be expressly inserted in the
formula. It required the judex to take into consideration, in the
R.S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (1968) 54 Va.,L. Rev. 195.
See also F. Kessler and E. Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining
in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study (1964)
77 Harv. L. Rev. 401.
2
See generally Sohm, Institutes of Roman Law, 367-371; Kaser,
Roman Private Law. 142 et seq.
Sohm, op.cit., 279-282; Kaser, op.cit.; Buckland, A Text-Book
of Roman Law, 679.
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first place, the fact that the plaintiff had been guilty of dolus, or
conscious misrepresentation, at the time of the formation of the
contract. However, even where there had been no misrepresentation,
the exceptio doli required of the judex to take account, in the second
place, of dolus of which the plaintiff was guilty merely by bringing
the action against the debtor."1" Dolus, in this latter sense, meant
that the plaintiff brought the action knowing that it was a violation
of bona fides to do so. According to Sohm
/S/uch would be the case, for example, if a person were
to sue on a transaction which he had obtained from the
defendant by intimidation, or if he were to sue the
defendant in breach of an informal agreement not to sue
(pactum de non petendo). In this way the exceptio doli
may sometimes serve the purposes of an exceptio metus or
exceptio pacti. But Roman jurisprudence did not stop
there. An exceptio doli was declared to be available,
not only where the plaintiff, by taking legal proceed¬
ings, was acting maliciously, but also wherever, as it
was said, 'ipsa res in se dolum habet'... i.e. wherever
the raising of the action constituted objectively a
breach of good faith. The insertion of the exceptio
doli in the formula was considered to empower the judge
to take account of every single circumstance that would
render the condemnation of the defendant substantially
unjust.,. /T7t was this breadth of scope that fitted
the exceptio doli for becoming the instrument employed,
both in the theory and the practice of Roman law, for
effecting such modifications of the material law as
equity seemed to require.^
Sohm, op.cit., 279-280. Although modern commentators on Roman
law sometimes refer to the exceptio doli which pertained to
fraudulent misrepresentation as the exceptio doli specialis
and to the other as the exceptio doli generalis, Roman law did
not draw this terminological distinction.
Sohm, op.cit., 280. See also Jolowicz, Historical Introduction
to the Study of Roman Law, 425.
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Apart from formal contracts Roman law also recognised consensual
contracts, indicia "bonae fidei. There it was not necessary to raise
the exceptio doli expressly: exceptio doli iudiciis bonae fidei inest."^"
The index therefore automatically took into consideration dolus. He
had to examine the legal relationship and determine the content of a
party's obligations by reference to the objective norm of bona fides,
2
or by what was bonum et aequum in the circumstances.
3
According to Van Oven defective consent was not in classical
Roman law an independent ground for refusing enforcement of a consensual
contract. By virtue of the implied exceptio doli the mere bringing of
an action for enforcement of an improperly obtained contract constituted
dolus, and was thus refused on the ground of being a violation of bona
fides.
Roman law required bona fides in every stage of a contract: the
causa or the foundation of the legal tie, the formation, and the per¬
formance. The existence and scope of a party's obligations were
assessed by reference to what good faith required. As Powell said,
bona fides defined "the whole complex of rights and duties between the
4
parties in the particular transaction'.' The good faith required of the
parties often reflected commercial usage, but bona fides was a suffic¬
iently flexible standard for it to be used to impose various duties
on the parties in order to remain in tune with changing conceptions in
5
society's values and customs.
1
D. 10.1.14; 24.3.21 and 30.5.84.
2
Kaser, op.cit., 142.




De Zulueta, The Roman Law of Sale, 9.
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Bona fides in Scots Law
( i) The institutional writers
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when Roman law influence
in Scotland was at its peak, were also the formative centuries of modern
Scots law."'" The imprint of Roman law on the developing Scottish legal
system was thus necessarily extensive and this is nowhere more evident
2
than in the law of contract.
Scots law apparently accepted the Roman distinction between
contracts stricti juris and contracts bonae fidei. Craig's Jus Feudale
showed strong Roman law influence and his exposition of bona fides was
both one of the most unequivocal in the institutional writings and
conceptually the most closely aligned to bona fides as it existed in
Roman law.
Contracts 'bonae fidei' are those which are interpreted
in accordance with the fair and just intention of the
parties even though they have not themselves fully
expressed it. In construing them regard is paid
rather to the intention of the mind than to the words
employed. As Hotman puts it, it is as if the parties
had agreed that their rights under the contract should
be those which are fair and just in its circumstances.
The class of contracts 'bonae fidei' includes all the
mutual contracts, such as purchase and sale, lease,
hire and those others which are enumerated by Justinian...
/I7n this whole class of contract the reliance placed by
the parties on the sincerity of each other's contractual
intentions makes it necessary to ascertain the precise
effect of their agreement by reference to that which is
fair and just, and to that which is ordinarily done in
similar transactions. In contracts 'stricti juris'
P. Stein, The Influence of Roman Law on the Law of Scotland (1957)




it would be a great mistake to suppose that consider¬
ations of good faith or of fairhess and justice are put
out of view; but considerations of that nature are
restricted within narrower bounds and are controlled by
the formal stipulations made by the parties. It is
not therefore admissable to depart from the express
terms of such a contract nor to add to them. All formal
engagements are 'stricti juris', such as cautionry and
bail... /T/he contracts of lease, sale, and the rest,
remain by our law contracts 'bonae fidei' as they were
by the Law of Rome, each party being bound to fulfill all
conditions required by good faith and justice according
to the nature of the contract even though these conditions
be not expressly mentioned.!
It is clear from the juxtaposition of contracts stricti juris
and contracts bonae fidei that in Scots law, as in Roman law, bona fides
defined the rights and obligations of each party to the contract bonae
fidei. Although the primary sources of the contractual content were
to be found in the intention of the parties and common usage, the courts
also had the power to depart from or add to the express terms of the
agreement in order to attain a contract which corresponded more closely
to the standard of what was "fair and just" in the circumstances.
Stair, although he maintained that "bonum et aequum" were the
foundations of the whole caselaw of Scotland, made hardly any reference
to bona fides. However, in his Institutions he wrote:
The civil law gives so little to mutuum, by the nature
of the contract, that it is amongst the contracts
stricti juris, where nothing is understood but what is
expressed, or necessarily consequent therefrom: and^






Stair evidently regarded mutuum in Scots law as also being
stricti juris, because he continued: "So we allow no profit in mutuo,
unless it be so agreed upon"."'" The same strictness of interpretation
2
applied to tacks, which Stair described as strictissimi juris. And
in discussing mandate, he said that the "mandatar" who, unaware that
the mandant had died, performed the mandate, had the exception bonae
3
fidei. The diligence required of a mandator was not the "exactest
diligence" as Roman law would have it, but, in view of the fact that
the undertaking is gratuitous, merely such diligence as the mandator
4
would use in his own affairs, "but still there must be bona fides".
In view of Craig's strong assertions as to the importance of
bona fides in contracts, Stair's relative silence is all the more
peculiar. His singling out, and implied acceptance of mutuum and
tacks as stricti juris probably indicates that they were worth special
mention because they were exceptions to the general rule of contracts
being bonae fidei. In view of Stair's numerous statements to the
5
effect that bonum et aequum underlie Scots law it is certainly far more
plausible to accept this explanation than to take it that he denied the
existence of a general standard of good faith in the Scots law of con¬








I, 12, 10. See also I, 9, 10 where Stair described the contract
of sale as bonae fidei.
5
See, for example, I, 1, 18.
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Bankton referred to the Roman law distinction between contracts
bonae fidei and stricti juris and concluded that "we have little use
for this distinction","'" not because bona fides was not known, but
2
because "only Loan and Promises are strictly interpreted". Contracts
bonae fidei he described as those in which the judge has
liberty to determine, upon the mutual obligations of
the parties, from the nature of the contract, accord¬
ing to their presumed will, as in Sale, Mandate,
Location and other enumerated by the Emperor /Justinian/
Karnes, discussing equity in Scots law, also referred to bona
fides in contracts:
Among persons who are swayed by interest more than by
conscience, the employing indirect means to evade the
effect of their engagements, is far from being rare.
Such conduct, as being inconsistent with that candor
and bona fides which is requisite in contracting, and
in performing contracts, is morally wrong, and a court
of equity will be watchful to disappoint every attempt
of that nature.4
Kames also distinguished contracts bonae fidei from contracts
stricti juris and said that in the former "equity may interpose to
correct inequalities, and to adjust all matters according to the
5
honest intentions of the parties. In the latter group nothing could
be considered which was not part of the agreement. Contracts bonae
fidei were those where the performance was merely a means to a further
end, for example, where horses are purchased for the purposes of breed¬
ing. The horses had to be fit for breeding otherwise equity would











was an end in itself.
Bell, the last of the institutional writers, was already
strongly influenced by classical contract theory and it is therefore
not surprising that bona fides, as a residual requirement for a valid
2
contract, played no role in his writings at all. However, in his
Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland he did refer to the
Roman distinction between contracts bonae fidei and contracts stricti
juris, but he made no comment on its relevance to the Scots law of
his time.
(ii) Seventeenth and eighteenth century caselaw
Seventeenth and eighteenth century case reports were brief and
although they generally referred to the arguments of counsel, they
gave no, or very few, reasons for the courts'decision. Yet, in a
number of cases the contract in question was referred to as being
3 4either bonae fidei or stricti juris.
5
In Fleming and Gibson v. Fleming and Baird, B had accepted




See, however, Principles, 474 where Bell described insurance as a
contract of good faith.
3 Morison and Glen v. Forrester 1712 Mor. 14236 - emption vendition;
Coutts & Co. v. Allen & Co. 9 January 1758 F.C. 144 - purchase and
sale; Sword v. Robert and Alexander Sinclair, and Campbell 1771
Mor. 14241 - purchase and sale; Stewart v. Morison 1779 Mor. 7080 -
insurance contract; Thompson v. Buchanan 1781 Hailes 886 - insurance
contract; Kinloch v. Campbell 14 June 1815 F.C. 421 - insurance
contract.
4
Duke of Lauderdale v. Lord and Lady Yester and the Earl of Tweed-




of all that his wife could succeed to by her family. However, as the
wife's mother had earlier put more bonds in the wife's name she
pursued B and his wife to grant an assignment of this sum and to repay
the sums which he had used over and above that constituted by the
tocher. The pursuer alleged that as this was a honae fide contractus
the meaning and interest of parties is most to he
respected; and therefore, though it contains but
expressly a discharge, which cannot he effectual to
lift the sums from the creditors, hut would lose them
to both parties, he must assign; especially, seeing
his acceptance of full satisfaction imports an oblige-
ment to denude himself of the superplus; and which the
Lords found relevant, and sustained the summons.^
(iii) Bona fides after the rise of freedom of contract
The requirement of bona fides did not, as one would have expected,
disappear entirely during the nineteenth century. Surprisingly little
was heard of it in respect of the contract of purchase and sale^but it
did make an appearance through the recognition that a warrandice existed
•3
in respect of the goods sold. Lord Justice-Clerk Hope, charging the
jury in Whealler v. Methuen expressed the principle as follows:
Ibid. See also Wemysses v. Wemyss 1768 Hailes 238, where a
marriage contract, although not signed, was held to he binding.
"In marriage-contracts" Lord Auchinleck said, "the greatest
honesty and fairness are required... Can this woman lie by
for thirty or forty years, and then object to the formality of
the contract, whereof she does not pretend that she was
ignorant?"
See, however, Whitson's Trustees v. Neilson (l828)6 S. 579
where the central question was whether the contract had been
implemented in a manner consistent with bona fides.
See J.J. Gow, Warrandice in Sale of Goods (1963) 8 Jur. Rev. 31,
and Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland, 161; Brown on
Sale. 288.
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/r/he principle of the law of Scotland is, that every
man selling an article is hound, though nothing is said
of the quality, to supply a good article without defect,
unless there are circumstances to show that an inferior
article was agreed on. That is the implied warranty in
law, and therefore the price agreed on is important, as
showing the 'understanding of the parties. For when
anyone sends an order for goods, without a word as to
their quality, he is entitled to such an article, as
the price entitles him to expect, of good, sound, fair
quality.1
Although later in the nineteenth century insurance contracts,
under the influence of English law, came to be referred to as uberrimae
fidei, the courts early in that century apparently still regarded them
as no different from most of the other types of contracts and they were
2 3
referred to as being bonae fidei. According to Bell insurance was a
contract of good faith because the insurer, in calculating the risks
to be run, greatly relied on the statement of the insured.
Both Rankine^ and Hunter^made spirited pleas that leases or tacks
should be regarded as bonae fidei contracts and not stricti juris as
the institutional writersSiad asserted. Both writers relied on a
7
number of cases as authority for their views. However, in many of
^ (1843) 5 D-4-02, 406. See also the statement by the same judge
in Paterson v. Dickson (1850) 12D. 502, 503.
2
Thompson v. Buchanan 1781 Hailes 886; Forbes & Co. v. Edinburgh





Law of Leases in Scotland, 98.
^ Landlord and Tenant. Vol II, 149-152.
^
See, for example, Erskine II, 6, 31; Bankton II, 9, 11.
^
See, for example, Smith v. Robertson (l83l)9 S. 751, 752;
Ross v. Sutherland (1838)16 S. 1179. 1180; Wight v. Earl of
. Hopetoun (1858) 2QD. 955, 958; Fraser v. Ewart 25 February 1813
F.C. 223.
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these cases bona fides was given a limited role: It was no longer
regarded as the norm by reference to which the parties' rights and
obligations were determined. Bona fides at most functioned to prevent
an unreasonable interpretation being given to ambiguous terms."'" As
Lord Curriehill said in Wight v. Earl of Hopetoun:
/T/he court is not to alter the express stipulations
of parties in any contract, yet it is a principle in
our law that certain contracts are to be regarded as
contracts in bona fide, and are to be construed so
as to give effect to the probable intention of the
parties.2
There is no doubt, however, that even in the second half of the
nineteenth century bona fides could still be used to limit a party in
the exercise of his right.
3
In Wemyss v. Wilson , the First Division affirmed the decision
of Sheriff Monteith to award damages to a tenant of a farm on the ground
that the landlord had increased the game on the farm beyond what was
fair. Although there was no provision in the contract as to an
increase in the game Sheriff Monteith based his judgment on the fact
that a lease was a contract bonae fidei.
and that as such it falls to be construed according
to the understanding of the contracting parties at its
date: Finds that the law does not recognise any right
on the part of landlords to exercise their exclusive
privileges in regard to the game upon their lands, in a
manner inconsistent with the bona fides of contracts of
lease existing between them and their tenants.4
See, however, Stirling v. Miller 29 June 1813 F.C. 416 in which
the court considered the effect of a clause in a tack to which a
party had succeeded,stipulating personal residence. Lord Meadow-
Bank declared that "/t7he clause must be construed reasonably, and
with allowance for all contingencies. Now, here the party was
detained by the hand of God, and unable to comply with the provision
of residence, without any fault of her own. /it/ is to receive a
fair interpretation, according to the course of human affairs" 7.4127
2 (1858) 20D. 955, 958.
3 (1847) 1QD. 194.
4 Ibid.. 195.
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And. in Morton v. Graham''" a lease contained a clause reserving to the
landlord "all game /etc^J with the exclusive liberty to him...of
hunting, shooting, sporting and fishing on the premises, without being
liable to compensate the tenant in respect of the reservation and
liberty herein expressed." In an action by the tenant for damages
caused by an increase in the game, the court held that as the parties
had contemplated such an increase and it had not been extravagant,
the pursuer could not succeed. However, referring to the rule set out
2
in Wemyss v. Wilson Lord President Inglis said:
I think the great principle involved in that mile is,
that something has been done by the landlord not con¬
templated in the contract of lease, and against the
faith of the contract.3
As the parties here envisaged an increase, that rule was not applicable.
The question here was whether the increase had
been done to so unreasonable an extent as nevertheless
to admit a claim of damages on the part of the tenant...
ZI7t was plainly contemplated that the agricultural
tenant should suffer damage, but for that he was to
have no claim. Still I can imagine a case of such
extravagant and unscrupulous use of means to increase
the game as would amount to a fraud on the agricultural
tenant, and open to him such remedy as he here seeks...
I think that where a tenant is by his lease declared to
have no claim for compensation, unless he makes out a
case amounting to bad faith on the part of the landlord
he has no claim for damages.4
Lord Ardmillan reiterated these views by saying that the tenant was
"bound by that clause according to its fair meaning, and with reference
1 (1867) 6M. 71.
2 (1847) 10D. 194.




to the state of the faim".^
Veinyss v. Wilson and Morton v. Graham were decided at a time
when bona fides was generally being given a more restricted function
and in an era which, on the whole,was hostile to general standards such
as good faith. Yet they clearly illustrate the way in which bona fides
was used to impose certain limitations on the rights arising from a
contract. Looked at differently, it can also be said that, by virtue
of the standard of good faith, the court imposed on the landlord an
additional duty, to exercise his right reasonably.
In the Wemyss and Morton cases good faith fulfilled a role
similar to that of implied terms in presentday law. In addition, those
cases illustrate the way in which bona fides could have been employed to
undercut unfair exemption clauses. However, that potential has not
been realized. Although Gloag stated that "/I7t is a general rule
2
that contracts are to be construed on the assumption of honest dealing"
the context in which this statement appeared clearly indicated that by
"honest dealing" he merely meant subjective honesty and not that the
rights and obligations of the parties would be determined or adjusted
by reference to what an objective standard of bona fides required in
the circumstances.
(iv) Conclusions
As far as it is possible to make any firm deductions from the





eighteenth century Scots law accepted the distinction between contracts
bonae fidei and contracts stricti juris. Most contracts were regarded
as bonae fidei: mutuum, tacks and possibly "transaction""'' (compensation)
being the exceptions. In the case of stricti juris contracts, the
creditors could insist on performance according to the precise terms
of the agreements. In bonae fidei contracts, however, the court, in
assessing the scope and content of the rights and obligations of the
respective parties, had to do so by reference to what bona fides
required. This process involved more than a mere interpretation in
good faith of the terms of the agreement. It meant that the court, in
deciding the manner in which the agreement was to be implemented - or
applied in the concrete situation - could, by virtue of the residual
requirement of bona fides, add to or depart from the terms agreed on
by the parties. As Craig said, "it is as if the parties had agreed
that their rights under the contract should be those which are fair and
2
just in the circumstances". In essence this meant that a creditor
could only rely on a contractual right and claim performance in terms
of the agreement if it was consistent with bona fides to do so. That
did not entail that the agreement reached by the parties was worthless
or that what bona fides required in a particular situation was deter¬
mined solely by the courts subjective view of fairness. In Scots law,
just as in Roman law, bona fides was an objective standard and the
intention of the parties, commercial usage and the mores of the





Bona fides was still referred, to in a few early nineteenth century
cases, as well as in some treatises. Wemyss v. Wilson"*"and Morton v.
2
Graham showed that even in the second half of that century a court
could still to some extent define parties'rights and obligations by
reference to good faith requirements. However, in most of the nine¬
teenth century caselaw bona fides was used in a narrow sense, to mean
that contract terms, if ambiguous, should be construed so as to have
a reasonable rather than an unreasonable effect.
Even during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the require¬
ment of bona fides never appears to have been very clearly circumscribed
or consistently applied so that it is not surprising that it fell into
disuse during the reign of freedom of contract. As there is virtually
no reference to an overriding standard of bona fides to be found in
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries it can only be surmised that
the entire concept had contracted to become merely a canon of construct¬
ion. As it had become completely subordinated to the principle of
freedom of contract it lost its effectiveness as an instrument through
which contractual fairness could be promoted. However, bona fides.
as a residual requirement for a valid contract has not been abolished
3
by statute or authoritative decision and could possibly be resurrected
4
by an enterprising court.
1 (1847) 1®. 194.
2 (1867) 6M. 71.
3
Scottish Law Commission, op.cit., 142-143.
^
In South African law, for example, the exceptio doli has recently
been resurrected as a ground for refusing enforcement of contractual rights
which would otherwise have caused great injustice: See NoVick v.
Comair Holdings Ltd., 1979(2) S.A. 116 (WLD); Rand Bank Ltd. v.
Rubenstein 1979(2) S.A. 848 (WLD).
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It was pointed, out that in Roman law bona fides, whether
intrinsically as in the case of iudicia bonae fidei or through the
exceptio doli as in the case of stricti juris contracts, was required
in every stage of a contract, from its formation to its performance.
It is, on the other hand, a common feature of both Scots institutional
writing and judicial utterances on the subject of bona fides that refer¬
ence was made predominantly to the relevance of good faith in respect of
the process of determining the content of the parties' rights and
obligations and to the implementation of the agreement. The fact that
bona fides was hardly mentioned in relation to the formation of con¬
tracts in Scots law does not mean that it was not required in that field.
It merely means that with the rise of the individual will or intention
as the basis of contractual liability, the function fulfilled in that
area by bona fides in Roman law was, in seventeenth century Scots law,
taken over by the notion of consent."'" The rise of the will theory,
caused the link between fraud, vis ac metus and error, and the good
faith principle to be severed and the latter's sphere of influence to
be confined to the implementation of the contract. The substitution
of the specific defects, fraud, error and vis ac metus, for the general,
violation of bona fides, was a formal process, attributable to the newly
found importance of consensus rather than to any fundamental change of
policy. There was and is no necessary conflict between the require¬
ment of consensual propriety and that of good faith. As Abas rightly
pointed out, the cases where a party will truly consent to enter into
2
what is for him a highly disadvantageous transaction, are extremely rare.
""




At first sight it would not seem as if fraud, error and force
and fear would be wide enough to cover all the improprieties
which Roman law could categorise simply as violations of bona fides.
Yet, when the nature of fraud, as set out by the institutional writers,
is examined it becomes clear that, like Roman dolus.it had the character
of a residual category, growing in meaning and content as new manifest¬
ations of improper conduct were classified as fraud.
The most widely accepted definition of fraud was that given by
Erskine: "a machination or contrivance to deceive".''" This already
broad notion of fraud was further expanded by the custom of inferring
fraud from the facts of a particular case. Stein said that
/s7uch cases were justified as being lata culpa quae
dolo aequiparatur:'for the difference betwixt dolus
and lata culpa is that dolus est magis animi.and
oftentimes by positive acts, and lata culpa is rather
facti, and by omission of that which the party is
obliged to show.^
3
By this device the category fraud was broadened to include not only
conscious misrepresentation and concealment but things as diverse
as the conclusion of contracts by insolvents, the exploitation of the
facile, the weak, the necessitous and the inexperienced, as well as
the so-called pacta contra fidem tabularum. It can thus be said that
in seventeenth and eighteenth century Scots law, fraud functioned as a




Stein, Fault in the formation of contract in Roman law
Scots law. 173 citing Stair I, 9, 11.
3
See generally McBryde, Void, Voidable. Illegal and Unenforceable
Contracts in Scots Law. 71-92.
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ground, on which to denounce any agreement which the courts regarded as
unjust. Since that era the concept of fraud has been whittled down.
In addition many of the instances covered by fraud have evolved into




Although Scots law has, with a few exceptions"'", proved
unwilling to relieve from contracts merely on the ground of inequality
in the exchange, there are statements by the institutional writers and
in reported cases which suggest that a contract may be so extortion¬
ate in its terms that reduction of it is justified even though there
was no fiduciary relationship between the parties, nor improper
2
practice, nor a legal defect in capacity. However, neither the
institutional writers nor the courts have dealt with the problem of
such extortionate contracts in a uniform manner. Two approaches have
been adopted: on the one hand, relief has been given on the basis
that an unfair contract could be attributed to, or explained by, a
bargaining weakness of the disadvantaged party. In such a case it
was apparently assumed that the benefiting party had exploited the
particular bargaining handicap of the other by taking from the latter
an unfair advantage. On the other hand, the courts have reduced con¬
tracts on the ground of fraud which was inferred principally from the
inequality of the parties and the lesion suffered by the inferior
party, or from enorm lesion in itself.
For his opinion that extortionate contracts may be reduced
Gloag relied primarily on Stair, who despite his assertion that an
3




Gloag on Contract, 492-493- See also Walker, Principles of Scot¬
tish Private Law, Vol. I, 597; Walker, Equity in Scots Law, 346-347;




maintained, that there may be circumstances in which the court may
compel a person to sell his goods at a "just price". This can occur
for example,
if the buyer take advantage of the ignorance and simplicity
of the seller, and where there is no alteration of the common
rate, nor ground thereof asketh or taketh more ... /or/ when
ware is kept up till pinching necessity. ... or when some
special necessity of an acquirer puts him so upon the mercy of
the disponer, that he may take a price, even above that which
himself accounts the thing worth.
To Stair the mere fact that there was no deceit on the part of the
disponer is of no consequence. What is required for judicial inter¬
vention is that the seller exploited or took advantage of the diffic¬
ulties of the buyer, to the latter's financial detriment. The court
may intervene even though the buyer knowingly paid more for something
than it was worth. The court, having found the contract to be
"extortionate" may then either reduce it completely or adjust the price
2
so that it conforms to what is just in the circumstances. The just
3
price will normally be the "common" price, that is the market price.
A few cases exist in which the courts acted on principles
4
similar to those set out by Stair. In Murray v. Murray's Trustees,
the pursuer, a young and inexperienced man, received £400 through a
legacy from his uncle, to whom he was also heir at law. He was sub¬







4 (1826) 4S. 374.
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requested him to renounce his legal rights as heir. He complied as he
was ■under the impression that his uncle wished to disinherit him
completely. As there was some doubt about the validity of this deed
the pursuer was asked to subscribe to another deed of renunciation.
He again complied, ostensibly "from feelings of gratitude and regard
for his deceased uncle, and from a conviction of the probably ruinous
effects to all parties of any attempt to disturb the settlements of
the defunct.""'" The Lord Ordinary, discussing the reduction of these
2
deeds, referred with apparent approbation to the cases of Lochiel's
Trustees""' and M'Neill v. M'Neill^", and said that
/t/hese cases seem to lead to the conclusion, that, without
being obliged to establish facility, a very unequal transact¬
ion entered into, by which a great advantage has been
obtained by one of the parties from the ignorance or want of
experience of the other, who ought to have been invited to seek
the aid of a friend or a man of business to advise with,
may be set aside.5
On appeal, the court affirmed the decision of the Lord Ordinary and
refused to sustain the deeds on the ground that they had been procured
from an ignorant and inexperienced young man without the benefit of
deliberation or advice and that he had been taken advantage of.^
7
And in Ewen v. Magistrates of Montrose where a father had
obtained a discharge of his obligations from his married daughter for





3 8th July 1795.
^
January 1816.
5 (1826) 4S. 374, 377.
6
Ibid.. 378-380.
7 (1830) 4W. & S., Sc.App. 346.
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contract on the ground that the father had taken advantage of his
daughter's anxiety about her and her husband's imminent departure for
India and of the financial distress of his son-in-law.""
2
A similar approach was followed in M'Donagh v. MacLellan ,
where in an action by an employee for compensation for injuries suffer¬
ed in the course of his duties, the employer relied on a document signed
by the employee, stating that he had received £8 in full compensation.
The Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff held that although the employee had
signed the document and had thus formally assented to the transaction,
that fact did not exclude an additional claim, as there was ample
evidence that the employee was an unsophisticated and illiterate man
and "the parties /were/ not altogether upon an equal footing".
The employee was inferior to the other in rank and did not have the
same facilities for considering the document. Where that is the case
the party suffering from the insufficiency of understanding must he
4
made perfectly aware of the effect of his actions. And in Gilmour,
Morton and Co. v. Bolland,~" the Lord Ordinary (Lord Johnston) similarly
held that a discharge of all future claims, given by a man who could
neither read nor write and which was signed for him by an agent of his
employers, was ineffectual.
""
Ibid.. 357 per Lord Wynford.





1906, 14 S.L.T. 583.
r
See, however, Welsh v. Cousin (1899) 2F. 277, where Lord Kyllachy
maintained that the question was not whether the grantor read or
understood a document, but whether he was capable of doing so and
being so, signed it voluntarily.
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These cases illustrate that lesion which can be traced to and
explained by the necessity, dependence, inexperience, insufficient
knowledge or understanding of the disadvantaged party, may provide a
basis on which the contract can be set aside. Some cases leave one
with the impression that an unfair contract may be insulated from
attack if the stronger party has made perfectly sure that the inferior
one is fully informed as to the nature and effect of the agreement.
Informed consent may thus save an unfair bargain from being struck
down. This raises the important question of the standard of explana¬
tion or enlightenment that a party is bound to provide - is it such as
would remove the misunderstanding from a reasonable man or is the test
subjective? Although the courts did not directly address themselves
to this question, it would seem as if the character of the party in
question can not be left out of consideration. In addition,
judicial dicta suggest that an unfair contract may be enforced if the
inferior party was given the benefit of independent advice.
In contrast to the case where a party is taken advantage of
because of his insufficient understanding is the situation highlighted
by Stair, namely where a party is compelled by his necessity to con¬
clude the agreement. In such a case there can be no question of
insulating the contract from attack by providing the disadvantaged
party with independent advice or by explaining to him the effect of
the terms. Indeed, Stair acknowledged that a person may knowingly
have to submit to onerous terms in such circumstances.
So, in Anstruther v. Wilkie"^" the court reduced an undertaking
"*■ (1856) 18D. 405. This case is also sometimes cited as authority
for the recognition of undue influence in Scots law.
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by a "needy embarrassed, destitute client" to give £1,000, ostensibly
as a gift, to his agent. Lord Justice-Clerk Hope declared that this
was obviously no gift, but a sum extorted as an extra reward for
1
services.
Advantage of the embarrassed condition of the client's affairs
the agent shall not take for his own interest, and in
order to obtain gifts, as this is called, for himself, on the
condition of ordinary professional aid, as here, in obtaining
a loan, which the pressing embarrassments of the client
required to be immediately procured, to relieve him from
destitution or personal diligence.^
Later writers, while pursuing a similar aim, proposed a differ¬
ent approach to that set out above. Bankton, Erskine, and later also
Bell, postulated fraud as the basis of judicial intervention. Such
an approach was, of course, facilitated by the wide meaning given to
3
fraud in Scots law. Fraud was not only defined widely, but was
further expanded by the custom of inferring fraud from the facts
of a particular case. Although Stair expressed the opinion that
. . 4 5
"/f/raud is not to be presumed, but must be proven", Stein pointed
out that this view was by implication contradicted by Stair himself.
Bankton was less ambiguous than Stair: he maintained that
/f7raud is either in the thing itself, and signified the
enormous Lesion or Prejudice sustained by one, even tho'
there was no fraudulent purpose in the other to wrong
him.6
He added:
Deceit is never presumed, but must be clearly proved ... But
sometimes the deeds themselves, without any proof of actual














as when there is Great Lesion in the case, the deed bearing
an affected recital, or otherwise being liable to suspicion,
and the granter a weak person.^
And according to Erskine
All bargains which, from their very appearance discover
oppression, or an intention in any of the contractors to
catch some undue advantage from his neighbour's necessities,
lie open to reduction on the head of dole or extortion, with¬
out the necessity of proving any special circumstance of fraud
or circumvention on the part of that contractor.2
Fraud, therefore, comprised not only the well-known incidents of fraud¬
ulent misrepresentation and concealment, but also a variety of
transactions in which the courts were of the opinion that it would be
inequitable for a party to benefit from the contractual rights which he
had obtained. It is clear that the concept of fraud as espoused by
the institutional writers and in some judicial dicta, was not confined
to questions relating to the propriety of the formation of the contract,
but was concerned also with the objective merits of the agreement.
Even before the time of Bankton there were cases in which
the courts expressed the opinion that enorm lesion coupled with a
bargaining weakness could indicate dolus in re. In 1696 in Alison
3
v. Bothwell the court held that a bargain stipulating for a grossly
unequal exchange and made with a simple young man constituted dolus in
re and could therefore be adjusted in order to repair the damage.
4
And in Gordon v. Crauford and Crauford , a disposition of an estate





5 1696 Mor. 4954.
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necessitous and in debt, was set aside. The pursuer had argued that
the transaction should he set aside on the basis of fraud and circum¬
vention and the court accepted this argument, inferring fraud from the
distressed state of the grantor, the deceitful terms of some of the
writing and the great inequality of the bargain.
The practice of inferring fraud from the extortionate terms
of the contract continued into the nineteenth century. In the
previously cited case of Murray v. Murray's Trustees,4 Lord Hermand
declared that
/t/he very nature of the deed itself shows that he must
either have been an idiot, or must have been imposed upon;
and as I am of opinion that it was obtained under the
influence of ignorance and deception, it is impossible that
I can sustain it.^
3
And in Tennent v. Tennent's Trustees Lord Westbury expressed the
relevant principle as follows:
J_T/here is an equity which may be founded upon gross inad¬
equacy of consideration. But it can only be where the
inadequacy is such as to involve the conclusion that the
party either did not understand what he was about, or
was the victim of some imposition.4
At the same time, however, there is evidence of a hardening
5
of attitude in the nineteenth century. In M'Kirdy v. Anstruther,
for example, a person in great financial need sold a contingent inter¬
est in a succession for one quarter of its value. Lord Gillies
1 (1826) 45, 374.
2
Ibid.. 378-379.
3 (1870) 8M. (I!.!.) 10.
4
Ibid.. 26.
3 (1839) ID. 855. See also A.B, v. Joel (1849) 12D, 188; Mathieson
v. Hawthorns & Co. Ltd. (1899) 1 F. 468; Caledonian Railway Co.
v. North British Railway Co. (l88l) 8R.(H.L.) 23.
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declared that inadequacy of consideration was not per se sufficient
to reduce a transaction, but that the price may be so grossly inade¬
quate that it is evidence of facility on the part of the seller and
circumvention on the part of the buyer. But his Lordship made it
clear that in such a case the transaction would be reduced because
facility, circumvention and lesion were all present. The court
declined to intervene because both the seller and the buyer were men
of full discretion and intelligence, dealing fairly and openly towards
each other.""
The practice of inferring fraud from enorm lesion fell into
disfavour in the nineteenth century primarily because, under the
influence of freedom of contract, the concept of fraud was interpreted
far more restrictively than it had been in the previous century and
a half. Although, therefore, mere inadequacy of consideration was
unlikely to lead to a presumption of fraud "/s7uch inadequacy /would
still/, no doubt, form a very important element in considering the
2 3
question whether there has been fraud." In M'Lachlan v. Watson
the Lord Ordinary (Lord Mackenzie) admitted that the bargain under
scrutiny was a very hard one, yet he refused reduction on the ground
of extortion, because the agreement had been entered into with full




M'Lachlan v. Watson (1874) 11 S.L.R. 549, 550.
^ Ibid.
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party was "of undoubted capacity, and in a position to act and judge
for himself; and that he did so, perfectly understanding what he was
about." 4
It would therefore seem as if the power of the courts to set
aside unfair transactions on the ground of fraud or exploitation of
a party's bargaining handicap was interpreted more and more restrict-
2
ively in the course of the nineteenth century. Gloag cited only
two comparatively recent cases in support of his view that inequal¬
ity of the bargain could in itself lead to an inference of fraud,
Young v. Gordon^ and Gordon (Gordon's Administrator) v. Stephen.4
However, although the courts reduced the contracts in both these
5
cases, the bases on which they proceeded were not clearly stated.
Since then this jurisdiction has apparently passed into desuetude.
Despite some references to the contrary by Erskine^ it has
7
been authoritatively stated that the Chancery jurisdiction against
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4 - FACILITY AND CIRCUMVENTION
Stair made no mention of a separate and distinct doctrine of
facility and circumvention and neither did Bankton or Erskine. Never¬
theless, the latter two hinted in somewhat uncertain terms at the power
of the courts to reduce lesionous contracts concluded with facile
parties."'" Bell was the only one of the institutional writers who made
a distinct reference to facility and circumvention in the foim in which
it was to become known in modern times:
The deeds of persons of full age, not cognosced, nor
interdicted, may yet be reduced on showing evidence of
weakness of mind, combined with fraud (or circumvention,
as it is called in this Instance) and lesion... /¥/acility
alone, where the person has understanding enough to save
himself from a sentence of idiotry, is not a sufficient
ground of challenge; and still less is lesion by itself,
or gross inequality. But where lesion and facility
concur, or where facility and circumvention appear, or
even where there is lesion so gross as to indicate the
other two qualities, a deed of conveyance or contract
will be reducible. Such cases must, of course, depend
on their own circumstances, and scarcely can be brought
under any general rule of law.^
The protective policy of the courts operates in respect of both agree¬
ments inter partes, and testamentary dispositions of property. The
principles of what later came to be known as facility and circumvention
derive from the wide notion of fraud which Scots law recognised in the
3
seventeenth century. As early as 1669 in Trinch v. Watson the court
reduced a disposition on the ground of fraud and circumvention, which
Bankton I, 10, 66; Erskine IV, 1, 27.
2
Commentaries I, 136.
5 1669 Mor. 4958.
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was inferred entirely from the fact that the grantor was weak, stupid
and half deaf, coupled with the great inequality of the bargain. A
few years later in Galloway v. Duff"*- the court reduced a disposition,
again on the ground of fraud and circumvention, while stating in
support of this finding that the defender had ordered the dispositions
to be drawn up and that these were not read to the pursuer. The dis¬
position, which consisted of a tenement, some bonds and all the
pursuer's moveables, was made after the pursuer had been bleeding at
the nose for days and while she thought she was going to die.
The practice of inferring fraud and circumvention where a facile
party had been induced into a highly disadvantageous agreement was
2
followed in subsequent cases and almost a century later fraud was still
the customary ground for reducing such transactions. In Mackie v.
Maxwell, an heiress who was prone to drunkenness sold her lands to her
sister. The sister thereupon came to court to ask for reduction of
certain dispositions of land which some people, mostly innkeepers, had
elicited from the seller as payment for her liquor purchases. In




Maitland v. Fergusson 1729 Mor. 4956, affirmed in Fergusson v.
Maitland (1732) 1 Paton 73 - a deed reduced on the head of fraud
which was principally inferred from the facility of the grantor
coupled with the great inequality of the bargain. Contra:
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in order to get drinking money, and that the challenged dispositions
were not given for an adequate cause. The court reduced the dispos¬
itions on the ground of fraud and circumvention. However, Karnes,
commenting on the decision, denied that there was any evidence of
fraud and circumvention. The real basis of the judgment, he contended,
was that
UJt is certainly unjust to take advantage of weak
persons, who cannot resist certain temptations; and
to make use of such temptations to rob them of their
goods. Let us examine the foundation of a judicial
interdiction. It is nothing but a notification to
the lieges of the weakness of the person interdicted,
and to caution them against dealing with that person,
■unless upon an equal footing. It was therefore wrong
in the defenders to take advantage of the known facility
of Jean Mackie, and to elicit from her dispositions for
a song, at least far under the true value. Where a weak
person makes a deed, perhaps foolish, but voluntary,-'- in
favour of any person who is entirely passive, such a deed
admits of a very different construction. It is not
reducible, however strong the lesion may be.^
By the late eighteenth century the practice of inferring fraud
principally from the facility of one party coupled with the inequality
of the transaction, began to meet with some criticism. In Robertson
3 4
v. Fraser , a reference was made to two cases in which the Lords held
that facility and lesion, without specific averments of fraud, were
sufficient to reduce a transaction. In the Robertson case itself no
fraud other than that which could be inferred from the deed itself, was
Karnes was not correct if he implied that reduction would be
refused in all cases where a deed was made voluntarily. In
the Mackie case, for example, relief was given despite the
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The cases are referred to in the report as Dallas v. Dallas and
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alleged and the Lord Ordinary (Monboddo) thought that insufficient
and refused to allow proof of the reasons for reduction. The Lords,
on the other hand, allowed a proof and Lord Gardenston even went so
far as to hold that facility and lesion were, per se. sufficient
grounds for reduction.
The authority of the Robertson case was not strong enough to
change a practice which had, over such a long period of time, become
so deeply ingrained and the custom of inferring fraud continued in some
cases,"'" even well into the nineteenth century. However, it was clear
that the judicial attitude to the concept of fraud was changing and
that the prevailing tendency was to restrict its sphere of application.
Such an approach was no doubt more consistent with the classical theory
of contract which was beginning to hold sway at that time.
However, as could be expected during a time of change, the
general picture that emerged as regards the doctrine in the first half
of the nineteenth century was a conflicting one. There were dicta
in some cases which pointed to a stricter approach. In Scott v.
2
Wilson, for example, Lord Pitmilly declared that
/t7he pursuer must make out facility to the extent law
/slcj holds necessary - he must also prove lesion -
and likewise that all was done by fraud and circumvention.
Facility to a great extent, and lesion to the greatest
amount, are not sufficient without fraud and circumvention...
At the same time, if the facility and lesion are great then
slighter proof of fraud and circumvention are sufficient,
which is the only limitation I can make of the doctrine.-^
See, for example, White v. Ballantyne (1823) 1 Shaw's App. 472;
Mcllwham v. Kerr (1823) 2S. 240; Gibson & Others v. Watson & Others
(1827) 2 W. & S. 648; McDiarmid v. McDiarmid (1826) 4-S. 583;
affirmed in (1828) 3 Bli. N.S. 374. Contra: Scott v. Archibald and
Others 1789 Mor. 4965; Morrison v. Morrison (l84l) 4D. 337.




At the same time the tendency to infer fraud and circumvention primarily
from the facility and the lesion continued. In McNeill v. Moir4 there
was proof of facility and enormous lesion, but not of fraud. Never¬
theless, the court declared that
the transaction upon the face of it appeared so
grossly unequal and irrational, that it was plain
that it could only have been brought about by a
fraudulent advantage having been taken of his
facility.^
However, the whittling down of the concept of fraud in the
nineteenth century made it increasingly difficult to continue to give
relief on the ground of fraud in circumstances where no positive acts
of deceit were averred. At the same time the Court of Session proved
unwilling to limit the jurisdiction to that extent. The result was
3
that in Clunie v. Stirling , Lord Justice-Clerk Hope held that separate
issues of facility and circumvention on the one hand and fraud on the
other, should henceforth be granted.
After Clunie v. Stirling the established form of issue in these
cases was:
whether....the pursuer was weak and facile in mind,
and easily imposed on; and whether the defenders....
taking advantage of the pursuer's said facility and
weakness, did, by fraud or circumvention procure the
deed or minute of agreement,... to the lesion of the
pursuer.4
Although fraud continued to be included in the issue it was a much more
restricted species than the concept on which relief had earlier been
1 (1824) Shaw's App. 206.
2
Ibid.. 211-212.
5 (1854) 17D. 15, 19.
4 McCulloch v. McCracken (1857) 20D. 206, 210.
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based. In effect, therefore, the jurisdiction had, by the second half
of the nineteenth century, gained an existence independent of the pre¬
vailing notion of fraud. In order to be given relief it was necessary
to prove facility, fraud or circumvention, and lesion.
(i) Facility
The early cases,"'" where they did not refer merely to the weak¬
ness or facility of a party without more, alluded almost exclusively
to physical impairment as evidence of facility. It was only in the
nineteenth century that the courts began to regard facility primarily
2
as an impairment of the mind. Although the source of facility was
still predominantly the physical debility of a party the term was then
used to denote that state of mental weakness which arose from such
debility. The meaning of the term was further explained by Lord
Moncreiff when he said that the question of facility
does not depend altogether on the state of the mind in
respect of mere intellect or understanding. It rather
regards the state of the mind morally and constitution¬
ally, whereby it may be liable either to undue influence
induced by fraudulent pretences or to intimidation under
peculiar relations between the parties.^
The quintessence of facility is thus the fact that as a result of his
mental state a party is susceptible to imposition or as Lord Justice-




See ante, 2C9 and accompanying footnotes.
2
See the cases referred to in footnote 1, page 211.
^ Cairns v. Marianski (1850) 12D. 1286, 1290.
4 (1854) 17D. 15, 17.
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The requirement of facility has been very liberally interpreted
1
at times. In Gibson and Others v. Watson and Others, a deed of settle¬
ment executed by a woman who was found to be capable of disposing of her
estate was reduced because she was not in such a state of mind as to
appreciate that the effect of the deed was to deprive her of all her
2
power of revoking or altering it. And in McKellar v. McKellar. a
testator who had a "lack of fixity of purpose" was found to be facile
despite being able to conduct his other business quite satisfactorily.
The Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis in Morrison v. Maclean's Trustees, in
charging the jury, expressed the opinion that a man may be "facile for
want of judgment or reason, another man may be weak and facile from
3
mere nervousness and incapacity to resist solicitation". These dicta
show a considerable watering down of the requirement of facility, but
it is doubtful whether they can be regarded as representative of a new
direction. The view expressed by Lord Justice-Clerk Alness in his
dissenting judgment in Gibson's Executors v. Anderson, that facility
connoted pliability and meant that "a person is in such a mental state
that he is unable to resist pressure, and that someone else can mould
and fashion his conduct as he pleases"4 was rejected with some vehemence
5
by Lord Blackburn in the same case. Lord Blackburn instead accepted
the definition of facility given by Bell in his Dictionary and Digest
of the Law of Scotland:
1 (1827) 2 W. & S. 648.
2 (1861) 24D. 143.
3 (1862) 24D. 625, 635.
4




a condition of mental weakness, short of idiocy, in
which an individual is easily imposed upon and induced
to do deeds to his own prejudice
On the whole, the courts have been reluctant to expand the scope of
facility by discarding the requirement of a weakening of the mental
2 3
faculties. However, in Gray v. Bunny. Lord Deas was of the opinion
that facility
may arise from many different causes, temporary or
permanent - for instance, from old age, exciteability,
timidity, sickness, or, as in this case, from affect¬
ion.
(ii) Lesion
A contract will only be reduced where the pursuer has relevantly
averred that he suffered lesion as a result of it. Lesion is serious
loss, damage or detriment incurred as a result of the transfer of
property or rights whether gratuitously or in a contract for consider¬
ation. Where the lesion is great, the requirement of circumvention
4
will be inferred more readily. In addition, substantial lesion may
also to some extent be regarded as evidence of facility.
(iii) Circumvention
From the late seventeenth century until well into the nineteenth




In Gray v. Binny (1879) 7R. 332, 346, Lord Shand expressed the
opinion that where there was no averment of mental impairment
"facility" was not the appropriate term.
^ (1879) 7R. 332, 350. See also Clunie v. Stirling (1854) 17D.
15, 17 per Lord Justice-Clerk Hope.
^ Munro v. Strain (1874) IH. 1039, 1048; Mackay v. Campbell 1966
S.C. 237, 249.
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facility and his lesion. In the intellectual climate of the nineteenth
century the earstwhile wide concept of fraud was radically curtailed.
It was then thought that fraud could only be found if there had been
averments of positive acts of deceit. Naturally, such a notion of
fraud conflicted with the species on which reduction had customarily
been based and, if it had been required,would have severely restricted
the scope of the jurisdiction. In order to protect its jurisdiction
the Court of Session, therefore, held that reduction would be granted
if facility, lesion and fraud and/or circumvention were to be relevantly
1 2
averred. This approach has persisted despite some attempts by the
3
House of Lords in the latter part of nineteenth century to impose a
requirement that fraud proper had to be proved.
However, in 1966 the House of Lords again intimated that where
the grantor of a deed was alive, circumvention would not be found
4
unless there was proof of deceit or dishonesty. Such an opinion is
contrary to the established principles of facility and circumvention
and it is submitted that it should not be followed.
The juxtaposition of fraud and circumvention, of course, raised
the question as to the precise meaning of circumvention. In Gibson's
Executor v. Anderson. Lord Hunter defined circumvention as "the
4
Clunie v. Stirling (1854) 17D. 15; McCuIloch v. McCracken (1857)
20 D. 206.
2
Munro v. Strain (1874) 1R. 1039; Horsburgh v. Thomson's Trustees
1912 S.C. 267; Gibson's Executor v. Anderson 1925 S.C. 774.
Mann v. Smith (l86l) 23D. 435.
•z
Marianski v. Cairns (1852) 1 Macq. 212. See also Lord Anderson
in McDougal v. McDougal's Trustees 1931 S.C. 102, 116.
4
1967 S.C. (H.L.) 53.
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impetration of a will or deed against a person's interest", and Lord
Kyllachy, in the unreported case of Parnie v. Maclean, said that
fraud and circumvention are two shades of the same
thing, the meaning of the issue heing that you have
the question put to you whether, facility existing,
there had been either distinct machinations, tricks,
importunities, solicitations, even suggestions, to¬
wards the testator while the testator's facility was
such that she was not in a position to resist - not
likely to be in a position to resist. It is not
necessary that there should be deceit. It is enough
that there should be solicitation, pressure, import¬
unity, even in some cases, suggestion. The degree
of circumvention would depend on the degree of
facility.2
However, there is seldom any direct proof of any of the acts of
circumvention enumerated by Lord Kyllachy and the courts have recognised
this by maintaining that "/t7he existence of such acts of impetration
3
must always be a matter of inference'.' In Cleugh v. Fleming Lord Sorn
justified this practice as follows:
In circumstances which do not lend themselves to the
suggestion of impetration, it might be that the Court
would refuse to entertain an action in the absence of
some specific averment of circumvention. On the other
hand, where circumstances do lend themselves to the
suggestion, the general averment may be treated as
enough to entitle the aggrieved person to have the
matter tried out. Were it otherwise, you might have
a case in which the surrounding circumstances all
pointed irresistibly to impetration and yet in which
the aggrieved party would have no remedy because, not
being privy to the fraud, he could not specify the
actual form of suasion used.4
1
1925 S.C. 774, 783.
2
Cited by Lord Blackburn in Gibson's Executor v. Anderson 1925
S.C. 774, 778.
^ Ibid., 783 per Lord Hunter.
4 1948 S.L.T. (Notes) 60.
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In Clunie v. Stirling, Lord Justice-Clerk Hope listed some of
the surrounding circumstances from which circumvention may be inferred;
/T/he result may demonstrate that the party was really
circumvented... when he was led into the transaction
under challenge; and then the nature of that trans¬
action, the mode in which, and the party by whom it
was carried through, and the object apparent on the
face of it, for which, if palpably disadvantageous,
it was huddled up without proper inquiry, and with¬
out the individual receiving the aid he ought to have
received, all bear on the jury question, whether the
party had been circumvented.
The paramount importance of the result and nature of the transaction
in the process of inferring circumvention is illustrated by the actual
decision in the Clunie case where both Lord Justice-Clerk Hope and Lord
Blackburn found circumvention proven on the evidence only of the
"ruinous" and lesionous bargain. There was no evidence whatsoever of
any of the acts of impetration mentioned by Lord Kyllachy. The same
2
was true of the decision in Gibson's Executor v. Anderson and most of
the other cases in this survey. When such evidence is available the
proof of circumvention will, of course, be all the stronger, but the
absence of evidence as to impetration will not necessarily preclude
the courts from making a finding of circumvention.
There is also a close relationship between the requirements of
facility and circumvention,which is reflected in the rule that the
greater the facility the less is the proof of circumvention which will
be required, and where proof of circumvention is strong the degree of
3
facility required will be comparatively less.
1 (1854) 17D. 15, 17.
2
1925 S.C. 774.
^ Munro v. Strain (1874) Ifi. 1039, 1047 per Lord Ormidale.
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9 - UNDUE INFLUENCE
A partial reception of the English law concept of undue
influence has taken place in Scots law."'" In England the term undue
2
influence has a double meaning; when used in relation to wills an
element of coercion is required. Coercion is, however, not a nec¬
essary element when undue influence pertains to transactions inter
vivos. In contrast, undue influence exists in inter vivos trans¬
actions where, in a relation of confidence and trust between the parties,
the one in whom the confidence is reposed, uses such personal influ-
3
ence to the detriment of the confiding party.
The reception of undue influence in Scots law is of comparative¬
ly recent origin. A few early nineteenth century cases are sometimes
referred to as evidencing the application of principles similar to
4
those underlying undue influence, but it was only really in Gray v.
5
Binny that the concept of undue influence was clearly and voluntarily
accepted in Scots law. However, even at the present day the extent
of its importation is uncertain.^
In Gray v. Binny a mother, with the help of the family solicit¬
or, obtained from her son, who was twenty-four, a deed of consent to
disentail for a grossly inadequate return, by taking advantage of the
^
See generally W.H.D. Winder, Undue Influence in English and Scots





For example Taylor v. Long (1824) 2 Shaw 253; Ewen v. Magistrates
of Montrose (1830) 4 W. & S., Sc.App. 346; Anstruther v. Wilkie
(1856) 18D. 405.
5 (1879) 7R. 332.
g
See Smith, Short Commentary of the Law of Scotland, 840-841;
Scottish Law Commission, Memorandum No. 42, Defective Consent and
Consequential Matters, par. 3*102.
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soil's ignorance of his rights and by abusing the confidence that he
had placed in them. The court reduced the deed on the ground of undue
influence and Lord President Inglis accepted**" the relevant principles
to be those set out by the Lord Ordinary (Lord Young):
The principle is that where a relation subsists which imports
influence, together with confidence reposed, on the one side,
and subjection to the influence and the giving of the confi¬
dence on the other, the Court will examine into the
circumstances of any 'transaction of bounty' ... between
parties so related, whereby the stronger party ... greatly
benefits at the cost of the weaker, and will give relief if
it appears to have been the result of influence abused or
confidence betrayed.
Lord Shand, in the same case, argued strongly in favour of the
adoption of the principle of undue influence. He maintained that a
refusal to do so would lead to
transactions obviously unjust, entered into by one of the
parties in the position of not being truly an entirely free
agent, being nevertheless held valid, because it could
not be shown that the deed was procured by deceit.-'
The requirements for undue influence, Lord Shand set out as follows:
/l7n the first place, the existence of a relation between
the granter and the grantee of the deed which creates a dominant
or ascendant influence, the fact that confidence and trust
arose from that relation, the fact that a material and gratui¬
tous benefit was given to the prejudice of the granter, and
the circumstance that the granter entered into the transaction
without the benefit of independent advice or assistance.4
It has been said that the essence of undue influence lies in
the fact that the confiding party did not exercise a free and independ¬









See, for example, Gray v. Binny (1879) 7R. 332, 347 per Lord Shand;
Inche Noriah v. Shaik Allie Bin Omar 719297 A.C. 127.
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the ideal of the contractual party who is entirely free from outside
influence is essentially unattainable. Many contracts are upheld
by the courts, despite the fact that they were entered into under some
outside influence. Lord Guthrie was therefore correct when he held
in Forbes v. Forbes Trustees"*" that the view that the essence of undue
influence was to be found in the absence of a free and independent
2
judgment was too wide to be acceptable. Instead he approved the
following statement made by Lord President Clyde in Ross v. Gosselin's
Executors:
The essence of undue influence is that a person, who has
assumed or undertaken a position of quasi-fiduciary respons¬
ibility in relation to the affairs of another, allows his own
self-interest to deflect the advice or guidance he gives,
in his own favour.3
The relation of confidence and trust between the parties
creates a situation which enhances the opportunities for abuse. The
court will, therefore, normally find ■undue influence if the terms of
the contract itself indicate that the fiduciary relation has been abused.
The tendency to judge the question of undue influence objectively, in
terms of the result or effect of the transaction, rather than in
terms of improper motive has been fairly consistently followed by
Scottish courts.^ What the courts regard as fair in the circumstances
will ultimately depend on the institutional pattern in similar trans-
5
actions and upon the mores of the community. For example, the
1
1957 S.C. 325, 351.
2
Ibid.. 332.
3 1926 S.C. 325, 334.
^
See, for example, Harris v. Robertson (I864) 2 M. 664; Carmichael
v. Baird 1899, 6 S.L.T. 369; McKechnie v. McKechnie's Trustees
1908 S.C. 93; Allan v. Allan and Others 1961 S.C.200.
3
M.D. Green, Fraud, Undue Influence and Mental Incompetency (1943)
43 Col.L.Rev. 176, 182, note 34.
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fairness of an onerous contract is usually assessed with reference to
the equality of exchange or the adequacy of consideration. Vhen deal¬
ing with a gift or voluntary conveyance the tests for fairness are more
diverse, hut they still amount to an objective question, namely,
whether the opportunity of abuse of influence presented by the con¬
fidential relationship has been made use of to divert the gift from
its normal and natural course when seen against the background of all
the relevant circumstances and the total situation of the donor -
economic, social and psychological."'"
2
It was implicitly accepted in Allan v. Allan and Others
that undue influence may be found even though the benefit arising
from the transaction does not accrue to the person who exercised his
influence unduly.
This does not mean that a grossly unfair transaction will not
in certain circumstances receive judicial sanction. In Gray v. Binny.
Lord President Inglis asserted that the contract in question would have
stood if it (a) had been carried through with good advice, (b) had
been concluded with careful attention to the rights of both parties,
and (c) had been entered into with full knowledge on both sides.
However, even these tests may not he conclusive. In the same case,
Lord Shand insisted that even if the son had been fully informed as to
the value of the right he was renouncing he would still have regarded
the transaction as having been concluded under undue influence, if
J.P. Dawson, Economic Duress - An Essay in Perspective (1947)
45 Mich. L.Rev. 255, 264.
2
1961 S.C. 200, 204.
3 (1879) 7 R. 332, 340.
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only because of the great prejudice which had been suffered by the son.""
Whether he would have taken the same view even where the son had had
an independent adviser, Lord Shand did not intimate. He did, however,
assume that in such an event the transaction would not have been so
prejudicial to the son.
It is against all ordinary experience to suppose that if a
business man or independent adviser had presented the
transaction to the pursuer in the light of what was reason¬
able from his point of view ... that a transaction so
prejudicial to himself would have followed.^
Despite the fact, therefore, that the concept of undue influ¬
ence is generally framed in terms of motive, it is clear that the fair¬
ness of the contract terms is a very important consideration in decid¬
ing whether influence was exercised unduly or not. Nevertheless, it is
evident that where the inequality caused by the one party's confi¬
dence and trust in the other, is removed, as for example, by the
presence of an independent adviser, the courts will generally not
intervene, no matter how prejudicial the transaction may be.
There may be circumstances in which the facts of a particular
case can lead to a finding of either facility and circumvention or
3




Ibid. See also statement to the same effect by Lord President
Inglis at page 341.
McKechnie v. McKechnie's Trustees 1908 S.C. 93.
224
6 - FORCE AND FEAR (VIS AC METUS)
Force and fear (or extortion, as it is often referred to) is de¬
rived from the Roman law of metus.as interpreted by the medieval
2
commentators. Metus was fear occasioned by threats or intimidation.
A person who was induced by such threats to perform damaging legal
acts, such as the conveyance of property or the payment of money was
given certain remedies by the praetor. He could defend himself by
means of the exceptio quod metus causa or, where he had already render¬
ed performance, claim restitutio in integrum. In addition, damages
could be claimed with the delictual actio quod metus causa. The actio
was delictual because the doctrine of metus arose as a supplementary
incident of the criminal and delictual law against the perpetration of
3
physical violence by private individuals. The origin of the doctrine
was reflected in two central requirements: Firstly, the intimidation
4
or threat must have been one of physical violence, and secondly, the
threat must have been so severe as to overcome a"constant man". The
transaction was reducible because it had been obtained by
an unlawful act. The limited scope of metus was later extended by
various condictiones. but these "left no imprint on the formal statements
See generally Sohm, Institutes of Roman Law, 209; Buckland,
A Text-Book of Roman Law. 593 et seq.
2
Scottish Law Commission Memorandum No. 42: Defective Consent and
Consequential Matters. Vol. II, para. 3.104.
3
J.P. Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and
German Law (1937) 11 Tul. L. Rev. 342, 347.
^ Sohm.op.cit., 209, said only that the action threatened must have
been unlawful, but Buckland, op.cit., 593 insisted that it had to
be a threat of physical harm.
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of the doctrine in the Corpus Iuris with which medieval commentators
were confronted".^
In dealing with the different forms of pressure which might
affect the validity of an agreement the civilian legal systems gener¬
ally distinguish between vis absoluta. force which leads to a physical
overpowering so extreme as to exclude any question of a juristic act
by the affected party, and vis compulsiva. which exists where a person
is threatened with some evil unless he concludes the contract. In the
former case there is no declaration of will and consequently no contract,
hut in the latter a contract is formed, but it is reducible at the
instance of the threatened party. Bankton, who is the only institut¬
ional writer who drew this distinction clearly, rightly said of vis
compulsiva that
the fear occasioned by it does not exclude all consent.
The person put in fear chuses the least of two evils,
rather to part with his right, than suffer pain, or the
like grievance threatened; and, as the law expresses
it, Quamvis, si liberum esset, noluisset, tamen coactus
voluit.2
Other institutional writers were more equivocal about whether force and
3
fear excluded consent or not. This has caused uncertainty as to






Stair, (i, 9, 8), thought that deeds or obligations extorted were
valid because true consent was given. Both Erskine (ill, 1, 16),
and Bell (Commentaries. 1,314) however, thought that consent
given in such circumstances was not true, but merely apparent.
^
Gloag on Contract, 488, took the view that the effect of the instit¬
utional writing was that the agreement is void, but the Scottish Law
Commission, op.cit., para. 3.115, expressed the opinion that such
transactions are only voidable. See also C.M. Campbell, Force and
Fear (1979) 24 J.L.S. 289.
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What types of threat will found a plea of force and fear? Stair,
who relied heavily on Roman law in setting out the principles of force
and fear, maintained that the action threatened should be unlawful,
but he clearly did not think it necessary that it should be confined
to physical violence."1" Discussing the types of threat which could
possibly overcome a person of constant firmness he included "loss of
2 3
estate". Bankton and Bell made statements to the same effect.
4 5 6
Wiseman v. Logie , Foreman v. Sheriff and Gow v. Henry also support
the proposition that a fear of economic loss caused by an unlawful
threat could found a plea of force and fear. Yet, the institutional
writers when they gave examples of relievable threats alluded mostly to
threats of physical violence or of unlawful imprisonment. Bell, in
his Commentaries, nevertheless,gave one example where even a lawful
threat of imprisonment could possibly constitute legal force and fear.
/Whenever this instrument of terror is applied to extort
from a debtor something more than the debt for which
imprisonment is competent, or from others advantages
to which otherwise they would not have consented there
seems to be such a want of lawful consent as to give
relief.J
But, if the intimidation produced only a settlement of a debt which









5 1791 Mor. 16515.




invalidate the transaction."'" Bell's view that the unfairness of a
transaction could lead to the invalidation of the transaction if it
was entered into because of a lawful threat has received support in
2
a few judicial dicta. On the whole, however, Scots law insisted
that a transaction would only be annulled on the ground of force and
3
fear if the defender had threatened unlawful or unwarranted action.
4
This view has persisted into the twentieth century.
What degree of coercion is necessary for the plea of force and
fear to succeed, or when will the fear be a "just fear"? The instit¬
utional writers, although they generally followed Roman law in holding
5
that the threat must have been such as to put a normal man in fear,
considerably mitigated this rule by saying that the age, sex or general
weakness of a party had to be taken into account when deciding the
question.^ Stair, for example, maintained that
extortion will be more easily presumed and sustained in
the deeds of persons, who are weak and infiim of judg¬
ment or courage....than of those who are knowing and
confident; and more easily in deeds and obligations
gratuitous and free, than in such as are for an onerous
cause, which will not easily be annulled, unlest manifest




Foreman v. Sheriff. 1791 Mor. 16515; Mackintosh v. Chalmers (I883)
11R. 8, 15; Education Authority of Dumfriesshire v. Wright 1926
S.L.T. 217. ^
^ Priestnell v. Hutcheson (1857) 19D. 495.
^
Hunter v. Bradford Property Trust Ltd. 1977 S.L.T. (Notes) 35*
Although the judgment was only reported in 1977 it was delivered
in 1957.
^
Stair, I, 9, 8; Bankton I, 10, 51; Erskine 17, 1, 26; Bell's
Principles, Section 12.
^




However, the mere fact that a person in mean circumstances conferred a
benefit on a powerful party would not raise a presumption of a "just
fear"."1" Despite the relaxation by the institutional writers of the
2
strict Roman law requirement, they, and the courts, still maintained
3
that the fear should not have been "foolish or vain".
Bell expressed the opinion that there was no distinction to be
drawn between the case where threats were made against the person who
eventually entered into the transaction and the case where the threats
were directed to a near relation of his. If the other requirements
4
were met, force and fear should be found in both cases. The Scottish
Law Commission has now suggested that a plea of force and fear should
succeed even where a person undertakes an obligation in consequence of
a threat of harm to the property or economic interests of a third
party, provided that such a third party stands in a close social or
5
economic relationship to the obligor.
Despite the Roman law principle that a remedy was available even
where the person receiving the benefit had not made the threat,^ this
V 8




Hunter v. Bradford Property Trust Ltd. 1977 S.L.T. (Notes) 33;
Hislop v. Dickson Motors (Forres) Ltd. 1978 S.L.T. (Notes) 73.
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^ In Stewart Brothers v. Kiddie 1899, 7 S.L.T. 92, it was said that
the threats had to be made by the other contractual party or by
somebody on his behalf. See also Hunter v. Bradford Property Trust




institutional writer who suggested that a remedy could lie against a
third who had profited from the unlawful threat made by another. In
this context the Scottish Law Commission"^ has also recommended a
reform of the law so that the coerced party should have a remedy
against somebody who had knowingly taken advantage of the threat made
by a third person.
This short historical survey shows that even by the twentieth
century little expansion of the force and fear doctrine had taken place.
However, the regularity with which it was employed, especially during
2
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but also in the nineteenth
century indicate that even such a limited doctrine had an important
finaction to fulfil. The lack of development might be explained by the
fact that the scope of the existing doctrine was adequate to deal with
the problem of compelled transactions, compulsion at that time generally
taking the form of threats to life and limb. Since then, however,
civil imprisonment has been abolished and the use of physical force as
a form of coercion in contract law has become increasingly rare with
the result that force and fear became an almost irrelevant doctrine.
In the twentieth century it was increasingly realized that modern
industrialised society lent itself to more sophisticated, but no less
coercive forms of compulsion and in a climate in which the standards
of acceptable negotiating behaviour were set ever higher there was a
clear need for a re-examination of the scope of the doctrine of force
Op.cit.. para.3.115. Cf. the similar suggestion made in respect of
English law by counsel in Barton v. Armstrong (1976) A.C. 104, 108.
2
See, for example, the cases gathered in Morison's Dictionary of
Decisions, 16479 et seq.
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and fear. A rare opportunity to embark upon such a re-examination
came in the most recent case on force and fear, Hislop v. Dickson Motors
(Forres) Ltd.^
In that case the pursuer, after a heated discussion, admitted
embezzling some money from the defenders and agreed to repay it. As
arranged the defenders called on her at home. They had with them
withdrawal forms for the pursuer's savings bank account. After signing
these the pursuer also handed the keys of her car to the defenders.
Neither the amount embezzled nor the value of the monies or the car
handed over by the pursuer was at this stage known to the parties.
Having learnt, while withdrawing all the money from the pursuer's sav¬
ings account, that she also had a current account, the defenders return¬
ed to the pursuer's home. After some hectoring the pursuer gave the
defenders a blank cheque which they subsequently cashed to the amount
in credit. The pursuer averred that she was compelled by force and
fear to sign the withdrawal form and the cheque,which were,therefore,not
voluntary deeds by her and that the car was taken from her without any
consent whether voluntary or otherwise. In support of this contention
the pursuer relied on the defenders' threats to report her to the
police for alleged embezzlement and maintained that these, coupled with
the consequent fear of prosecution and damage to reputation, amounted
to an unlawful threat.
The Lord Ordinary (Lord Maxwell) drew a distinction between
threats and the exercise of pressure and held that the only threat
1978 S.L.T. (Notes) 73> discussed by Campbell, op.eit.
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actually proved was not a threat in the sense in which the word is
used in extortion cases:
The characteristic of such a threat is the expression
or implication of intention to do something, as for
example to report to the police, unless the victim
gives way to the extortioner's demand.^
In this case there was no such implication of "buying off" of the
action threatened. And in any case, the Lord Ordinary added, a threat
to report to the police was not illegal or unwarrantable. Lord Max¬
well did, however, indicate that a threatened action, even if it was
not unlawful might found a plea of extortion where it was not "used
in good faith to get back that which is due in respect of the matter
with regard to which the threat is made". In applying this test his
Lordship found the English authorities to be an unsafe guide as they
seemed to have moved more in favour of the party claiming reduction
than the Scots cases and because of the different bases of prosecution
in the two jurisdictions. Although little indication was given it
would seem as if a threat which was otherwise lawful would be used in
bad faith if it was made to induce payment of more money than was in
fact due or where the threat of legal proceedings was used in order to
apply pressure in a matter unconnected with the subject-matter of the
proceedings.
Lord Maxwell also expressed the opinion that apart from




there is a broader underlying principle that deeds
^ will be reducible and payments recoverable when they
have been extracted by pressure of a certain degree.
In general the pressure must be such as would over¬
power the mind of a person of ordinary firmness so
that there is no true consent.^
Despite finding that there was no such threat as would render a con¬
tract reducible, Lord Maxwell ordered repayment of the sum extracted
from the plaintiff by cheque and declared:
I am of the opinion that against the whole background
and in the light of the sudden reappearance of the
Dickson brothers, armed with knowledge of an account
which the pursuer had never volunteered and demand¬
ing that she admit the truth, the action of the pursuer
in signing a blank cheque cannot reasonably be consider¬
ed a truly voluntary act on her part, but was rather the
submission to pressure which might in the whole circum¬
stance well have overpowered the mind of a woman of
normal firmness finding herself in such a situation.
While the pursuer in fact signed the cheque, I con¬
sider that the abstraction by the defender of the
funds in her account is more akin to a forceful
seizure of those funds than a voluntary payment of
them by her.^
Lord Maxwell's decision that conduct which was not normally
unlawful might in certain circumstances be wrongful if used oppress¬
ively or for the purpose of inducing another person to perform some
transaction,constituted a very welcome extension of the force and
fear doctrine. Together with the notion, hinted at by some of the
institutional writers, that threats aimed at the economic interests
of a party could cause a just fear, it should open the way towards the
greater regulation of lawful, but nevertheless oppressive, economic






accompanied, by a greater attempt at elucidation, because the judgment
also raised a number of problems.
As I have indicated before, the Lord Ordinary distinguished
between fear resulting from threats and imprisonment on the one hand,
and "pressure" on the other. Although the judge thought that threats
implied a "buying off", the distinction was not further clarified and
there would seem little merit in differentiating between the various
forms of compulsion on that basis. Lord Maxwell did say that in the
case of threats and actual imprisonment "the requirement of the over¬
powering of the mind of reasonable firmness has been somewhat depart¬
ed from...but in other cases in my opinion it is still the law"."'"
Where, therefore, a contract was concluded under "pressure" it would
still be necessary to prove that the pressure was such as to overcome
a reasonably constant person so that there was no "true consent".
This formulation raises various problematic issues, not the least of
which is the difficult psychological distinctions as to when the mind
of a person will be so overcome by fear that he cannot be said to have
given true consent and when not. The judgment in the Hislop case
provided no criteria for the drawing of this distinction. Secondly,
there is the contention by various commentators already referred to in
2
the discussion on duress, that it is inaccurate and unhelpful to
assume the absence of consent where such consent was induced by com¬






constant fiimness test. If the absence of true consent is the fund¬
amental question on which reducibility depends then surely the test
should he wholly subjective. A coercing party should not be able
to defend the transaction by saying that the coerced person should
not have been coerced so easily. A party must be held responsible
for the consequences which he intended and where the very aim of
exerting the pressure was to coerce an otherwise unwilling party into
contracting, reduction should not be prevented merely because a
reasonably constant person would not have succumbed to it. The
question of the reasonableness of the fear should, nevertheless, be an evid¬
entiary factor in deciding whether a person was in fact coerced.
The relationship between force and fear and the fairness
of the coerced transaction
In Roman law metus arose to provide remedies to a person who
had performed damaging or disadvantageous acts as a result of unlawful
intimidation. The same concern over the damage suffered by the
coerced party was translated into the doctrine of force and fear.
Throughout its history great emphasis has been placed on the fairness
of the transaction induced by the coercion. Most of the cases that
have come before the courts have been claims for the restitution of
transfers or payments made in settlement of debts that were not in
fact owed or where the actual debt was smaller than the amount paid.
On the one hand, the courts have been prepared to uphold payments
obtained by unlawful intimidation where the payment was in fact owed
See, for example, Foreman v. Sheriff, 1791 Mor. 16515, where the
court seemed prepared to uphold the payment upon proof that the
sum paid was not exorbitant.
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on the other, they have been prepared to give relief where a convey¬
ance had been made or money paid in consequence of a lawful threat if
the property conveyed or money paid exceeded any debt owed."'" The
merits of the transaction have therefore played an important role in
the extension of force and fear.
2 3
In addition, there is the authority of Stair and Bankton
in support of the proposition that extortion would be more easily
assumed in gratuitous deeds and obligations, or in the case of oner¬
ous deeds, where there was manifest lesion. Where, however, "the
compulsion /was7 very evident"^ policy dictated the award of a remedy








Stair, I, 9, 8.
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7 - IRRITANCY PROVISIONS
An irritancy clause confers on the party in whose favour it
has been drafted,the right to terminate or cancel the contract on the
occurrence of some event on which the operation of the clause has been
made dependent. Irritancy clauses are sometimes distinguished from
penalties by the fact that -under the former, the party in default
merely loses his rights under the contract, whereas under the latter,
the party in breach forfeits property to which he has an independent
title."'"
Irritancies may be either legal, that is of a type which the
law generally implies in contracts of a particular kind, or convent¬
ional, that is agreed upon by the parties and expressly inserted in
2
the contract. Irritancy provisions are most frequently found in feu
3
contracts and leases, but they are not confined to these contracts.
It is common in leases or feu contracts to stipulate for an irritancy
in the event of the insolvency or bankruptcy of the tenant or feuar,
4
or on his failure to pay the rent or the feu duty.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries leases or tacks
were regarded as contracts stricti juris, to be enforced strictly
5
according to the terms in which they were expressed. As irritancies
"*"
See, for example , Smith, Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland,
856; Gloag on Contract, 664.
2
Gloag, pp. cit., 665; "Walker, The Law of Civil Remedies in Scotland,
85-87.
3
Walker, pp. cit., 85.
4
Gloag, op., cit., 665.
^ Stair II, 9, 26; Bankton II, 9? 11; Erskine II, 6, 31.
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were, during that time, mostly found in tacks it followed that they too
were enforced according to the letter. The practice of interpreting
irritancies strictly soon hardened into a general rule applied irres¬
pective of the contracts in which they were contained. Even at the
present day, irritancies are enforced without any regard to the hard¬
ship which it may cause.4
In the case of legal irritancies the strict rule is mitigated
by the fact that the party in default may "purge" it, for example, by
payment of the rent or the feu duty, before the decree passes in an
2
action for enforcement of the irritancy. Whether purgation is pos¬
sible in the case of conventional irritancies is a more controversial
question. On the one hand, it is generally accepted that irritancies
in feu contracts may be purged irrespective of whether they are legal
3
or conventional. On the other hand, the nineteenth century case
of Stewart v. Watson4is usually cited as having authoritatively settled
the law in relation to all other conventional irritancies in favour of
non-purgation. The decision in that case was followed in M'Douall's
5
Trustees v. MacLeod and recently affirmed by the House of Lords in
Dorchester Studios (Glasgow) Ltd. v. Stone and Another.^ The strict
rule that conventional irritancies cannot be purged and that effect
should be given to the provision irrespective of whether the party in
4
Gloag, op., cit., 665; Dorchester Studios (Glasgow) Ltd. v. Stone
and Another 1975 S.L.T. (H.L.) 153, 157.
Walker, pp. cit.. 89; Dorchester Studios (Glasgow) Ltd. v. Stone
and Another, supra.
5 Ibid.




1975 S.L.T. (H.L.) 153.
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default is willing and able to purge or that the party in whose favour
the irritancy was inserted, suffers little or no loss through such
purgation, stands in stark contrast to the treatment in English law
of forfeiture clauses in leases."'" This harsh rule, which is largely
the result of judicial rigidity in the nineteenth century, has been
2
subjected to strong criticism.
Pre-nineteenth century law
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the rule that
irritancies were to be enforced strictly was mitigated by disting¬
uishing between penal and non-penal irritancies. Non-penal irritancies
were enforced without giving any opportunity for purgation, but a penal
irritancy, which required a declarator of the court before being
enforced, could be purged. According to Stair the Lords
... have power to qualify these clauses irritant, and to allow
time for purging the same; yet only if they be truly exorbi¬
tantly penal: for such clauses contained in gratuitous
rights take their full effect, because then they are not
penal, but are conditions and provisions qualifying the
right.3
The caselaw of this period, which was extensively surveyed in both the
4 5
M'Douall's Trustees and Dorchester Studios cases, is contradictory
and because the reasons for a court's decision are seldom given, it is
"*"
Ante, 33.
See, for example, Dorchester Studios (Glasgow) Ltd. v. Stone and
Another 1975 S.L.T. (H.L.) 153, 156 per Lord Kilbrandon; Irritancy
in Leases (1976) 21 J.L.S.4; W.W. McBryde, Breach of Contract
(1979) 24 Jur.Rev. 60-63.
^
IV, 18, 3- See also Stair I, 10, 14 and Erskine II, 8, 14.
^
1949 S.C. 593, 600-601 per Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson and at 611-614
per Lord Mackay.
5
1975 S.L.T. (H.L.) 153, 157-158 per Lord Fraser of Tullybelton.
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difficult to establish the grounds on which the courtp proceed. It
was, nevertheless, considered penal that a feuar should lose the whole
estate simply because he had omitted to pay a term's rent and he was
therefore given the opportunity to purge his default."'" On the other
hand, a similar irritancy in a lease, which if enforced would have
resulted only in the landlord getting his own property back, was
2
generally not regarded as penal and could therefore not be purged.
At the same time, however, some cases did allow purgation of irritan-
3
cies in leases. It would seem as if the courts were reluctant to
enforce an irritancy clause if the contractual obligation which the
clause fenced was complied with, in whatever way, so that the
4
irritancy had in effect fulfilled its purpose. However, despite the
uncertain picture presented by the case law of that time an early
nineteenth century writer on the law of leases still declared that
whatever might have been the position earlier, irritancies in leases
whether legal or conventional, were then purgeable at any time before
5
a decree in foro was made.
Hepburn v. Nisbet 1665 Mor. 7229.
2
Hay v. Moffat 1586 Mor. 7226; George Seton v. James Seton 1611 Mor.
7184; Finlayson and Weir v. Clayton 1761 Mor. 7239; Clerk v.
Bennet 1759 Mor. 7237.
3
Bishop of Orkney v. Sinclair 1587 Mor. 7227; Old College of Aber¬
deen v. Earl of Northesk 1675 Mor. 7230; Hogg v. Hogg (1780)
2 Paton App. 516.
4
See, for example, Forsyth and Johnston v. Kennedy 1708 Mor. 7255 where
an irritancy for sub-letting was held purgeable because the sub-letting
had terminated by the time the landlord wished to enforce the irri¬
tancy. Also Hog v. Morton (1825) 35. 617 where the court refused
to allow the landlord to irritate the lease as the arrears in the
rent had been extinguished by the landlord sequestrating the stock
and selling it.
5
Bell, Treatise on Leases. 184-185. See also Gloag, ojd. cit., 666.
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The nineteenth and twentieth centuries
During the nineteenth century the already rigid distinction
between conventional irritancies in feus - which the courts generally
regarded as penal because they involved the loss of property - and
irritancies in leases - which were ordinarily thought of as non-penal -
was applied without considering the reason underlying it."'" It
consequently became firmly established that conventional irritancies
in feu contracts could be purged, but that purgation was impossible
2
in the case of irritancies in leases. The notion that leases, un¬
like feus, do not convey a right of property was questioned by Lord
Kilbrandon in the Dorchester Studios case and described as wearing
3
"today an air of unreality".
To the nineteenth century judges, two considerations, in
particular, militated in favour of holding conventional irritancies,
other than those contained in feus, non-purgeable. The first, and
most important, was that a conventional irritancy was expressly
included in a consensual contract and should therefore be taken to
be an expression of the intention of the parties. It followed from
the elevated status accorded to the parties' intention in nineteenth
century contract theory that such irritancies should be given effect
4
to irrespective of their fairness. As Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis
said in Stewart v. Watson; "An intending tenant may or may not agree to
such a stipulation, but if he does, I think there is no doubt that he
""
Stewart v. Watson (I864) 2M. 1414, 1416, 1422.
^
Ibid. See also Lvon v. Irvine (1874) LR. 512, 518.
3
1975 S.L.T. 155, 156.
^
See, for example, M'Douall's Trustees v. MacLeod 1949 S.C. 593, 604.
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must be bound by it."^" And Lord Neaves declared: "I am of the
same opinion. In all consensual contracts the agreements of parties
2
ought to be enforced." These sentiments were enthusiastically
3
approved almost a century later in M'Douall's Trustees v. MacLeod
and received a similarly sympathetic reception from Lord Praser of
Tullybelton in Porchester Studios(Glasgow) Ltd. v. Stone and Another.
His Lordship maintained that "if the tenant has agreed to a lease
containing an irritancy I do not think it is in principle unfair to
4
hold him to his bargain" even if he were only one day late in pay¬
ing his rent.
In the second place, irritancies were in the nineteenth
century increasingly regarded not as a means whereby enforcement of a
contractual obligation could be effected, but as a method by which a
5
landlord could rid himself of an unsatisfactory tenant, and this view
has been carried through to the twentieth century. In M'Douall1s
Trustees, Lord Mackay described the following dictum, by Lord Kinnear
7
in Cassels v. Lamb, as not applicable to leases. His Lordship,
discussing the power of the court to allow purgation of an irri¬
tancy, had said:




1949 S.C. 593j 604 per Lord Mackay.
4
1975 S.L.T. (H.L.) 153, 159.
^ Stewart v. Watson (1864) 2M. 1414, 1420.
6
1949 S.C. 593, 610.
7 (1885) 12R, 722.
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/r/he true ground, of this equitable interference, in
violation of the letter of a clause of irritancy, is, that in
substance the condition is a stringent remedy for non¬
payment or non-performance. The Court, therefore, inter¬
feres to carry out the true intention of the contract, by
allowing the irritancy to be purged when its purpose of
compelling performance has been effectuated.^
In Dorchester Studios,Lord Fraser thought it not unreasonable that a
landlord might rely on an irritancy to get rid of an unsatisfactory
2
tenant, but Lord Kilbrandon questioned whether a doctrine founded
3
upon such a purpose reflected current social policy.
Purgation on the ground of oppression
Despite general judicial approbation of the modern rule that
conventional irritancies may not be purged, it has been repeatedly
stated that the Court of Session retains a residual power to allow
time for purgation if the irritancy provision is abused or used opp-
4
ressively. However, it has been said that the court will only
"violate the terms of the bargain, if there are circumstances of
5
extreme abuse or heavy equities." The equitable power has not
been applied in any modem case and it is uncertain in which circums-
g





1975 S.L.T. (H.L.) 153, 159.
^
Ibid., 156.
^ Stewart v. Watson (I864) 2M. 1414; Dorchester Studios(Glasgow) Ltd.
v. Stone and Another 1975 S.L.T. (H.L.) 153-




'Oppression' infers that there has been impropriety of
conduct on the part of the landlords. 'Misuse of rights'
or 'abuse of irritancies' involves that the terms of the
contract have been invoked by the landlord to procure an
unfair consequence to the tenant.^
2
But in the same case Lord President Clyde cited with approval the
following dictum of Lord Chancellor Birkenhead in Gatty v. Maclaine:
It would, in my opinion, be quite wrong and it is certainly
without justification in authority for a court of law to
deprive parties of their clear contractual rights by a con¬
sideration of possible motives or prejudices which the party
in default may suffer if the contract is enforced.3
It is clear that the courts' equitable power to allow purgation has
been interpreted so restrictively that it is doubtful whether there








1921 S.C. (H.L.) 1, 6.
^ See Irritancy in Leases (1976) 21 J.L.S. 4, 5-6.
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C - ENGLISH ADD SCOTS LAW
1 - MANIPULATION OF THE RULES OF CONSENT
Unfair contract terms, particularly exemption clauses, are
usually contained in printed documents. The courts soon realised
that the notion of consent gave them a lever which could be manipulated
against such terms. A party who wishes to rely on a particular term
first has to show that it has been incorporated into the contract.
(i) Signature
It was decided in L'Estrange v. F. Graucob"*" that where a con¬
tractual document has been signed by a party, he is bound by the terms
contained in it, notwithstanding the fact that he may never have read
them. The injustice of this long standing rule has been widely
2
recognised and attempts have been made to ameliorate its effects.
3
In the Canadian case of Tilden Rent-a-Car v. Clendenning the court
held that a signature could only be relied on as manifesting consent
if the party who was relying on the signed document could reasonably
have believed that the signer did consent to all the terms contained
in the document. Where a contract was concluded in a hurry the offeror
of the document could not reasonably draw such an inference and was
therefore precluded from relying on any onerous or unusual printed
/l934/ 2 K.B. 394; Bahamas Oil Refining Co. v. Kristiansands
Tankrederie A/S /I9787 1 LI. Rep. 211, 215-216.
^
McCutcheon v. David MacBrayne Ltd. _/l9647 1 W.L.R. 125, 133 per
Lord Devlin. See also the remarks made by Lord Denning M.R. in
(1967) 41 Aus. L.J. 261, 268-269; J.R. Spencer, Signature,
Consent, and the Rule in L'Estrange v. Graucob (l973) C.L.J. 104.
3 (1978) 83 D.L.R. (3d) 400.
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terms not specifically drawn to the attention of the signer."*"
It has also been decided that where the offeror of a document
(or his agent) misrepresented the effect of its terms, he is deprived
of the benefits conveyed by such terms notwithstanding the fact that
the document had been signed. In Curtis v. Chemical Cleaning & Dyeing
2
Co. Ltd., Denning L.J. declared that in certain circumstances even a
mere failure to draw attention to the existence of an exemption clause
might amount to sufficient misrepresentation.
(ii) Notice
The greatest activity of the courts has, however, been in those
cases where there was no incriminating signature and the terms on which
the offeror was relying were contained in a printed document which was
either handed to the offeree or displayed in a central place. Here a
detailed set of rules has developed, the effect of which has been to
lay down strict limitations to the incorporation into the contract of
unsigned documents.
In order to qualify for incorporation a document containing an
exemption clause must have special significance as a contractual
document. The question of what falls within that category has been
approached strictly. Notwithstanding a long line of carriage and
deposit cases recognising "tickets" as contractual documents, the
courts have been loath to expand this category. In Taylor v. Glasgow
Ibid., 405-410 per Dubin J.A. See also Jaques v. Lloyd D. George
& Partners Ltd. /19687 1 W.L.R. 625.
2 /l95l7 1 K.B. 805, 809.
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Corporation"*" the Court of Session decided that a ticket handed to a
person wishing to use a public bath was not to be regarded as a con¬
tractual document, but was a mere voucher or receipt. An exemption
clause contained in a ticket for the hire of a deck chair has similarly
2
been held to be ineffective. There can be no doubt that the re¬
luctance to enlarge the category of "contractual" documents is based
on a policy against unfair exemption clauses.
Once it has been decided that a document has contractual force
the courts may further limit the incorporation of the terms by the
degree of notice which they require. In Parker v. South Eastern
3
Railway, Mellish L.J. stated that in order to incorporate a document,
the party to whom it is given must have been aware of the terms contain¬
ed in it, or that it must have been handed to him in such a way that a
reasonable man would have concluded that it contained contractual
4
terms. The adequacy of the steps taken to bring the terms to the
notice of the offeree might also depend upon whether the offeror knew,
or should have known, that the offeree suffered from a disability which
would have precluded him from gaining knowledge of the printed terms.
5




Chapelton v. Barry U.D.C. /19407 1 K.B. 532. See also Jude v.
Edinburgh Corporation 1943 S.C. 399; The Eagle /197772 LI.
Rep. 70.
3 (1877) 2 C.P.D. 416, 423.
^ See also Lewis v. Laird Line 1925 S.L.T. 316; Williamson v.
North of Scotland and Orkney and Shetland Steam Navigation Co.
1916 S.C. 554; Caven v. Scottish and Universal Newspapers 1976
S.L.T. 92; Henderson v. Stevenson 1875 2R. 71 (H.L.)
3 Richardson, Spence & Co. v. Rowntree /18947 A.C. 217 (H.L.) Cf.,
Thompson v. L.M. & S. Railway /193Q/ 1 K.B. 41.
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the language in which the terms were expressed a higher degree of
notice would be required for incorporation.
The degree of notice required for a successful incorporation
of a document is a flexible mechanism which is also used for protect¬
ing a party against the workings of an unusual clause. In Thornton v.
2
Shoe Lane Parking, Megaw L.J. held that where a restrictive condition
is "usual" it will be sufficient if the party has received "fair"
notice that "some" conditions are intended to become part of the
contract. Where, however, the conditions are not usual in that type
of contract, it must be shown that the notice was fair in relation to
3conditions of that particular type. The sufficiency of notice
will thus depend upon whether it was fair to hold the offeree bound by
the restrictive condition in the circumstances of the case. In
4
J. Spurling Ltd. v. Bradshaw. Denning L.J. also declared that the
more unreasonable a term, the greater was the notice which was required
to be given, and he added:
Some clauses which I have seen would need to be
printed in red ink on the face of the document with
a red hand pointing to it before the notice could be
held to be sufficient.5
Another technique often employed by the courts is to hold that
terms must be brought to the attention of the party either before con¬
tracting or contemporaneously with the conclusion of the contract.
4
Geier v. Ku.jawa, Weston and Warne Bros (Transport) Ltd. /I970/
1 LI. Rep. 365, 368.
2
/I97l7 2 Q.B. 163.
3
Ibid.. 172.




Thus in Olley v. Marlborough Court Ltd.,^ a notice in a hotel bedroom
purporting to exempt the proprietors from liability for the loss of
the guests' luggage was held not to be incorporated as the contract
had been concluded earlier, at the reception desk.
Another instance where the courts refuse to give effect to a
printed exemption clause is where a separate oral warranty is taken
2
to override the exclusion clause. In Couchman v. Hill the plaintiff,
at an auction, bought a heifer described in the catalogue as "unserved".
The catalogue also set out the usual conditions of sale and stated
inter alia that lots must be taken subject to error of description.
At the sale the plaintiff asked both the defendant and the auctioneer
whether the heifer was in fact unserved, to which they replied in the aff¬
irmative. When the heifer died as a result of being in calf the
plaintiff claimed damages for breach of warranty. Scott L.J. held
that the defendant could not rely on the exemption clause contained
in the catalogue, because by answering plaintiff's question in
the affirmative he had made an offer of a warranty to plaintiff which
overrode the printed conditions. This offer was accepted when the
3
lot was knocked down to the plaintiff.
Exemption clauses can be incorporated into a contract on the
basis of a course of dealing but here too the requirements are stringent.
1 /I9497 1 K.B. 532. See also Macrae v. K.I. Limited 1962
S.L.T. (Notes) 90; The Eagle /19777 2 LI. Rep. 70.
2
/19477 K.B. 554.
^ See also Harling v. Eddy /l9517 2 K.B. 739; Webster v. Higgins
/l94§7 2 All E.R. 127; Mendelssohn v. Normand Ltd. _/l970/ 1 Q.B.
177; Gallaher Ltd. v. B.R.S. Ltd. and Containerway & Roadferry Ltd.
/1974/ 2 LI. Rep. 440; J. Evans & Son (Portsmouth) Ltd. v. Andrea
Merzario Ltd. 1 W.L.R. 1078, 1081-1082.
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In McCutcheon v. David MacBrayne.4 the pursuer's agent, on account of
an oversight by the defender, was not asked to sign a "three or four
thousand" word document containing amongst others, a clause protect¬
ing the carrier from all "loss.... wheresoever or whensoever occurring".
Lord Devlin, in holding that the clause had not been incorporated into
the contract, stated that "previous dealings are relevant only if they
prove knowledge of the terms, actual and not constructive, and assent
2
to them". Here the pursuer had no knowledge of the purport of the
conditions. The requirement of actual knowledge has now been over-
3
ruled by the House of Lords.
The Court of Appeal has decided in Hollier v. Rambler Motors
(AMC) Ltd.,4 that three or four transactions over a period of five
years do not constitute a course of dealing sufficient to incorporate
5
an exempting provision. In British Crane Hire v. Ipswich Plant Hire
there were only two prior dealings and they occurred a long time before. It
would thus not have been very realistic to speak of a course of dealing in
that case. Nevertheless, Lord Denning M.R. maintained that the
exempting conditions were incorporated into the contract on the basis
of a "common understanding".^ He contrasted this case with that of
Hollier v. Rambler Motors (AMC) Ltd., and said:




Hardwick Game Farm v. Suffolk Agricultural Poultry Producers
Association /19697 2 A.C. 51. 90.
4 /19727 1 All E.R. 399.




That was a case of a private individual....The
plaintiff there was not of equal bargaining power...
The conditions were not incorporated. But here
the parties were both in the trade and were of
equal bargaining power.^
The courts have used the rules of consent very effectively to
exclude from contracts such standard terms as had not been properly
brought to the notice of the other party. However, such remedial
action by the courts can at most be supplementary. As Lord Devlin
2
said in McCutcheon v. David MacBrayne Ltd., such standardized terms
are seldom read by the parties at whom they are directed and, indeed,
are not intended to be read by them. In addition, the mere fact that
certain terms were brought to the notice of a contracting party is of
no assistance to him if they are not negotiable or where alternative
terms are not available. While, therefore, the rules of consent as
developed by the courts to limit the incorporation of standardized
terms may alleviate the position, they are inadequate in themselves




/19647 1 W.L.R. 125, 133.
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2 - INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT1
Once it has been established that an exemption clause was
incorporated into a standard form contract the courts may further
limit its effect by construing it very narrowly. An Australian judge
has even promised that the courts would use the rules of construction
2
in such a way as to "read out" or "read down" unfair exemption clauses.
Construction has indeed been the main technique used to ameliorate the
effect of harsh terms in contracts. The advantage of the construction
method is that an objectionable clause can be excised from the contract
without necessarily bringing the whole contract to an end. The doctrine
of fundamental breach which has been described by the House of Lords as
based essentially on the rules of construction will be discussed in the
following section.
(i) The contra proferentem rule
The principal rule of construction in respect of exemption
clauses is that in order to be effective in the way intended by their
3
drafters they must be expressed in clear and unambiguous words. It
has even been stated by Lord Wilberforce that the more radical the
breach the clearer the language of the exemption clause must be to
See generally E.W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction
of Contracts (1964) 64 Col. L. Rev. 833; Treitel, Law of Contract,
157-160. Also E.A. Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts
(1967) 76 Yale L.J. 939.
^
C.H. Bright, Contracts of Adhesion and Exemption Clauses (l967)
41 Aus. L.J. 261, 263.
^
Hamilton v. The Western Bank of Scotland (l86l) 23D. 1033, 1037;
Stevenson v. Henderson (l873) 1R. 215. 221.
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free the party in breach from liability."'" When there is any ambig¬
uity in the clause it will be construed adversely or contra -proferentem,
that is, unfavourably against the drafter of the clause who is relying
on it (the proferens) and favourably towards the other party. This
canon of construction is widely followed in both Scots and English law.
Thus a declaration, made in connection with an insurance policy, to the
effect that a party was a total abstainer from alcoholic drinks and had
2
been since birth, was held not to cover future behaviour, and in F.S.
•Z
Stowell. Ltd. v. Nicholls and Co. (Brighton) Ltd. a clause limiting
liability for loss or damage to goods to "£200 per ton of the gross
weight" was construed as £200 per ton or part of a ton and not £200
per ton gross weight pro rata, as the defendants had contended. And
in John Lee and Son (Grantham) Ltd. v. Railway Executive,4 where a
clause in a lease purported to exclude liability for loss or damage
(whether by act or neglect of the company or their servants or agents
or not) "which but for the tenancy hereby created or anything done
pursuant to the provisions hereof would not have arisen", Sir Raymond
Evershed M.R. found that the phrase "which....arisen" confined the
exemption to liability created by the lease relationship. The contra




Suisse Atlantique Societe d'Armement Maritime S.A. v. N.V.
Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale (1967) 1 A.C. 561, 452. /This case
will hereafter be referred to as Suisse Atlantique.7
2
Kennedy v. Smith and Ansvar Insurance Co. Ltd. 1976 S.L.T. 110.
3 /196^7 2 LI. Rep. 275.
4 /19497 2 All E.R. 581.
5 Ibid.. 582-583.
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In England., application of the contra proferentem rule also has
the effect that a clause which specifically excluded warranties would
not necessarily exclude liability for breach of conditions,"'" or that a
clause which gave protection for breach of implied conditions and warr¬
anties would not afford protection if the party breached an express
2
provision of the contract.
Contra proferentem construction is used not only where exemption
3
clauses are concerned. In Aitken's Trustees v. Bank of Scotland it
was, for example, also applied in the construction of a formal guarantee
4
given by a cautioner.
(ii) Exemption or Indemnity^ from liability for negligence
The validity of clauses purporting to exempt a party from liability
for negligence will be severely curtailed by the provisions of the Unfair
Contract Terms Act 1977.^ However, the effectiveness of such clauses
Wallis. Son & Wells v. Pratt & Haynes /l91l7 A.C. 394.
2 —
Andrews Bros. (Bournemouth) Ltd. v. Singer and Co. Ltd. /19347




In respect of contra proferentem construction see also:
Robert Hutchison and Co. Ltd. v. British Railway Board 1970 S.L.T.
(Notes) 72; Kyle v. East Kilbride Town Council1970 S.L.T.
(Sh. Ct.)37; North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board v. D. & R.
Taylor 1956 S.C. 1.
^
In Smith v. U.B.M. Chrysler (Scotland) and South Vales Switchgear
Co. Ltd. 1978 S.L.T. 21, 29, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton thought
that the rules which had been developed in respect of clauses
excluding liability for negligence similarly applied where a clause
stipulated for the indemnifying of a party from liability for
negligence.
^
Sections 2 and 16.
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had become severely limited as a result of particularly narrow con¬
struction by the courts long before the passing of that Act. Accord¬
ing to Buckley L.J. the reason for this practice was that the courts
regarded it as "inherently improbable that one party to a contract
should intend to absolve the other party from the consequences of the
latter's own negligence.""'" It has, therefore, been held that a
clause exempting a party from liability for breach will not be given
2
effect to unless "adequate" words were used. But the matter does
not end there.
A distinction has further been drawn between cases where there
are heads of damage other than that caused by negligence for which a
party can be held liable and those where he can only be liable for
negligence. Where a party in breach can be held liable irrespective
of negligence, the courts will generally construe the exemption clause
3
as not excluding liability for damage caused by negligence. In order
to protect a party from liability under such circumstances very clear
words will have to be used in the exemption clause. This requirement
is usually fulfilled when the words indicate that liability for all
loss or damage, no matter how it might arise, is covered by the exemp-
4tion clause, for example, "any cause whatever" or "at customer's sole
4
Gillespie Bros. Ltd. v. Roy Bowles Transport Ltd. /197J5/ Q.B. 400,
419.
^
Rutter v. Palmer [_'1322/ 2 K.B. 87, 92 per Scrutton L.J.
North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board v. D. & R. Taylor 1956
S.C.I; Canada Steamship Lines Ltd., v. R. /I952/ A.C. 192;
White v. J. Warrick & Co., Ltd. 719557 2 All E.R. 1021.
4
Rutter v. Palmer 7192272 K.B. 87, 94 per Atkin L.J.
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risk"."'" However, the courts' result-oriented construction makes it
extremely difficult to forecast with certainty which clauses will he
adequately worded so as to exclude liability for negligence. In a
2
recent case the phrase "all loss or damage whatsoever" was construed
as not covering liability for damage caused by negligence.
Where, however, liability for negligence is the only possible
head of damage to which an exemption clause can apply then the clause
3
will operate more readily to exempt the party. In Alderslade v.
4
Hendon Laundry Ltd.. the defendant, having negligently lost articles
belonging to the plaintiff, wished to rely on a clause stating: "The
maximum amount allowed for lost or damaged articles twenty times the
charge for laundering". Lord Greene M.R. held that as the only
liability that could realistically arise was for negligence or default
the clause had to be construed as pertaining to negligence, otherwise
5
it would have been devoid of subject-matter.
However, it does not axiomatically follow from the fact that
a party can only be liable for negligence, that an exemption clause
will necessarily exclude him from liability. In Hollier v. Rambler
Motors (A.M.C.) Ltd.,^ Salmon L.J. was called upon to construe a clause
1
Ibid.
Smith v. U.B.M, Chrysler (Scotland) and South Wales Switchgear
Co. Ltd. 1978 S.L.T. 21.
^
Rutter v. Palmer /19227 2 K.B. 87, 92 per Scrutton L.J.




/19727 1 All E.R. 399.
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which read: "The company is not responsible for damage caused by
fire to customers' cars on the premises". His Lordship reasoned,
rather unconvincingly, that because ordinary people, confronted by
such a clause, would interpret it as excluding liability only for
damage not due to the negligence of the defendant, the clause was
ineffective where the fire was in fact caused by the defendant's
negligence. It is clear that even where a party's liability can
only be for negligence, a clause will only exempt him if it is expres¬
sed in words which clearly encompass such a contingency.
(iii) Repugnancy
Although more frequently used in connection with deeds than
contracts the doctrine of repugnancy may also function to deprive an
objectionable clause of effect. This can occur where a party gives
a positive promise to perform something which is then rendered illusory
by another clause nullifying the effect of the first."'" As Devlin J.
expressed it in Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Vokins; "It is
illusory to say: 'We promise to do a thing but we are not liable if
2
we do not do it.'" The underlying fear seems to be that the contract
will be reduced to a mere declaration of intent. The repugnancy doct¬
rine may also operate where, in a contractual document,a written clause
contradicts a printed one. In such a case the written terms will
^
See generally Adams v. Richardson and Starling Ltd. /l96_97 2 All
E.R. 1221, 1224 per Lord Denning M,R._(dissenting); N.F. Lanitis &
Co. Ltd. v. Kyodo Shoji (U.K.) Ltd. /l95^7 2 LI. Rep. 176, 178-179.
2 /19517 1 LI. Rep. 32, 39.
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prevail, presumably because the latter will more closely correspond
with the real intentions of the parties."'"
This survey indicates that the control over the volitions of
contractual parties by means of various rules of construction has been
extensive. The process of policy-orientated construction has been
well described by Lord Denning M.R. in Gillespie Bros, and Co. Ltd. v.
Roy Bowles Transport Ltd:
But, even so, I say to myself: This indemnity clause,
in its ordinary meaning, is wide enough to cover the
negligence of the carrier himself. Why should not
effect be given to it? What is the justification for
the courts, in this or any other case, departing from
the ordinary meaning of the words? If you examine all
the eases, you will, I think, find that at bottom it
is because the clause (relieving a man from his own
negligence) is unreasonable, or is being applied un¬
reasonably in the circumstances of the particular case.
The judges have, then, time after time, sanctioned a
departure from the ordinary meaning. They have done
it under the guise of "construing" the clause. They
assume that the party cannot have intended anything so
unreasonable. So they construe the clause "strictly".
They cut down the ordinary meaning of the words and
reduce them to reasonable proportions. They use all
their skill and art to this end... I know that the
judges hitherto have never confessed openly to the test
of reasonableness. But it has been the driving force
behind many of the decisions".^
3
Llewellyn has pointed out three crucial defects which these
indirect methods suffer from: in the first place, these techniques
Gloag on Contract, 399.
2 /l972/ 1Q. B.400, 415-416^ See also L. Schuler A.G. v. Wickman
Machine Tool Sales Ltd. _/l9747 A.C. 235, 272 where Lord Kilbrandon
said: "One must, above all other considerations as I think in a
case where the agreement is in obscure terms, see whether an inter¬
pretation proposed is likely to lead to unreasonable results, and
if it is, be reluctant to accept it".
^ Book Review (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700, 703.
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are all based on the assumption that the clauses and contracts under
scrutiny are permissible in content and they thus act as an incentive
to draftsmen to improve their workmanship and in future devise more
foolproof provisions. Construction, it must be remembered, is in
the last instance concerned not with the fairness of contracts but
only with the meaning of words as a method of ascertaining the intent¬
ion of the parties, and no amount of zeal on the part of judges to
construe a clause strictly can ultimately change the effect of wholly
unambiguous terms."'" By placing such a high premium on the skill of
draftsmen the court merely increases the distress of the party at the
receiving end of a standard form, as the offeror of the form contract
2
will usually have greater drafting expertise at his disposal; second¬
ly# by refusing to face the issue squarely, the courts deprive them¬
selves of much needed authority in laying down "minimum decencies"
which should be essential prerequisites for enforceability of a contract.
It may be added that subsuming the real rationale of relief under
construction principles may have the effect that fair and just clauses
are also struck down; thirdly, by pretending to construe a contract
when they are in fact intentionally misconstruing it, the courts not
only increase uncertainty, but also present inadequate remedies. As
unfairness is never indicated as the raison d'etre for such "construct¬
ion" the courts create the impression that these misused techniques
are of general application. This generates uncertainty and makes
""
See Levison v. Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co. Ltd. /19777
3 W.L.R. 90, 95 per Lord Denning M.R.
J.H. Baker, The Freedom to Contract without Liability (l97l)
24 Curr.Leg. Prob. 53, 66.
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the predictability of future judgments very difficult.
Criticism, such as the above, has not been entirely without
effect. In the Gillespie Bros, case Lord Denning M.R. maintained
that an exemption, limitation or indemnity clause must be construed
in the same way as any other clause.
It should be given its ordinary meaning, that is,
the meaning which the parties understood by the
clause and must be presumed to have intended. The
courts should give effect to the clause according
to that meaning - provided always...that it is
reasonable as between the parties and is applied
reasonably in the circumstances of the particular
case.-'-
In that case the Master of the Rolls held that an indemnity clause
was "agreed upon, and is reasonable" and should thus be given effect
1
119727 1 Q.B. 400, 416.
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•5 - FUNDAMENTAL BREACH
Judicial reluctance to allow a party to rely on a clause
exempting him from liability where he had committed a serious breach
of contract, has been manifested mainly through the practice of con¬
struing such a clause narrowly so as not to cover the breach which had
occurred. However, the reliance on exemption clauses in such circum¬
stances came to be regarded as so inequitable that for a time the courts
recognised a substantive doctrine of fundamental breach. This meant
that a particularly serious breach was regarded as tantamount to a
repudiation which the innocent party could accept and by doing so,
put an end to the entire contract (including the exemption clause),
except for the purpose of claiming damages."*"
Antecedents of the substantive doctrine
The main source of the substantive doctrine of fundamental
breach was certain rules of construction developed primarily in cases
relating to bailment.
(i) The "deviation" cases: As a result of the fact that the
owner of goods may lose the protection of an insurance policy when a
sea carrier departs from the agreed route, the courts have held the
2
carrier liable if he so deviates. This naturally led to carriers
attempting to exempt themselves from the liability so incurred. In
3
Glynn v. Margetson and Co., a ship that was under contract to convey
Treitel, Law of Contract, 160.
^
Joseph Thorley Ltd. v. Orchis S.S. Co. 1K.B. 660.
^ /l89^/ A.C. 351. See also Sze Hai Tong Bank Ltd. v. Rambler Cycle
Co. Ltd. /195.27 A.C. 576; Hain Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Tate & Lvle Ltd.
/193672 All E.R. 597.
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oranges, from Malaga to Liverpool first went eastwards and then retraced
her course hack to Liverpool, with the result that the cargo was found
to be damaged on arrival. Despite a printed exemption clause which
purported to cover the deviation, the House of Lords were of the
opinion that by not proceeding to Liverpool directly, the shipowners
had acted inconsistently with the main object and intent of the
contract and could therefore not rely on the deviation clause.""
(ii) "The four corners rule": It was also established early
on that an exemption clause would only protect a party from liability
if the contract was performed in the way envisaged by the parties.
In Gibaud v. Great Eastern Railway Co. Ltd., Scrutton L.J. expressed
the principle as follows:
Zl7f you undertake to do a thing in a certain way, or to
keep a thing in a certain place, with certain conditions
protecting it, and have broken the contract by not doing the
thing contracted for, or not keeping the article in the
place in which you have contracted to keep it, you cannot rely
on the conditions which were only intended to protect you if
you carried out the contract in the way in which you had
contracted to do it.^
A similar principle has been relied on to render ineffective
an exemption clause where, in a contract of sale of goods or hire-
purchase, a party performs something essentially different from that
contracted for. It has been said that this will occur where, for
3
example, a party promises to deliver peas, but in fact delivers beans
"" [_189^7 A.C. 351, 355 per Lord Herschell, and at 357 per Lord
Halsbury.
2 /l92l/ 2 K.B. 426, 435. See also The Can Palos /l92l7 P. 458.
where the principle expressed by Scrutton L.J. was made applicable
to all contracts.
3 Chanter v. Hopkins (1838) 4 M. & W. 399, 404 per Lord Abinger.
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or chalk when he promised to provide cheese."'" In Smeaton Hanscomb &
Co. Ltd. v. Sassoon I. Setty, Son & Co.. Devlin J. explained
that it was
... a principle of construction that exceptions are to he
construed as not being applicable for the protection of
those for whose benefit they are inserted if the beneficiary
has committed a breach of a fundamental term of the
contract.2
A fundamental term, his Lordship maintained, was
... something which underlies the whole contract so that,
if it is not complied with, the performance becomes some¬
thing totally different from that which the contract
contemplates.3
The substantive doctrine
Although Devlin J. in Smeaton Hanscomb still felt compelled to
cloak the doctrine in the language of construction it is indicative
of the increasing animosity towards unjust exemption clauses that three
years later Denning L.J. (as he then was) could say unequivocally that
/t/hese exempting clauses are nowadays all held to be
subject to the overriding proviso that they only avail to
exempt a party when he is carrying out his contract, not
when he is deviating from it or is guilty of a breach which
goes to the root of it.^
Similar statements were made in Karsales (Harrow) Ltd. v. Wallis^
where the parties had contracted for the hire-purchase of a used car.
U.G.S. Finance Ltd. v. National Mortgage Bank of Greece and Nat¬
ional Bank of Greece /l9647l LI. Rep. 446, 453 per Pearson L.J.




J. Sourling Ltd. v. Bradshaw /I956/ 1 W.L.R. 461, 465.
5 /19567 1 W.L.R. 936.
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The car which was eventually delivered to the purchaser, turned out
to he substantially different from the one which he had earlier in¬
spected: although it was the same car it had to be towed there, old
tyres had been substituted and various parts were missing. Despite
the fact that the purchaser refused to accept the car and that it was
towed away again,the seller, relying on a clause which provided that
no warranty or condition as to the quality of the car was given,
claimed ten months' instalments. Denning L.J., in giving judgment
for the purchaser, declared:
/n7he law about exempting clauses has been much developed in
recent years, at any rate about printed exempting clauses,
which so often pass unread. Notwithstanding earlier cases
which might suggest the contrary, it is now settled that
exempting clauses of this kind, no matter how widely they are
expressed, only avail the party when he is carrying out his
contract in its essential respects. ... They do not avail
him when he is guilty of a breach which goes to the root of
the contract. The thing to do is to look at the contract
apart from the exempting clauses and see what are the terms,
express or implied, which impose an obligation on the party.
If he has been guilty of a breach of those obligations in a
respect which goes to the very root of the contract, he
cannot rely on the exempting clauses.""
The substantive doctrine of fundamental breach soon became a
very popular instrument through which the unfair effect of exemption
2
clauses could be prevented. Yeoman Credit. Ltd. v. Anns, for example,
again concerned the hire-purchase of a defective used car. The court
maintained that there was in the car
... an accumulation of defects which, taken singly, might well
have been within the exemption clause, but taken en masse
constitute such a non-performance or repudiation or breach
1
Ibid.. 940.
2 /I962/ 2 Q.B. 508.
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going to the root of the contract as disentitles the owners
to take refuge behind an exception clause intended only to give
protection to those breaches which are not inconsistent with
and not destructive of the whole essence of the contract.
2
And in Sze Hai Tong Bank Ltd., v. Rambler Cycle Co. Ltd. where goods
had been misdelivered by a carrier, Lord Denning declared that even
if the exemption clause were to apply to the breach, it would not
protect the carrier as that would defeat one of the "main objects"
of the contract.
Suisse Atlantique Societe d'Armement Maritime S.A. v. Rotterdamsche
Kolen Centrales
A few judges continued to assert that fundamental breach
was not an independent rule of law which was to be applied in dis-
4
regard of the parties' intentions. This view was vindicated by the
House of Lords in the Suisse Atlantique case. Their Lordships un¬
animously held that the question whether a party could rely on an
exemption clause where he had comitted a fundamental breach or where
he had breached a fundamental term, was purely a matter of construction
of the contract."' Lord Wilberforce^ explained earlier cases (includ¬
ing those proclaiming a substantive doctrine) as instances where, on a
proper ascertainment of the intention of the parties, a breach fell
outside the scope of an exemption clause.
^
Ibid., 520. See also Pollock & Co. v. Macrae 1922 S.C. (H.L.) 192.
^ /l95^7 A.C. 576. Charterhouse Credit Co. v. Tolly 7,1962 Q.B. 683.
5 /l96,27 1 A.C. 361.
4
See, for example, U.G.S, Finance Ltd. v. National Mortgage Bank of
Greece and National Bank of Greece /l9647 lLl.Rep. 446, 450 per
Pearson L.J.
^ /l96^7 1 A.C. 361, 393, 406, 413, 427, 434; also Photo Production
Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd., The Times, 20th February 1980.
6 /I9627 1 A.C. 361, 430 et seq.
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According to the opinions expressed by the House of Lords
fundamental breach was, therefore, merely an application of the
principle that, unless very clear words are used, exemption clauses
should not be construed so as to cover a breach which would have the
effect of defeating the main purpose of the contract."*" And even where
a clause is so worded that it covers a fundamental breach it might not
be given that effect if it "would lead to an absurdity, or because it
would defeat the main object of the contract or perhaps for other
2
reasons." Lord Wilberforce also reiterated that
... the parties cannot, in a contract, have contemplated that
the clause should have so wide an ambit as in effect to
deprive one party's stipulations of all contractual force:
to do so would be to reduce the contract to a mere declar¬
ation of intent.3
Fundamental Breach after Suisse Atlantique
The principles underlying fundamental breach were frequently
applied long before it acquired the force of a substantive doctrine
and since its relegation to a rule of construction it has been simil¬
arly used to deprive exemption clauses of effect where they are not
expressed clearly enough to cover the breaches that have been
4
committed. Construction, as has been pointed out before, is in any
1
Treitel, op. cit., 167.
2 J±%jJ 1 A.C. 361, 398.
^
Ibid., 432.
^ Farnworth Finance Facilities Ltd. v. Attryde /l970/_2 All E.R. 774;
Anglo-Continental Holidays Ltd. v. Typaldos Lines /l96'jJ 2 LI.Rep.61;
Levison v. Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co.Ltd. /197773 W.L.R.90;
Mendelssohn v. Normand Ltd. /l9707 1 Q.B. 177; Wathes (Western) Ltd.
v. Austin (Menswear) Ltd. /1976/1 LI.Rep. 14.
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event itself a policy oriented activity so that the limitation
imposed by the opinions expressed in the Suisse Atlantique case has
2
not been so restrictive as might have been thought. Exemption
clauses which are framed in general terms will be unlikely to free
3
a party from liability for a fundamental breach.
There were indications in some of the speeches in the Suisse
Atlantique case that if the innocent party had terminated the con¬
tract, as he was justified in doing, the exemption clause would have
4
been ineffectual. These statements were seized on by Lord Denning
5
M.R. in Harbutt's "Plasticine" Ltd. v. Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd.
and interpreted in a manner which went a considerable way towards
resurrecting fundamental breach as a substantive doctrine. The
Master of the Rolls held that where a contract was affirmed by the
injured party after the breach, the question whether he could claim
damages depended upon a proper construction of the exemption clause,
but where the contract was terminated, either by the injured party
himself or automatically (because any further performance had become
impossible) such a party was entitled to claim damages without the




See Treitel, oja. cit. . 168-169.
3
Ibid. See, for example, Levison v. Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning
Co. Ltd. /197273 W.L.R.90 - "at owner1s risk".
4 /19627 1 A.C. 361, 419.
5 /19707 1 Q.B. 447.
^
See also Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd. /l978/
1 W.L.R. 856. The reasoning of the Court of Appeal in that case
has been criticised and the decision overturned by the House of
Lords in Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd., The
Times, 20th February, 1980.
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Lord Denning's continued espousal of fundamental breach as a
substantive doctrine was affirmed by his statement in Levison v.
Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co. Ltd."*" that where a party used his
superior bargaining power to impose an exemption clause upon the
weaker he would not be allowed to rely on it if he himself were
2
guilty of a breach going to the root of the contract.
However, the situation anticipated by Lord Denning will now
be dealt with under the provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Act
3
1977. That Act has largely obviated the need to resort to funda¬
mental breach in order to cut down the effect of unfair exemption
clauses. Nevertheless, where that Act does not apply the principle
of fundamental breach will still be of considerable importance.
Policy considerations underlying fundamental breach
Professor Coote expressed the real rationale behind the
doctrine of fundamental breach when he said that
... the opprobrium which attaches to extravagant exception
clauses, and the general reaction against laissez-faire notions
of the nineteenth century, together assured that the new
concepts of fundamental breach and fundamental term would
receive an enthusiastic welcome, both from the courts and from
academic writers. Here at last, it seemed, was a way in
which justice might be served and the monopolists contained.
Time and time again the courts focussed on the unreasonableness
of allowing a party who committed a fundamental breach to exclude








liability by relying on an exemption clause. And in Levison v.
Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co. Ltd. Lord Denning admitted that
"/t/he ... means of getting round the injustice of these exception
or limitation clauses is by means of the doctrine of fundamental
2
breach." And the reason why these clauses are unjust, Lord Denning
said, is because of the illusion created by promising to do something,
but at the same time adding that you are not to be held liable if
3
you do not perform accordingly.
The courts clearly disapproved of the fact that a promisor
could, by invoking the exemption clause, substantially alter the value
of the promisee's bargain and the quantum of remedies available to and
against him, and thereby frustrate the promisee's legitimate expect¬
ations. The operation of the doctrine was not dependent upon any
showing of procedural unfairness or that the exemption clause was
commercially -unjustified. It was rather a direct attempt to impose
certain "minimum decencies" on contract. It presupposed that every
contract had a number of core duties which could not be detracted
from. The basis of this transactional essence was the legitimate
expectations created by the contract itself. Any term which detracted
from the "iron essence" of the contract would, in terms of the doctrine,
4
be ineffective.
See, for example, Sze Hai Tong Bank, Ltd. v. Rambler Cycle Co. Ltd.
119527 A.C. 576.
2 /J-9127 3 W.L.R. 90, 96.
3 Ibid.. 96-97.
^
Cf. Llewellyn, The Pommon Law Tradition, 362-371.
269
Criticism of Fundamental Breach
The difficulties involved in a substantive doctrine of
fundamental breach related, in the first place, to the real effect
of an exemption clause. Contrary to conventional wisdom which main¬
tained that in order to establish the content of a party's obligations
one should look to the contract apart from the exempting clauses,^"
Coote asserted that there are two classes of exemption clauses:
Type A: exception clauses whose effect, if any, is upon the
accrual of particular primary rights.... Type B: exception
clauses which qualify primary or secondary rights without
preventing the accrual of any particular primary right.^
The distinction between these types of exemption clauses was important
because */i7nstead of being mere shields to claims based on breach of
accrued rights /Type £/ exception clauses substantively delimit the
3
rights themselves" with the result that what might ordinarily have
amounted to a fundamental breach was prevented from becoming so as a
result of the operation of the exemption clause. Courts have been
4
reluctant to accept this formula, presumably because they realized that
it would severely limit their power of "getting at" unfair exemption
clauses.
Secondly, the inability of accurately circumscribing the "core
of the contract", or the "fundamental term" made it difficult to develop
the doctrine rationally with the result that its application was of
necessity inconsistent. Thirdly, the doctrine of fundamental breach
See, for example, Karsales (Harrow) Ltd. v. Wallis /l956/ 1 W.L.R.






See, however, Kenyon, Son & Craven Ltd. v. Baxter Hoare & Co.Ltd.,
/l97l7 1 W.L.R. 519, 522 per Donaldson J.
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because it operated only where a breach had been serious, presented
no solution to the broader problem of unfair terms in standardized
contracts: where a breach had only been minor the exemption clause
would still operate no matter how widely worded it was.
A Substantive doctrine of fundamental breach in Scots law?"*"
2
It was established in Wade v. Waldon that a party may rescind
a contract only when there has been a material breach or a breach which
goes to the root of the contract. Lord President Dunedin explained
the meaning of such a breach as follows:
It is familiar law, and quite well settled by decision, that in
any contract which contains multifarious stipulations there
are some which go so to the root of the contract that a
breach of those stipulations entitles the party pleading the
breach to declare that the contract is at an end. There are
others which do not go to the root of the contract, but
which are part of the contract, and which would give rise, if
broken, to an action of damages.3
Whether a term is material or not will depend upon construction. It
has been said that if the failure to perform a contractual obligation
"would make the performance of the rest of the contract a different
4
thing from what the other party had stipulated for" the innocent
party is entitled to rescind.
Some Scottish cases have been reluctant to allow exemption
clauses to undercut an innocent party's remedies where the breach has
See generally, J.M. Thomson, Fundamental Breach in Scots and





Gloag on Contract. 602, cited with apparent approbation in Alexander
Stephen (Forth) Ltd. v. J.J. Riley (U.K.) Ltd. 1976 S.L.T. 269.
See also Thomson, op,, cit., 49.
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been material. In Hamilton v. The Western Bank of Scotland,4 the
Lord Ordinary (Lord Jerviswoode) declared that
where there is a flaw which strikes at the contract itself,
and which would suffice to annul it, nothing short of a
positive declaration that the purchaser shall be held to have
no remedy in such a case can bar his right to restoration
against it.2
It has even been hinted at by Lord President Cooper while discussing
the validity of exempting conditions contained in an airline ticket,
that excessively wide exemption clauses might not be legal:
The remarkable feature of these conditions is their amazing
width, and the effort which has evidently been made to create
a leonine bargain under which the aeroplane passenger takes
all the risks and the company accept no obligations, not even
to carry the passenger or his luggage nor even to admit him
to the aeroplane. It was not argued that the conditions were
contrary to public policy, nor that they were so extreme as to
deprive the contract of all meaning and effect as a contract of
carriage; and I reserve my opinion upon these questions.
Scots law has not, however, gone so far as to accept the
substantive doctrine of fundamental breach. In the first case in
which the doctrine was expressly discussed, Alexander Stephen (Forth)
Ltd. v. J.J. Riley (U.K.) Ltd.4 the Lord Ordinary (Kincraig) described
fundamental breach in Scots law as "the breach of a material condition
5
of the contract which justifies the other party in rescinding it."




Ibid., 1037. See also Stevenson v. Henderson (1873) 1R. 215.
^ McKay v. Scottish Airways 1948 S.C. 254, 263. See also the similar hint
by Lord Cowan in Stevenson v. Henderson (1873) 1R. 215, 223.
4 1976 S.L.T. 269.
5 Ibid.. 272.
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in Suisse Atlantique that the question whether an exemption clause
covered, such a breach depended on a proper construction of the contract
and he held that the clause in the Stephen case was in sufficiently
clear language for it to be relied on by the party in breach notwith¬
standing the fact that the injured party had rescinded the contract. "*"
In the subsequent case of W.L. Tinney & Co. Ltd. v. John C.
2
Dougall Ltd. Lord Wylie said that a limitation or exclusion clause
had to be spelt out in the clearest possible terms in order to be
effective in the event of a breach. He accepted the statement by
3
Lord Wilberforce in Suisse Atlantique that the more radical the
breach the clearer the language had to be if it was to be covered
and,construing the clause contra proferentem, held that the defenders




1977 S.L.T. (Notes) 58.
3 /196I7 1 A.C. 361, 432.
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4 - IMPLIED TERMS1
The courts, when construing a contract, often impose terms in
order to reform an otherwise unfair agreement. During the nineteenth
century the prevailing jurisprudence dictated that all implied terms
should be relayed back to the parties' intentions. It was accord¬
ingly said that terms would be implied only if they were necessary
to give a contract business efficacy in a manner intended by the
2
parties, or to make the agreement workable in a manner in which the
parties would have done had they applied their minds to it. In
rz
Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd., Mackinnon L.J. expressed
the test as follows:
Prima facie that which in any contract is left to be
implied and need not be expressed is something so obvious
that it goes without saying; so that, if, while the parties
were making their bargain, an officious bystander were to
suggest some express provision for it in their agreement,
they would testily suppress him with a common, 'Oh, of
course I'4
As a result of the need to relate every implied term to the
intention of the parties, this technique of implication, known as
5
implication in fact, occurs comparatively rarely. A term will,
for example, not be implied where one of the parties was unaware of
the facts on which the implied term is to be based.^ Similarly, a
term will not be implied if it cannot be defined with a high degree
See, generally, E.A. Farnsworth, Disputes over Omission in Contracts
(1968) 68 Col.L.Rev.860.
^
Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd. v. Cooper /l94l/ A.C. 108, 137; Shell U.K.
Ltd. v, Lostock Garages Ltd. /l976/ 1 W.L.R.1187, 1197.
3 Zl9327 2 K.B. 206.
^
Ibid., 227; Young and Marten Ltd. v. McManus Childs Ltd. /l96Q/
2 All E. R. 1169, 1172.
5
Treitel, Law of Contract, 145.
^
McCutcheon v. David MacErayne Ltd. /l961 W.L.R. 125.
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of precision by the courts, for in such a case it is impossible to
impute the term to the intention or presumed intention of the
parties.
However, determining what the parties intended depends prim¬
arily on the construction of the contract and in doing so the court
will to some extent, be influenced by its own view of what the parties
2
ought to have intended. Although the "obviousness" and "necessity
for business efficacy" tests are not wide enough to allow implication
of a term in every case where it would be reasonable to do so, they
are sufficiently flexible yardsticks for the court at least to take
into account all the circumstances of the case and to balance the
interests of the parties in the process of deciding whether a t erm
3
should be implied or not.
However, the mere fact that a term cannot be implied in fact
does not mean that implication is impossible. The courts also imply
a variety of terms which cannot be defined by or ascribed to the
4
intention of the parties. These consist mainly of duties which
the courts impose in particular types of contract - a vendor of a
5
business must not entice away the purchaser's customers, a landlord
covenants that the tenant shall have quiet possession, a depositary
in a contract of locatio conductio operis must exercise reasonable
Cf. Shell U.K. Ltd. v. Lostock Garages Ltd. /I976/ 1 W.L.R. 1187 >
1204 per Bridge L.J.
J.F. Burrows, Contractual Co-operation and the Implied Term (1968)
31 Mod.L.Rev. 390, 406. See also Gloag on Contract, 289 who
maintains that the test is whether two reasonable men would have




G. Williams, Language and the Law (1945) 61 L.Q.R. 401.
5
Trego v. Hunt 718967 A.C.7.
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care , a builder of a house guarantees that it will be reasonably fit
2
for human habitation. In these cases neither the existence nor the
extent of the duty can be determined by reference to the intention or
even the presumed intention of the parties. It is, therefore, clear
that when the courts impose such obligations on the parties they are
concerned with the intention of the parties only in so far as a clear
3
contrary intention would serve to exclude such an implication.
What then is the basis upon which such terms are implied?
4
It has been suggested that policy considerations underlie the imp¬
osition by the courts of these duties. According to Gloag
/I7n the earlier history of the law of Scotland the Court
seems generally to have proceeded on equitable grounds rather
than on any evidence of general practice in similar or
analogous cases. Thus where a lease contained no provision
as to the term of entry, the implication that an immediate
term of entry was to be inferred, now regarded as an
integral part of the law of landlord or tenant seems orig¬
inally to have been arrived at simply on the ground that to
the judicial mind it appeared fair and reasonable without
any evidence as to practice in other cases.5
It would appear as if Scots contract law,like the civilian juris¬
dictions, has been more prepared to impose general obligations in
particular types of contract without the necessity of imputing it to
the parties' intentions. In earlier times this was usually done by
virtue of the requirement of bona fides.^
Forbes v. Aberdeen Motors Ltd. 1965. S.L.T. 333> 337.
^








Ante. 179 et seq.
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The realization that contractual duties are frequently implied
in order to do justice between the parties has similarly led Lord
Denning M.R. to espouse the view that they are implied whenever it is
1 2
reasonable to do so. In Liver-pool City Council v. Irwin the
Council built a towerblock and let the flats out to tenants. In
terms of the tenancy agreements the Council retained control of the
lifts and staircases. The agreements imposed certain obligations
on the tenants but none in respect of the Council. The parts of the
building over which the Council had control deteriorated badly and the
question before the court was whether there was an implied obligation
on the Council to keep them in repair. Roskill and Ormrod L.JJ. held
that because implication of a term was not necessary for the business
3
efficacy of the contract no such obligation could be implied. Lord
Denning, on the other hand, thought that such an obligation could be
implied, but that it had not been breached. He based his argument
for the implication of such a term on the fact that such a term would
be reasonable in the circumstances.
It is often said that the courts only imply a term in a
contract when it is reasonable and necessary to do so in order
to give business efficacy to the transaction... (Emphasis is
put on the word "necessary" ...). Or when it is obvious that
both parties must have intended it ...
Those expressions have been repeated so often that it is with
some trepidation that I venture to question them. I do so
because they do not truly represent the way in which the courts
act. Let me take some instances... Such as the terms
Greaves & Co. (Contractors) Ltd. v. Baynham Meikle & Partners /19757
1 W.L.R.1095, 1099-1100; Federal Commerce and Navigation Co.Ltd.
v. Tradax Export S.A./I9777 2 W.L.R.122. 155. Contra Reigate ~v~T
Union Manufacturing Co.(Ramsbottom) Ltd. /I918/ 1 K.B. 592,605.
2 Z19767 Q.B.319.
3 Ibid., 337-538, 343.
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implied by the courts into a contract for the sale of goods...
into a contract for work and materials ... or into a contract
for letting an unfurnished house... or a furnished house...
or into the carriage of a passenger by railway ... or to enter
on premises... or to buy a house in course of erection...
If you read the discussion in those cases, you will see that
in none of them did the court ask: what did both parties
intend? If asked, each party would have said he never gave
it a thought: or the one would have intended something
different from the other. Nor did the court ask:
Is it necessary to give business efficacy to the transaction?
If asked, the answer would have been: "It is reasonable, but
it is not necessary." The judgments in all those cases show
that the courts implied a term according to whether or not
it was reasonable in all the circumstances to do so. Very
often it was conceded that there was some implied term. The
only question was: "What was the extent of it?" Such as,
was it an absolute warranty of fitness, or only a promise to
use reasonable care? That cannot be solved by inquiring what
they both intended, or into what was necessary. But only
into what was reasonable. This is to be decided as matter
of law, not as matter of fact.^
2
Although on appeal the House of Lords affirmed Lord Denning"s
finding that the Council was under an implied obligation to repair the
common parts, their Lordships did not approve of his reasoning. The
House was of the opinion that a distinction should be drawn between
a search for a term which might be necessary for business efficacy
and the implication of "such a term as the nature of the contract might
3
call for or as a legal incident of this kind of contract." In
respect of this latter category - which comprises all contracts of
common occurrence - the court, when deciding whether or not to imply
a term, does not look to the intention or presumed intention of the
1
Ibid.. 329-330.
2 /19767 2 W.L.R. 562.
Ibid., 568 per Lord Wilberforce.
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parties. It should in the first place, determine whether an obli¬
gation has already become established as a rule of law in similar types
of contract, and if so, it should impose such a duty in all similar
factual settings."'" If, on the other hand, the courts have not yet
defined the obligation they may still do so on the basis of "wider con-
2
siderations" According to Lord Cross
/w7hen it implies a term in a contract the court is some¬
times laying down a general rule that in all contracts of a
certain type - sale of goods, master and servant, landlord and
tenant and so on - some provision is to be implied unless
the parties have expressly excluded it. In deciding whether
or not to lay down such a prima facie rule the court will
naturally ask itself whether in the general run of such cases
the term in question would be one which it would be reason¬
able to insert.3
The House of Lords felt that the contract between the Council and the
tenant fell within this category. So Lord Wilberforce held that
"7t7he subject-matter of the lease (high rise blocks) and the
relationship created by the tenancy demands, of its nature, some con-
4
tractual obligation on the landlord!' To hold otherwise would be
5
contrary to "common sense" and would render the whole transaction
"inefficacious, futile and absurd."^ The extent of the obligation
7







See Shell U.K. Ltd. v. Lostock Garages Ltd. /19767 1 W.L.R.1187,
1196 per Lord Denning M.R.
/I9767 2 W.L.R. 562, 568.
Ibid.. 570.
Ibid.. 567.
Ibid., 572 per Lord Cross.
Ibid., 574 per Lord Salmon.
Ibid.. 569 per Lord Wilberforce.
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The House of Lords clearly regarded Lord Denning's proposal
that terms should be implied when it is reasonable to do so as too wide.
Reasonableness may, however, be one of the "wider considerations"
which the court takes into account when deciding whether or not to
impose a duty on a party. The House of Lords was undoubtedly correct
in maintaining that the courts do not impose terms merely because
doing so would render a harsh contract more fair. That does not,
however, mean that a court will imply a term the effect of which is
unreasonable in the circumstances.The main objection to laying
down a rule like that proposed by Lord Denning rests on freedom of
contract. It is clearly felt that to imply terms on the sole
ground of a standard as undefined as reasonableness would provide too
great a threat to the sanctity of contracts. However, such an objec¬
tion relates only to the outer limits of implication and not to its
effect, which is often to do justice between the parties. This is
shown by the Liverpool City case where the House of Lords, contrary to
the general rule that the owner of an easement is not responsible for
maintenance of the property, imposed on the Council an obligation to
2
repair because that was "just". If, as the House of Lords maintains,
a duty may be imposed on a party by virtue of the fact that the nature
of the contract requires it and the effect of such an implication is
to do justice between the parties, the.question arises why the courts may
not base their implication directly on reasonableness. There is no
^
Ibid., 580 per Lord Edmund-Davies. See also Young and Marten Ltd.
v. McManus Childs Ltd. A.C. 454, 465 per Lord Reid.
2
Ibid., 570 per Lord Wilberforce.
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reason to believe that where a contract is of a kind where the rights
and duties have not yet been clearly defined by precedent the "nature
of the contract" is a less uncertain standard than a standard of
reasonableness. In addition, although a standard such as that
proposed by the House of Lords may be sufficient to indicate that a
duty must be imposed on one of the parties in order to make the con¬
tract effective it cannot by itself allocate the party who is to bear
the duty. Whether the one or the other party is to undertake an
obligation can only be arrived at by balancing the interests of the
respective parties and by determining what would be reasonable in the
light of all the circumstances of the case.
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5 - A COMMON LAW REQUIREMENT OF REASONABLENESS
(i) Contracts in restraint of trade
One of the few areas in Scots and English law in which the
application of a reasonableness test has become institutionalised is
that related to contracts in restraint of trade. In this field two
fundamental principles, namely freedom of contract and freedom of
trade, conflict.
There are very few reported cases on the subject in early
Scots law"'", but it would seem as if restrictive covenants in contracts
were enforced unless they were particularly restrictive of personal
2
liberty. However, since the end of the nineteenth century Scots
3
law has generally followed an approach similar to English law.
In English law contracts in restraint of trade were originally
4
void, but after the subject was re-examined in Mitchel v. Reynolds,
they were generally treated as prima facie valid, provided the restraint
was limited and supported by adequate consideration. This approach
continued into the nineteenth century, but the requirement of adequate
consideration became progressively less important and was eventually
5
not insisted on. In Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition
Co.^ the doctrine was again reviewed and restated in its modern form.
4
McBryde, Void, Voidable, Illegal and Unenforceable Contracts in
Scots Law, 148-149.
^
Stalker v. Carmichael 1735 Mor. 9455.
3
See, for example, Mulvein v. Murray 1908 S.C. 528; Maclntyre v.
Cleveland Petroleum Co.Ltd. 1967 S.L.T. 95.
4 (1711) 1 P.Wms. 181.
^
Hitchcock v. Coker (1837) 6 Ad. & El. 438.
6 /I8947 A.C. 535.
282
Since then contracts in restraint of trade are prima facie void,
unless it can be shown that the restraint is reasonable inter partes
and not contrary to public interest. In general, a restraint will
be upheld only if it goes no further than is reasonably necessary for
the protection of the covenantee's legitimate interests.
The doctrine did not remain unaffected by the principle of
freedom of contract. Although the courts were prepared to intervene
in the traditional areas such as restraints imposed by employers to
prevent former employees from competing with them and those imposed
by buyers of businesses to protect their goodwill against the com¬
petition of the seller, they were far more reluctant, especially
towards the end of the nineteenth century and during the first half
of the twentieth century, to invalidate price fixings and business
arrangements which resulted in monopolies and prevented competition.
2
According to Atiyah this attitude was the result of the courts'
obsession with freedom of contract: it was assumed that if commercial
parties had freely agreed to a restriction it was reasonable between
them and if that was the case it would be presumed not to be contrary
to the public interest. The result was that freedom of trade became
subordinated to freedom of contract.
Recently, however, the scope of the doctrine has been consid¬
erably extended to include some exclusive dealing and services arrange¬
ments. In Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Harper's Garage (Stourport)
Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, 697-703.
^
Op,, pit. , 699-
3
See generally J.D. Heydon, Recent Developments in Restraint of Trade
(1975) 21 McG.L.J. 325.
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Ltd.the House of Lords set aside, on the ground that it was restrictive
of trade, a so-called solus agreement between a petrol company and a
garage owner, whereby the latter had bound himself for twenty-one
years to buy petrol from the former at their scheduled prices. The
Esso case provided a clear indication that the courts were henceforth
going to be much more vigilant against practices which prevent comp¬
etition and free trade. However, complete freedom of trade as an
ideal is neither attainable nor always desirable. For example, the
exclusive dealing arrangements have considerable benefits not only
for the parties involved, but also as regards the public at large.
The question therefore, is not whether to allow or to strike down all
restrictive covenants, but how to demarcate the frontiers beyond which
a restraint will not be tolerated.
In Esso Lord Pearce suggested that the doctrine applies where
the restraint sterilizes trade and not where it merely regulates the
2
"normal commercial relations between the parties." And in a later
case Lord Reid said that "if contractual restrictions appear to be
unnecessary or to be reasonably capable of enforcement in an oppress-
3
ive manner, then they must be justified before they can be enforced."
4
In Instone v. A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co., Ltd., a case in
which an agreement whereby songwriters undertook to give their exclu¬
sive services to a firm of music publishers, was held to be unenforceable,
4 /I968J A.C. 269. See also Amoco Australia Ply Ltd. v. Rocca Bros.
Motor Engineering Ply Ltd. (1973) 47 A.L.J.R.681.
2
Ibid.. 327.
^ A. Shroeder Music Publishing Co.Ltd. v. Macaulay /l97i/ 1 W.L.R. 1308,
1314., formerly Instone v. A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co.Ltd.
/I9747 1 All E.R. 171.
4 Z19747 1 All E.R. 171.
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Russell L.J. rightly rejected this method of classification as pre¬
empting the question of reasonableness, and said:
Rather than attempt to classify some situations involving
restrictions on trade as 'restraints of trade' and other
situations as not, we would prefer a quite general approach
to all such situations.
In the Esso case the House of Lords declared the contract
unenforceable primarily on the ground that it was contrary to the
public interest and in doing so stressed the importance of consider¬
ing the effect of such agreements on freedom of trade. This must not,
however, be taken to mean that the court should embark on an equiry
into the effect of a restriction on the general social and economic
2
conditions. In Texaco Ltd. v. Mulberry Filling Station Ltd., Ungoed-
Thomas J. rightly warned that the court is not equipped to deal with
an inquiry of that nature and scope. To regard freedom of trade as
anything other than a general statement of policy will involve the
court in every restraint of trade case in an inquiry, the proportion
of which will correspond to those undertaken in anti-trust cases in
the U.S.A.
Esso was not decided solely on the basis of public interest.
Lord Reid also expressed the opinion that a party who agrees to a
restriction should receive some compensating advantage and that in
that respect, the quantum of consideration was of considerable imp-
3 4
ortance. In A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co.Ltd. v. Macaulay
Ibid., 177. For another application of the doctrine to a similar
factual setting see Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. W.E.A. Records
Ltd. /I97^7 1 W.L.R. 61.
2 /I972/ 1 W.L.R. 814, 827.
3 /I9687 A.C. 269, 300.
4 ZI974/ 1 W.L.R. 1308.
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the House of Lords similarly based their opinion that the contract
should not be enforced, almost entirely on the unreasonableness of the
restriction inter partes. Lord Diplock said:
It is, in my view, salutary to acknowledge that in refusing
to enforce provisions of a contract whereby one party agrees
for the benefit of the other party to exploit or to refrain
from exploiting his own earning power, the public policy
which the court is implementing is not some 19th-century
economic theory about the benefit to the general public of
freedom of trade, but the protection of those whose bargaining
power is weak against being forced by those whose bargaining
power is stronger to enter into bargains that are uncon¬
scionable. 1
Just as in Esso, the House emphasized the fact that while the
songwriter was bound to give his services exclusively to the publishing
2
company, they undertook no obligations in return. And in Clifford
3
Davis Management Ltd. v. W.E.A. Records Ltd., Lord Denning M.K.
similarly refused enforcement of an agreement, potentially effective
for ten years, whereby a songwriter bound himself to turn over all his
compositions to a publisher, who undertook no obligation to publish
4
them, and referred to the arrangement as a "stranglehold".
In the Esso case Lord Reid suggested that even where it has
been established that an agreement is unfairly restrictive the court
might not intervene if the parties were two experienced traders
bargaining on equal terms.
But there may well be cases where, although the party to be
restrained has deliberately accepted the main terms of the




Ibid., 1313 per Lord Reid.




terms: for example where a set of conditions has been in¬
corporated which has not been the -.subject of negotiation -
there the court may have greater freedom to hold them un¬
reasonable .
In the Schroeder case Lord Diplock, in holding the contract unreason¬
able in terms of the restraint of trade doctrine, similarly emphasized
the fact that the agreement between the songwriter and the publisher
was in standard form. He distinguished two types of standard form
contract. Firstly, there are those such as bills of lading and
charterparties in which the standard clauses have been settled over
the years by negotiation and have been adopted because they facilitate
trade. The fact that they are widely used by parties whose bargaining
power is fairly matched make them prima facie reasonable. This
presumption does not arise in the case of the second type of standard
form contract, which is of relatively recent origin.
The terms of this kind of standard form of contract have not
been the subject of negotiation between the parties to it, or
approved by any organisation representing the interests of
the weaker party. They have been dictated by that party
whose bargaining power, either exercised alone or in con¬
junction with others providing similar goods or services,
enables him to say: 'If you want these goods or services at
all, these are the only terms on which they are obtainable.
Take it or leave it.'
To be in a position to adopt this attitude towards a party
desirous of entering into a contract to obtain goods or
services provides a classic instance of superior bargaining
power.2
The fact, Lord Diplock continued, that a party's bargaining power is
strong enough to adopt this take-it-or-leave-it attitude does not
raise a presumption that he drove an unconscionable bargain, but
1 /1968/ A.C. 269, 300.
2 /197A7 1 W.L.R. 1308, 1316.
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where it results in a restraint on a party it calls for judicial
vigilance.
To summarise: According to Russell L.J."'" all restraints, or,
2
if the view of the House of Lords is accepted, those restraints which
are oppressive, must be subjected to the tests of the restraint of
trade doctrine. The tests must take the interest of the public in
free trade into account, but they should, in the main, focus on the
reasonableness of the restraint inter partes. A contract will norm¬
ally be unreasonable if it is one-sided or stipulates for an -unequal
exchange or if it unreasonably fetters a party or puts him in a
stranglehold. Even so, a court will be reluctant to refuse enforcement
if the contract was concluded by experienced parties of equal bargain¬
ing power. On the other hand, if one party merely had to accede to
another's standard terms it will be an indication of -unequal bargain¬
ing power and relief will be granted more readily.
Two criticisms can be levelled at this approach. The first
deals with the nature of standard form contracts and is thus also
relevant outside the sphere of the restraint of trade doctrine. The
drift of Lord Diplock's argument in the Schroeder case seems to be
that the use of standard form contracts is proof of a concentration of
market power and consequently, that a party who uses standard form
3
contracts has bargaining power superior to that of his counterpart.
^
Instone v. A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. lv$l£j 1 All E.R.
171, 177.
p




A similar assumption was made by Lord Denning in Clifford Davis.
2
In a perceptive discussion of the former case Trebilcock has con¬
vincingly argued that not only is it not necessarily true that the use
of standardized contracts result from market concentration in a few
hands, but the fact that there was no negotiation of the terms is not in
itself significant in respect of the question of bargaining power and
becomes so only if the party has no other means of fulfilling his
needs. Superior bargaining power arising from the market structure
can only be assumed after an inquiry has shown that no alternative
3
sources of supply were open to the party. Thereafter the court will
have to establish that a particular contract or clause in a contract
was a product of bargaining imbalance. It should be clear that the
use of unequal bargaining power arising from the market structure
as a reason for non-enforcement presupposes factual inquiries
4
which the courts are not qualified to embark on. The courts cannot
redress inequalities which are basic to the economic system.
1 Zl97^7 1 W.L.R. 61, 65.
2
M.J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power:
Post Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords (1976) 26 U.Toronto
L.J. 359, 364-366. Trebilcock rightly points out that not only
does the evidence in the Schroeder case indicate that the songwriter
had other outlets for his compositions which he rejected because
the publisher eventually chosen offered wider markets, but also
that some terms of the standard form contractwere actually changed
after representations by the composer.
3
See, for example, A Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining Power and the




This does not mean that inequality of "bargaining power arising
from sources other than market structure cannot be employed as a reason
for striking down unfair contracts or that unfairness perpetrated
through the use of standard form contracts should be tolerated. It
does mean, however, that inequality of bargaining arising from the
market structure and supposedly evidenced by the use of standard form
contracts cannot be assumed without a wide-ranging inquiry which the
court is not qualified to undertake. The courts should not - as they
did in the Schroeder and Clifford Davis cases - base on inequality of
bargaining power, decisions reached on other grounds. They should
instead, in the field of contracts in restraint of trade, do what they
have been doing in effect if not in theory, and that is to delimit
on policy or moral grounds the points beyond which restraints on
parties will not be allowed.
In the Schroeder case Lord Diplock said that the test of fair¬
ness involved asking
whether the restrictions are both reasonably necessary
for the protection of the legitimate interests of the
promisee and commensurate with the benefits secured to the
promisor under the contract.^
Lord Reid compared the respective promises and said that although the
songwriter had to assign the copyright in all his compositions to the
publisher for a five and possibly ten year period, he received little
payment (apart from royalties in case of publication) and the publisher
was under no obligation to publish his work. In addition, the composer
had no right to terminate the agreement or to have the copyright re-
1 /l97A7 1 W.L.R. 1308, 1315-1316.
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assigned to him. In the Clifford Davis case Lord Denning, on
2
substantially similar facts, voiced the same objections.
While admitting that the types of promise contained in these
contracts may often be so open-ended as to amount to no legal obli¬
gation at all, the question still arises as to what type of obligation
one could reasonably expect the publishers to have undertaken in the
circumstances. Indeed, in the Schroeder case Lord Reid recognised
that it would have been unreasonable to have required from him a defin-
3
ite commitment to publish the songs. It therefore seems somewhat
unfair to punish him for something which the court admits could not
be done. While recognising that the imbalance in the obligations
undertaken is an important consideration in deciding on the reason¬
ableness of a restraint it is suggested that the test should essent¬
ially focus on the extent to which a party's liberty is curtailed by
the restraint. The question then is not solely whether the restrict¬
ed party received an adequate consideration, but whether he was caught
in a "stranglehold" or became so subjugated to another that his entire
economic existence was controlled by that other party. This aspect
4
after all, lies at the heart of the restraint of trade doctrine. It
is a test which deals with the terms and the effect of the restraint
and not with the imbalance in market power that may have produced it.
1
Ibid.. 1314-1315.
2 /197^7 1 W.L.R. 61, 65.
5 /I9747 1 W.L.R. 1308, 1314.
^
See, for example, Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Harper's Garage
(Stourport) Ltd. /l96_§7 A.C. 269, 323 per Lord Pearce, 332-333
per Lord Wilberforce.
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When a restraint is so fettering as to become unreasonable is a
difficult question and the courts can only mark out the bounds of the
permissible by reference to the commercial context in which the
contract was to operate.
(ii) Contracts other than restraint of trade
It has been suggested in a few obiter dicta that a contract term
will only be enforced if it is reasonable or if it is reasonable
for the party wishing to rely on it to do so. These suggestions were
first made in a small number of late nineteenth"'" and early twentieth
2
century ticket cases. In view of the far-fetched example of un-
3
reasonableness cited by one of the judges, namely a term whereby
the owner of goods deposited at a cloakroom shall forfeit £1,000
if he fails to collect them within forty-eight hours, it is not
surprising that there is no indication that the test was ever success¬
fully applied at the time.
More recently, a similar test has been proposed and applied
by Lord Denning in a number of cases dealing with standard form
4
contracts. Jaques v. Lloyd D, George and Partners Ltd. concerned
the validity of a term as to the time when an estate agent's commission
became payable. The term, which was contained in the estate agent's
"*■
Van Toll v. The South Eastern Railway Co. (1862) 12 C.B. (N.S.)75,
88; Parker v. The South Eastern Railway Co. (1877) 2 C.P.D. 416,
42Q.
2
Thompson v. London, Midland and Scottish Railway Co. /l930/ 1 K.B.
41, 55.
^ Bramwell L.J. in Parker v. The South Eastern Railway Co. (1877)
2 C.P.D. 416, 428.
4 /I9687 1 W.L.R. 625.
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printed terms of business, was inconsistent both with representations
made in the pre-contract negotiations and the usual practice in these
cases. In holding the clause to be invalid Lord Denning suggested
as an alternative ground that the clause was unreasonable. He
maintained that if an estate agent wished to depart from the com¬
mission clause as usually understood it should be brought home very
clearly to the client. In the absence of such an explanation, the
client was entitled to assume that there was nothing unreasonable or
oppressive in the contract. If the client did not read the contract
and if it was afterwards found to contain unreasonable terms, then it
should not be enforced.
This view was reiterated in Gillespie Bros, and Co. Ltd. v.
Hoy Bowles Transport Ltd., Rennie Hogg Ltd.! a case concerning the
effectiveness of an indemnity clause. The Master of the Rolls review¬
ed the traditional judicial techniques of controlling terms which
restrict the liability of parties for their own negligence and
asserted that in all the instances where the courts have granted
relief from them they did so because they regarded the clauses as
unreasonable. The courts "will not allow a party to exempt himself
from his liability at common law when it would be quite unconscionable
for him to do so."2 However, "/w7hen such a clause is agreed upon,
3
and is reasonable, it should be given effect according to its terms."





The clause was reasonable in that case, said Lord Denning, because it
was common practice for carriers to limit their liability to specific
amounts and leave the owner of the goods to insure if he wished to have
greater cover. In effect, therefore, the clause was reasonable
because it was agreed to, and it was agreed to because the party was
deemed to have known about the clause, even if, in fact, he was unaware
of it.
The most recent case, Levison v. Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning
Co. Ltd.,^ concerned the validity of a limitation clause contained in
an order form. The plaintiff had arranged with the defendant
company to collect for cleaning a Chinese carpet valued at £900.
At the time of collection the plaintiff was requested to sign an order
form containing certain conditions and he complied without reading
those provisions. The effect of clause 2 was to limit the liability
of the defendant in respect of damage to the carpet to £40, and clause
5 provided that goods were "expressly accepted at the owner's risk"
and that therefore the owners were recommended to insure their property.
The carpet was lost while at the cleaners and the plaintiff claimed
damages. The Court of Appeal held that the defendant could not limit
its liability by relying on the limitation clause. Lord Denning simply
assumed that because the terms under which the cleaning was undertaken
were the cleaner's standard terns of business it was an instance
of superior bargaining power. He referred to the Gillespie Eros.





I suggested that an exemption or limitation clause should not
be given effect if it was unreasonable, or if it would be
unreasonable to apply it in the circumstances of the case.
I see no reason why this should not be applied today, at
any rate in contracts in standard forms where there is in¬
equality of bargaining power. In this case I would apply
it in this way: take the limitation clause ... In some
circumstances that clause might be reasonable. But it would
not in the present case be reasonable to allow the cleaning
company to rely on it. They knew that they were to collect
a heavy Chinese carpet which was worth a lot of money. To
limit liability to £40 (without a word of warning) would, I
think, be most unreasonable.^
The same considerations applied, Lord Denning maintained, in relation
to clause 5.
The nature of the reasonableness test, as set out by Lord
Denning, has been moulded by the factual setting in which it has been
applied. The question in every case was whether the party against
whom a clause operated was aware of it and -understood its purport.
If it was not brought to his attention or if it was not a case where
he ought to have been aware of the clause then it would be unreason¬
able for the -proferens to rely on it. The clauses were, in effect
therefore, struck down not because they were substantively unreason¬
able, but because it was unreasonable to rely on them where the other
party had not known about their existence or did not comprehend their
effect.
This ground can be more accurately described as "unfair surprise".
1
Ibid.. 95.
See, generally, Trebilcock, ojd. cit.. 370-373. Also J.A. Spanogle,
Analyzing Unconscionability Problems (1969) 117 U. Pa. L.Rev. 931.
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So phrased, it becomes clear that the test relates to terms which
the promisee was ■unaware of, or which were misleading or incomprehen¬
sible to the layman. Unfair surprise, however, presupposes that the
non-drafting party entertains certain expectations in respect of the
contract and, therefore, before a court can strike down a clause on
that basis it has to determine (a) whether the party's expectations
were reasonable in the circumstances, and (b) whether the actual terms
were substantially at variance with these expectations."'" In the
cases discussed these matters were not clearly examined.
Another important question raised by the recognition of unfair
surprise as a ground for striking down a clause, is whether a certain
degree of notification will be sufficient to insulate an unfair clause
from attack. In the cases reviewed this problem did not arise. Yet
in Gillespie Bros., Lord Denning did indicate that a clause will only
be given effect to if it is agreed and reasonable. In the Levison
case it would seem as if the Master of the Rolls regarded the terms
as oppressive, onerous and one-sided in that they required of Levison
to bear, except for a small amount, all the risk, while the cleaners
undertook very limited obligations in return. This is clearly a very
difficult problem which will depend upon judicial policy vis-a-vis
certain terms and a balancing of the parties' interests. It is
submitted that although there will obviously be clauses which are
objectionable per se, such as those which, purely to hinder a party
See Trebilcock, ojd. cit., 370.
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in the exercise of his rights, require of him to submit to foreign
jurisdiction in the case of disputes, a clause which is known and under¬
stood will only rarely be struck down.
If, therefore, a clause can be insulated from attack by
notification, what degree of notification will suffice? Is it
enough if the non-drafting party merely reads the contract terms or
must he also understand them? The courts have, in the past, used
strict rules relating to the incorporation of documents as a method
of denying consent to unfair exemption clauses. However, the problem
of unfair surprise may arise even where a term has technically been
consented to. It is therefore necessary for the proper application
and functioning of the test of unfair surprise that clear criteria
be laid down.
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6 - INEQUALITY OF BARGAINING POWER
Following his statement in Gillespie Eros. & Co.Ltd. v. Roy Bowles
Transport Ltd., Rennie Hogg Ltd."*" that contract terms may be struck
down if they are unreasonable, Lord Denning has suggested more recently
that English law permits a court to grant relief from unfair or un¬
reasonable contracts which were concluded by parties between whom
there was great inequality of bargaining power.
The principle was first enunciated in Lloyds Bank Ltd. v.
2
Bundv; Mr. Bundy was an elderly farmer and had but one main asset,
his farmhouse, worth £10,000. Out of affection for his only son he
charged his house for £11,000 as a guarantee for the repayment of
debts owed by his son's company to the bank. Eventually the company
went into receivership and the bank sought to enforce its rights as
mortgagee. Bundy's defence was that he had executed the charge under
the influence of the bank Eanager and that he had no-one else to advise
him on the transaction. The majority of the Court of Appeal (Cairns
L.J. and Sir Eric Sachs) set aside the transaction on the ground of
undue influence. Sir Eric Sachs accepted the proposition that Bundy
had relied on the bank manager for advice and concluded "that there
was a relationship of confidentiality between them. As the manager
knew that the company's position was precarious and that Bundy could
lose everything he had, but had not advised him accordingly, the duty
of care which arises from such a relationship was not discharged.
1 /1972/ Q.B. 400, 416-417.
2 /l97^7 1 Q.B. 326.
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Lord Denning M.R. based Ms decision on other grounds. He
said that although "/n7o bargain will be upset which is the result of
the ordinary interplay of forces"^ there are exceptional cases in
wMch the courts will set aside a contract or a transfer of property
when the parties have not met upon equal terms - "when the one is so
strong in bargaining power and the other so weak - that, as a matter
of common fairness, it is not right that the strong should be allowed
2
to push the weak to the wall." These cases are divided into separate
categories: duress of goods, unconscionable transactions with the weak
and necessitous, undue influence, undue pressure and unfair salvage
agreements.
Gathering all together, I would suggest that through all these
instances there runs a single thread. They rest on 'inequal¬
ity of bargaining power'. By virtue of it, the English law
gives relief to one who, without independent advice, enters
into a contract upon terms which are very unfair or transfers
property for a consideration wMch is grossly inadequate, when
Ms bargMning power is grievously impMred by reason of Ms
own needs or desires, or by Ms own ignorance or infirmity,
coupled with undue influences or pressures brought to bear on
Mm by or for the benefit of the other. When I use the word
'undue' I do not mean to suggest that the principle depends on
proof of any wrongdoing. The one who stipulates for an
■unfair advantage may be moved solely by his own self-interest,
unconscious of the distress he is bringing to the other. I
have also avoided any reference to the will of the one being
'dominated' or 'overcome' by the other. One who is in
extreme need may knowingly consent to a most improvident
bargain, solely to relieve the strMts in which he finds Mmself.
Again, I do not mean to suggest that every transaction is saved







Applying these principles to the case in hand Lord Denning held (l) that
the transaction constituted a grossly unequal exchange: while the bank
gained security of £11,000 neither Bundy nor his son's company got
anything in return, (2) the relationship between the bank and Bundy
was one of trust and confidence, and (3) Bundy was motivated to
conclude the transaction out of affection for his son."'"
Since Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy, Lord Denning has applied the
principle of inequality of bargaining power in a number of dissimilar
2
factual settings. In Arrale v. Costain Civil Engineering the Master
of the Rolls said that a release of a tort claim for no consideration
by a poor labouring Arab should be set aside on the ground that it was
done when his bargaining power was impaired by reason of his own ignor¬
ance. Although he signed the release in the presence of a lawyer friend
he did so without the effect of the release being explained to him.
Lord Denning added that no misconduct could be attributed to the
3
defendant's representative.
The principle has also been applied in the context of standard-
4
ized agreements. In Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. W.E.A. Records.
where two songwriters had bound themselves to assign the copyright in
their compositions to their manager, Lord Denning referred to the case
5
of A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co.Ltd. v. Macaulav as supporting the
principle of unequal bargaining power and held that the following factors
1
Ibid.. 339-340.
2 /I9767 1 LI.Rep. 98.
5 Ibid.. 102.
4 Zl97^7 1 W.L.R. 61.
5 ZI9747 1 W.L.R. 1308.
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made out a case of inequality of bargaining power:"^" (a) The fact
that the songwriters had tied themselves for a period of 10 years without
getting a retaining fee and with no promise in return other than that
the manager should use his best endeavours to get the compositions
published. (b) The copyright was turned over for a grossly inadequate
fee. (c) The songwriters' bargaining power was impaired by the fact
that they wished to get their work published and that they were de¬
pendent upon the manager in order to do so. (d) Undue pressure and
influences were brought to bear on the composers. They had to sign
long and complicated standard forms which they did not understand and
2
they had to do so without advice. In the already discussed Levison
3
v. Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co.Ltd. Lord Denning also purported
to apply the principle of unequal bargaining power.
A principle similar to that set out in Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy
has been widely applied in Canada. The cases, which date back as far
4
as the late nineteenth century seem to operate on the same principles
on which the Chancery courts gave relief from agreements in which one
party had unfairly taken advantage of or exploited a bargaining handicap
of another to the latter's detriment. Bradley Crawford, commenting
on the cases in 1966, said that
... the courts intervene to rescind the contract whenever it
appears that one of the parties was incapable of adequately
protecting his interests and the other has made some
immoderate gain at his expense.5
1
/j-31^7 1 W.L.R. 61, 65.
^
Ante, 293-
3 Zl97l7 3 W.L.R. 90.
^
See, for example, Waters v. Donnelly (1884), 9 O.R., 391.
^
Comment (1966) 44 Can. Bar Rev. 142, 143-
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So, for example, where a woman, in acute emotional and mental anxiety
and strain because of a pending divorce, signed away her half-share
in certain property and relinquished her claim to alimony, the court
set aside the transaction on the ground of the inequality of the parties
in respect of the task of protecting their respective interests, and
1 2
the improvidence of the transaction. In Paris v. Machnick, the
court adjusted a contract whereby an illiterate woman had sold land worth
$9,000 for $2,500. The court held the woman had no idea of the value
of the property nor any real understanding of the consideration that was
paid to her. These principles have been applied to a variety of con-
3 4
tract types such as sales of land, moneylending transactions, releases
5 6
of damage claims, and a contract for dancing lessons. The parties
who have merited such protection include the old, the poor, the ignor¬
ant and people of limited intelligence.
What is the nature of the doctrine espoused by Lord Denning and
applied in the Canadian courts? Although in Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy
Lord Denning provided a number of categories which, he claimed, supported
his principle of inequality of bargaining power, it is, in my view,
largely a resuscitation of Chancery's doctrine in terms of which relief
"**
Mundinger v. Mundinger (1969) 3 D.L.R. (3d) 338 (Ont. C.A.)
2 (1973) 32 D.L.R. (3d) 723 (N.S.C.T.D.)
^ Mundinger v. Mundinger (1968) 3 D.L.R. (3d.) 338 (Ont.C.A.); Paris
v. Machnick (1975) 32 D.L.R. (3d) 723 (N.S.C.T.D.)
^
McKenzie v. Bank of Montreal (1975) 55 D.L.R. (3d) 64I (Ont.H.C.)
^
Pridmore v. Calvert (1975) 54 D.L.R. (3d) 133 (B.C.S.C.)
^
Gaertner v. Fiesta Dance Studios Ltd. (1973) 32 D.L.R. (3d) 639.
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was given from unconscionable contracts entered into by weak and
necessitous parties. A few years before the Bundy case this doctrine
of equitable fraud was applied in Creswell v. Potter.2 where a woman
in the process of divorce signed a release of her interest in certain
property for inadequate consideration. Megarry J. relied on the
2
statement by Kay J. in Fry v. Lane that the court will set aside a
purchase made from a poor and ignorant person at a considerable under¬
value, the seller having no independent advice. In Backhouse v. Back-
3
house the court described Creswell v. Potter as possibly falling within
the principle of inequality of bargaining power as set out by Lord
Denning.
The operation of the principle of inequality of bargaining power
is dependent upon three factors: firstly, that the disadvantaged party
suffered from a bargaining handicap which made him vulnerable to ex¬
ploitation or which made him unable to protect his own interests. In
Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy this requirement was fulfilled by the fact
that Bundy, apparently inexperienced in commercial matters, implicitly
relied on the bank manager for guidance and in Arrale v. Costain Civil
Engineering by the fact that the person was, because of his station in
life, unable to understand the purport of the release which he signed.
Lord Denning has also assumed inequality of bargaining power to exist
where one party contracted with another on the basis of the latter's
4
printed terms of business. In such circumstances, it will often be
2
Decided in 1968, but reported only in /l978/ 1 W.L.R. 255.
2 (1888) 40 Ch.D. 312, 322.
3 /I9787 1 W.L.R. 243.
^
Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. W.E.A. Records /19757 1 W.L.R. 61;
Levison v. Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co.Ltd. /l972/ 3 W.L.R. 90.
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obvious that there is an imbalance in economic power between the parties.
That does not, however, mean that a court can assume that a contract or
clause was the product of inequality of bargaining power caused by
market concentration. Such an inference can only be drawn after a wide-
ranging inquiry as to the alternative sources of supply available to a
party. As I have argued before, the courts are hardly qualified to
V.
undertake an inquiry of that scope. A judicially applied principle of
inequality of bargaining power can operate in isolated cases to redress
unfairness which can be explained by or traced to a specific bargaining
weakness in one party, but it cannot undertake a task as comprehensive
as correcting imbalances which are inherent to the social and economic
system.
Secondly, relief will only be given where the terms are very
unfair or where there is a gross disparity in the value of the res¬
pective performances. While the recent cases have provided little
indication of the required degree of disparity the Chancery cases gen¬
erally gave relief where the imbalance was to the ratio of 2 to 1.
However, such a standard provides a guideline only where the unfairness
relates to price or related clauses and not where the contract terms
are generally one-sided or oppressive. In Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Eundy
Lord Denning listed a third requirement namely, that there must have been
"undue influences or pressures brought to bear ... by or for the benefit
of the other.""'" It is, however, clear from Lord Denning's statement
that, as was the case under equitable fraud, it is not necessary to
1 Zl97^7 1 Q.B. 326, 339.
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prove this conclusively. It is merely insisted on in order to provide
a causal link between the bargaining handicap of the one party and the
unfair contract and where these requirements are proved the court will
infer from them that the weaker party has been taken advantage of or
has been exploited. The Arrale case clearly indicated that relief
would be given even if there was no misconduct on the part of the
defendant.
An agreement which is substantively unfair may still be upheld
if the disadvantaged party had independent advice. Nevertheless, the
presence of such an adviser is, as the Arrale case shows, and Lord
Denning intimated in Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy.by no means conclusive.
The doctrine of inequality of bargaining power is a valuable
weapon against unfair contracts. It is not a novel doctrine, but is
firmly based on principles developed in the Chancery courts since the
late seventeenth century. However, its application is by necessity
restricted to cases where a specific bargaining handicap distorts the
market. It is not a mechanism through which the courts can attempt
to redress the inequalities inherent in the social and economic
structures.
The doctrine of unequal bargaining power, as set out by Lord
Denning, has not been applied in Scotland. Although it is based on
principles peculiar to English law there is no reason why extortion,
facility and circumvention and undue influence cannot be combined and
restated in the form of a doctrine of unequal bargaining power by an
innovative court.""
""
See the recommendation by the Scottish Law Commission in Memorandum
No. 42, Defective Consent and Consequential Matters, paras. 3-120-





1 - MONEYLENDING AND CREDIT AGREEMENTS:
A STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF FAIRNESS
The repeal of the usury laws in 1854 left the borrower un¬
protected and at the mercy of the moneylender. The ensuing exploit¬
ation of borrowers by unscrupulous moneylenders became so serious that
Parliament intervened and put the Moneylender Act 1900 on the statute
book. This Act and the Moneylender Act 1927 came into force in
both Scotland and England.
a) The Moneylenders Acts of 1900 and 1927"*"
The Moneylender Act of 1900 provided that where there was
2
evidence that the interest charged by a moneylender
in respect of the sum actually lent is excessive, or that the
amounts charged for expenses, inquiries, fines, bonus, premium,
renewals, or any other charges are excessive, and that, in
either case the transaction is harsh and unconscionable or^
is otherwise such that a court of equity would give relief
the court may reopen the transaction. This section was modified by
section 10 of the Moneylenders Act 1927 which laid down a rebuttable
presumption that interest at a rate of more than 48 per cent per
annum was excessive within the terms of the Act. If the court found
See, generally, Bellot, The Legal Principles and Practice of Bargains
with Money-lenders: Meston on Moneylenders.
2
According to section 6 "moneylenders" includes "every person whose
business is that of moneylending, or who advertises or announces
himself or holds himself out in any way as carrying on that
business." See, however, the exceptions mentioned in section
6(a) - (e).
Section 12 of the Act of 1927 made illegal any agreement that the
borrower should pay any sum on account of costs, charges or
expenses relating to the negotiations for or the granting of the
loan.
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a transaction to be harsh and unconscionable it had wide powers of
relief: it might
relieve the person sued from payment of any sum in excess
of the sum adjudged by the court to be fairly due in respect
of such principal, interest and charges, as the court,
having regard to the risk and all the circumstances, may
adjudge to be reasonable; and if any such excess has been
paid, or allowed in account, by the debtor, may order the
creditor to repay it; and may set aside, either wholly or
in part, or revise, or alter, any security given or agreement
made in respect of money lent by the moneylender, and if the
moneylender has parted with the security may order him to
indemnify the borrower or other person sued.^
The power of control which the Act conferred on the courts
2
was not uniformly welcomed by the judges and in England the section
was initially narrowly interpreted as merely entrenching in statute
the jurisdiction which Chancery had already developed earlier in order
3to protect weaker parties against exploitation. This was soon
seen to be an excessively restricted view and in Re Debtor, ex -parte
4
The Debtor it was held that the jurisdiction conferred by the Act
was new and was not confined to cases in which courts of equity would
have intervened before the Act. Such a view was strengthened by
the facts that under the Act the courts had the power to make new
agreements for the parties which they never had under the limited
jurisdiction of equity and that the Act also applied in Scotland where
Chancery's jurisdiction was unknown.
Section 1. Section l(4) provided that "/t7he foregoing provisions
of this section shall apply to any transaction which, whatever
its form may be, is substantially one of moneylending by a money¬
lender. "
^
See, for example, Channel J."s remarks in Barnett v. Corunna, The
Times, 16th June, 1902, as quoted by Bellot, o]q. cit. , 264.
3 Wilton & Co. v. Osborne /l90l7 2 K.B.110.
^ /l9012/ 1 K.B.705, approved in Samuel v. Newbold /19067 A.C. 461 (H.L.).
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Prom the start, however, the courts applied their newly
gained power with circumspection. Following the Act they pinpointed
the following situations as justifying the "reopening" of a trans¬
action: (i) where the remuneration was excessive and the transact¬
ion harsh and unconscionable, and (ii) where the remuneration was
excessive and the transaction otherwise such that a court of equity
would give relief. In practice there was no distinction between
these situations and the same circumstances could lead to intervention
on either ground.
In general, the courts were unwilling to give relief merely
because the remuneration was out of proportion to the sum advanced
and the risk incurred. According to Vaughan Williams L.J. in Poncione
v. Higgins
/f/he intention of the Legislature was to deal with cases of
persons in financial distress coming to moneylenders to borrow
money in order to get out of their financial distress,
which was often urgent and pressing, and not to deal with the
case of persons who were in a position to make their own
bargain on terms of equality with the money-lender. The
Legislature threw upon the money-lender who chose to
advance money to persons in financial distress the obli¬
gation not to take advantage of their distress or their
incapacity to negotiate.^
The approach envisaged was, therefore, one witji which the English
courts, through the well-known equity jurisdiction, were well acquain¬
ted. In the same case Cozens-Hardy L.J. held that to answer the
question whether a transaction should be reopened
/t/he circumstances of each case must be considered,
including the necessities of the borrower, his pecuniary
1 (1904) 21 T.L.R. 11, 12.
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position, the presence or absence of security, the
relation in which the moneylender stood to the borrower,
and the total remuneration derived by the moneylender
from the whole transaction.
In this enquiry the risk that the moneylender was running in
advancing the money was of extreme importance. Where sufficient
security was given the courts were loath to allow a high rate of
interest. And even where the advance was unsecured, but the money¬
lender was aware that he borrower had ample property to cover the
2
loan and was a good ma to do business with, the rate of interest
allowed would be lower than where the risk was high. Another factor
which had considerable influence on the question whether a transaction
3
would stand or not was the presence of a default clause, especially
where the precise effect of such a clause was not fully understood by
the borrower.^ Where there was active unfair dealing by the money-
lender during the negotiation such as misstatements or not explaining
a transaction which he knew the borrower did not understand,^ the
finding that the transaction was harsh and unconscionable would be
all the more emphatic. But it is extremely doubtful whether it was
necessary, as Lord McLaren maintained in Midland Discount Co. v.
Macdonald, to prove "some fault on the part of the moneylender,
1 (1904) 21 T.L.R. 11, 12.
O
_
Samuel v. Newbold /l905/ A.C.461, 475 per Lord James.
3
Section 7 of the Act of 1927 prohibited any contract for the payment
of compound interest "or for the rate or amount of interest being
increased by reason of any default in the payment of sums due under
the contract".
^
Levene v. Greenwood (1904) 20 T.L.R.389.
^
Victorian Daylesford Syndicate Ltd. v. Pott (1905) 21 T.L.R.742.
^
Levene v. Greenwood (1904) 20 T.L.R.389; Wells v. Joyce /l90^7
2 I.R.134. ' " ^
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some want of fairness in the transaction for which he may justly be
held responsible."'" At most it was required that the moneylender
had knowledge of the weakness, folly or necessity of the borrower and
often even this requirement was dispensed with.
In some exceptional cases the courts were even prepared
to depart from their general rule and give relief on the ground of
excessive remuneration per se. Where a very high rate of interest
was charged the technique used was to place on the moneylender the burden
of showing that despite the excessive interest rate the transaction
2
was in fact fair and reasonable. In other cases the courts were
prepared to infer solely from the exorbitant rate of interest that the
borrower was not fit to do business and that the transaction was
3therefore harsh and unconscionable within the Act. Where the rate
of interest was clearly exorbitant, for example, a few hundred per
cent per year, such an approach was perhaps justified.
Section 1 of the 1900 Act gave the court wide powers of
relief where it has found a transaction to be harsh and unconscionable.
Unlike the equity courts which could only set aside an unconscionable
agreement the courts could create an entirely new contract between
the parties. In general, the courts set aside the transactions and
ordered repayment of the principal sum lent plus reasonable interest.
1
1909 S.C. 477, 484.
2
Ibid.. 467 per Lord James. See also Debenham Ltd. v. McCall 1923
S.L.T.365 where an interest rate of 300 per cent per year was found
to be harsh and unconscionable because the moneylender could not
explain or justify the unreasonable nature of the transaction.
3
See, for example, the suggestion to that effect in Saunders v.
Newbold /l909/ Ch.260.
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In conclusion, it is clear that the courts, in applying the
statutory test of fairness, depended largely on the principles which
governed Chancery's jurisdiction against equitable fraud. While
paying lip service to the idea that parties were free to conclude any
agreements they wished and that relief would only be given where there
was evidence to show active overreaching of the borrower by the lender
they have in the main adopted a more objective approach.
b) Consumer Credit Act 1974"^
As a measure of consumer protection the value of the Money¬
lenders Acts was limited by the fact that the power of the courts to
reopen transactions was restricted to those which fell within the
scope of the Acts. Large areas of consumer credit such as hire-
purchase or instalment sale contracts were excluded from the juris-
2
diction. In addition, the fact that lenders could often justify a
high rate of interest in terms of risk or the smallness of the amount
advanced, made borrowers reticent to defend themselves in terms of
the Act.
To obviate these problems and to consolidate and unify the
law relating to credit transactions in a single Act the Legislature
passed the Consumer Credit Act 1974.
Although the Moneylenders Acts of 1900 and 1927 are still in
force it is expected that they will soon be superseded as the Consumer




Credit Act 1974 provides that the Secretary of State for Prices and
Consumer Protection may by statutory instrument repeal the Moneylenders
Acts."''
Sections 137-140 confer on the courts wide powers to reopen
a credit agreement where it is found that a credit bargain is extort¬
ionate. A"'credit agreement' means any agreement between an individ¬
ual ('the debtor') and any other person ('the creditor') by which
the creditor provides the debtor with credit of any amount." The
power to reopen therefore extends to all credit agreements except
3
hiring agreements, for which separate provision is made. The
transaction which may be reopened is the credit agreement, but in
order to do so the court must examine the credit bargain. The latter
includes not only the credit agreement but also such other transactions
which must be "taken into account in computing the total charge for
credit."^
In terms of section 138(l) a credit bargain is extortionate
if it:
(a) requires the debtor or a relative of his to make payments
(whether unconditionally, or on certain contingencies) which
are grossly exorbitant, or
(b) otherwise grossly contravenes ordinary principles of
fair dealing.
The words "(whether unconditionally, or on certain contingen¬









to the primary obligations of the debtor but also to stipulations
relating to default. It is furthermore significant that unlike
the Moneylenders Acts which did not expressly permit such a poss¬
ibility - although it was interpreted by the courts as being possible -
the Consumer Credit Act, by employing the word "or" expressly
recognises that mere exorbitancy of the payment to be made may
render a contract extortionate within the terms of the Act.
In determining whether a credit bargain is extortionate,
section 138(2) prescribes that
regard shall be had to such evidence as is adduced concerning -
(a) interest rates prevailing at the time it was made,
(b) the factors mentioned in subsections (3) to (5)> and
(c) any other relevant considerations.
The factors which in terms of section 138(3) are applicable
■under subsection (2) in relation to the debtor include -
(a) his age, experience, business capacity and state of health,
and
(b) the degree to which, at the time of making the credit
bargain, he was under financial pressure, and the nature
of that pressure.
And the factors which according to section 138(4) are appli¬
cable to the creditor include -
(a) the degree of risk accepted by him, having regard to the
value of any security provided;
(b) his relationship to the debtor; and
(c) whether or not a colourable cash price was quoted for
any goods or services included in the credit bargain.
Section 138(5) provides that the
factors applicable under subsection (2) in relation to a
linked transaction include the question how far the transaction
was reasonably required for the protection of debtor or
creditor, or was in the interest of the debtor.
The court is only obliged to consider the factors mentioned




note that the factors listed in section 138(2) are merely inclusive
and are thus not the only factors which may he taken into account.
Those factors which have been singled out for specific mention
largely correspond to the factors which the courts have considered in
deciding whether an agreement is to be reopened under the Moneylenders
Acts.
The court may not mero motu reopen a credit agreement. It
may only do so at the instance of either the debtor or a surety.
Section 17l(7) furthermore provides that if, in proceedings referred
to in section 139(l)> the debtor or surety alleges that the credit bar¬
gain is extortionate it is for the creditor to prove the contrary.
In reopening the agreement, the court may, for the purpose
of relieving the debtor or surety from payment of any sum in excess
of that fairly due and reasonable, by order:
(a) direct accounts to be taken, or (in Scotland) an account¬
ing to be made, between any persons,
(b) set aside the whole or part of any obligation imposed on
the debtor or a surety by the credit bargain or any
related agreement,
(c) require the creditor to repay the whole or part of any
sum paid under the credit bargain or any related agree¬
ment by the debtor or a surety, whether paid to the
creditor or any other person,
(d) direct the return to the surety of any property provided
for the purposes of the security, or
(e) alter the terms of the credit agreement or any security
instrument.
Such an order may be made by the court "notwithstanding that
its effect is to place a burden on the creditor in respect of an advan¬








2 - EXEMPTION CLAUSES: A STATUTORY
REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT
It has long been recognised that exemption clauses are a
source of actual or potential injustice. To the promisee, who is
often unaware of the existence and meaning of these clauses, their
invocation means that the value of his bargain and the remedies avail¬
able to or against him are substantially dissimilar from what he ex¬
pected. And even where the promisee knows of an exemption clause and
comprehends its effect he may find that he is unable to locate a
supplier who will contract on the basis of materially different terms.
In addition, by exempting a party from liability for his own negligence
or breach such a clause may promote inefficiency.
In view of these factors it was, therefore, hardly surprising
that the courts regarded exemption clauses with disfavour and attempted
to restrict their effectiveness where they were perceived to operate
unfairly. The various techniques employed and their shortcomings have
been reviewed before. It will suffice to say here that the main problem
was that although the use of those techniques was impelled by consider¬
ations of fairness their focus was on other matters. The effect was,
therefore, not only to distort the principles involved, but also to make
the controls inflexible and arbitrary, and thereby to create uncertainty.
The one instrument of control which attempted to deal directly with the
undercutting effect which exemption clauses have on a party's expect¬
ations, namely the substantive doctrine of fundamental breach, was beset
by conceptual problems. In addition, its application had become un¬
certain as a result of the statements made in Suisse Atlantique"*" and
1 JjS&fl 1 A.C. 371.
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the interpretation of those dicta in subsequent cases."'" The alter¬
native and more direct approach of subjecting exemption clauses to a
reasonableness test was suggested by Lord Denning in a few cases, but
on the whole the courts were unwilling to follow this lead. It was
thus necessary for the legislature to intervene and confer on the courts
the power to test the reasonableness of exemption clauses.
Until recently, the only situation in which the courts had been
given a statutory power to police exemption clauses for reasonableness
was in relation to carriage by railway: section 7 of the Railway and
Canal Traffic Act. More than a century was to pass before the legis¬
lature, by section 3 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967, again conferred
on English courts the power to test an exemption clause for reasonable¬
ness. Despite the criticism attracted by the method of control pro¬
posed in that Act, Parliament in 1973 passed the Supply of Goods (implied
Terms) Act, which laid down a similar test for terms which purport to
restrict the liability for breach of a seller or owner's implied obli¬
gations in contracts of sale of goods and of hire-purchase. A judicially
administered test of reasonableness was introduced over a much wider
area in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. The provisions relating
to implied undertakings in sales and hire-purchases have been repeated
in, and to some extent amended by, the 1977 Act and will be discussed
under that Act.
See, for example, Harbutt's "Plasticine" Ltd. v. Wayne Tank Co.Ltd.
/I9707 1 Q.B. 447.
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(a) The Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1854"^
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
common carriers were subjected to strict control by the common law:
not only were they obliged to carry goods offered to them for a
reasonable remuneration, but they were also held strictly liable for
any loss or damage in relation to the goods which they carried. Not
unnaturally, they attempted to exclude this liability by putting up
notices to that effect. The Carriers Act of 1830 somewhat restricted
this practice, but left the carrier otherwise free to limit or exclude
his liability under a "special contract." Towards the middle of the
nineteenth century the railway had become almost the only mode of
inland transport. This monopolistic position was used to conclude
"special contracts" with the consignors in which they drastically cut
down the liabilities which attached to them as common carriers. This
practice led to grave injustice and Parliament responded by passing the
Railway and Canal Traffic Act in 1854.
Section 7 of that Act held carriers by railway liable for any
loss or injury to the goods carried by them and caused by the neglect
or default of the carriers or their servants. However, special
contracts limiting such liability in relation to the receiving, for¬
warding and delivering of the goods were to be valid, but only if the
court adjudged them to be "just and reasonable".
The phrase "just and reasonable", of course, had no meaning in
itself and its content was entirely dependent upon judicial interpret-
2
ation, a fact which was by no means welcomed by all judges. However,
^
See, generally, Kahn-Freund, Law of Carriage by Inland Transport,
214-228.
See, for example, Pardington v. South Wales Railway Co. (1856)
1 H. & N. 392.
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eventually the House of Lord decided in Peek v. North Staffordshire
Railway Co.,that the exempting conditions had to he contained in a
document signed by the consignor and they had to be just and reasonable.
They furthermore maintained that a special contract containing con¬
ditions limiting or excluding the liability of the carrier would be just
and reasonable if the consignor had also been offered a "fair alternative".
That meant that the consignor had to be given the option of contracting
at his own or at the company's risk. In addition, it was declared
that such an alternative would only be fair if the consignor who chose
to bear the risk himself was offered a lower rate than he would have
had to pay if the carrier had assumed the risk, or if the consignor
was offered some other advantage.
The availability of a "fair alternative" subsequently became
the central factor in determining whether the exempting conditions were
reasonable or not. Such an interpretation of section 7 was entirely
consistent with the principle of freedom of contract, because it focussed
on the formation of the contract rather than on the substantive reason¬
ableness of the contract. Provided the consignor had a genuine choice
of alternatives the contract would be regarded as reasonably made.
And so long as the contract was made in a just and reasonable manner,
2
the contract itself was deemed just and reasonable.
During the twentieth century the railways lost its earstwhile
monopoly in respect of inland transport and in 1962 the Transport Act
1 (1863) 10 H.L.C. 473.
2
Atiyah, The Rise and Pall of Freedom of Contract, 559. See also
Brown v. Manchester. Sheffield & Lincolnshire Railway (1883)
8 App.Cas. 703, 716.
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repealed, the Railway and Canal Traffic Act. Section 7, however,
not only had an important effect on the manner in which transport law
developed, but the relative success with which it was applied, also
paved the way for the enactment of reasonableness tests in other areas
of contract law.
(b) The Misrepresentation Act 1967
Section 3 of the Misrepresentation Act has now been re-writtcn
by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.^ It reads as follows:
If a contract contains a term which would exclude or
restrict -
(a) any liability to which a party to a contract may
be subject by reason of any misrepresentation made
by him before the contract was made; or
(b) any remedy available to another party to the contract
by reason of such a misrepresentation,
that term shall be of no effect except in so far as it
satisfies the requirement of reasonableness as stated
in section ll(l) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977;
and it is for those claiming that the term satisfies that
requirement to show that it does.
Section ll(l) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act specifically
provides that in order to determine whether a term complies with
the test of reasonableness regard must be had to the time when the
2
contract was concluded. A main source of criticism of the earlier
version of section 3 was that no guidelines for the application of the
reasonableness test had been provided. It would, however, now seem
as if the guidelines contained in section ll(4) of the Unfair Contract
Section 8(l).
2
See, for example, P.S. Atiyah and G.H. Treitel, Misrepresentation
Act 1967 (1967) 30 Mod.L.Rev. 369, 384-385.
320
Terms Act are, by virtue of the words "or any other Act", also applic¬
able to section 3. The Misrepresentation Act does not apply to
Scotland.
(c) The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977"*"
The provisions of the Act largely follow the recommendations
2
of the Law Commissions of Scotland and England. The law relating
to England and Scotland is set out separately in Parts I and II
respectively. In the following discussion the English and Scots
provisions have been, wherever possible, discussed simultaneously.
In terms of the Act some exemption clauses are completely ineffective
3
and others are subject to a reasonableness test. The former
provisions are beyond the scope of this work.
The controls contained in the Act are wide, but they do not
apply to all exemption and related clauses: the operation of the Act
is dependent upon the status of the parties, the nature of the lia¬
bility or obligation affected and the type of contract in which they
4
are contained.
The Act has been firmly drafted on the premise that freedom of
contract should not be unduly disturbed. With the exception of the
See, generally, Rogers and Clarke, The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977;
Treitel, Law of Contract, 179-193; F.M.B. Reynolds, The Unfair Con¬
tract Terms Act 1977 /.19787 2 LMCLQ 201; B.Coote, Unfair Contract
Terms Act 1977 (1978) 41 Mod.L.Rev. 312.
The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission /hereafter the
Joint Law Comnn/ Exemption Clauses, Second Report.
3
Part I of the Act also deals with non-contractual notices, for
example, in sections 2 and ll(3). These fall outside the scope
of this work.
^
Coote, crp. cit., 312. In Scotland the main controls of the Act
apply only to the types of contract listed in section 15(2). There
is no corresponding provision in Part I.
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limited areas in which exclusion clauses are made completely ineffective,
there has been little attempt to impose any "minimum decencies" on the
contract. The exceptions that have been made apply mostly where one
party to the contract is a consumer. They have been singled out for
special treatment because they are regarded as having limited bargaining
power, and are, therefore, more vulnerable to exploitation. It was felt
that where both parties to a contract act in the course of a buiness"'"
should be left free to regulate their affairs according to the dictates
of commercial expediency. It may perhaps be questioned whether the
2
assumption as to the equal bargaining strength of business parties
is always as justified as it is made out to be. It would, perhaps,
have been better to have left any decisions on that point for the court
to make on the basis of the particular contingencies of the case rather
than to have disposed of the matter a -priori on the basis of status.
However, even between business parties the test of reasonableness
will still have to be complied with. The danger may be that the courts,
in applying the test, will make their decision with reference only to
the assumed equality of bargaining power between the parties and not by
considering the substantive fairness of the term in question. It is,
after all, implicit in the Act that an exemption clause may still be
reasonable even if it deprives a party completely of his contractual
3
or delictual remedies.
An exception has been made in sections 2(l) and l6(l) which render
ineffective a clause restricting liability for death or personal in¬
jury caused by negligence or breach of a duty, irrespective of whether
both parties act in the course of a business.
2
Joint Law Comm., 0£. cit., para. 147.
3
Cf. section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code which prohibits the total
exclusion of a promisee's remedies.
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The Law Commissions were clearly aware of the controversy
about whether exemption clauses prevent the accrual of obligations or
2
operate as defences to accrued rights of action, and some provisions
of the Act are expressly drafted to cover clauses Which purport only
3
to define a party's obligation. On the whole the Act has proceeded
on the assumption that exemption clauses operate as defences to liability
4
incurred. To have held otherwise, would have necessitated legis¬
lation dealing not with the reasonableness of exemption clauses but
with the reasonableness of the contract. That might indeed have been
the better approach. On the other hand, it has been validly argued that
at least in the case of standard contracts, the approach of the Act is
justified in view of the fact that the contracting party has certain
reasonable expectations, arising from the type of contract involved,
which should not be detracted from by exemption clauses or by careful
5
drafting on the part of the promisor.
1
Op., cit., paras. 143-144.
2
See Coote, Exception Clauses.
^
See, for example, sections 3, 17, 13(l) and 25(5).
4
This has led to severe criticism from some commentators, for
example, Coote, (1978) 41 Mod.L.Rev. 312 at seq.
5
See, for example, the argument by J. Adams, An Optimistic Look at the
Contract Provisions of Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (1978) 41 Mod.
L.Rev. 703, 704 that standard form contracts should not necessarily
be subjected to the same rules as negotiated contracts.
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(i) Scope and Application
Commercial contracts:
The main controls of the Act apply only where a clause
restricts or excludes liability for breach of obligations or duties
arising in the aurse of business or from the occupation of premises
used for business purposes."'" "Business", although not defined in
the Act, includes the professions, government departments and local
2
or public authorities. The Law Commissions were of the opinion that
the equality of bargaining power between private parties and the rarity
of exemption clauses in "private contracts" made it unnecessary to
3
extend the proposed controls to such contracts. Whether such a view
was justified will depend largely on how widely the term "business"
is interpreted by the courts.
Consumer contracts;
The operation of the Act is also in some cases made dependent
upon one party dealing, and the other not dealing in the course of a
business.4 In the case of contracts for the supply of goods there is
a further requirement that the goods must be of a type ordinarily supp-
5
lied for private use or consumption. In Rasbora Ltd. v. J.C.L.Marine
Ltd. it was held under the similar provision in section 55(7) of the
1
Sections 1(3), 16, 17, 18.
^
Sections 14 and 25(l).
3
Op. cit., para. 9.
4
Sections 12(l)(a), 12(l)(b) and 25(l).
^
Section 12(l)(c) and 25(l).
6
/l97l7 1 LI.Rep. 645.
324
amended Sale of Goods Act 1893, that a sale to a company can be a
consumer sale if the company was set up for the purpose of acquiring the
goods and they were for the sole consumer use of the members of the
company. In addition, the court held that a sale which was originally
a consumer sale would remain so even if, as a result of novation, a buyer
who is a non-consumer, is substituted.
Standard form contracts:
In one situation the operation of the Act is made dependent upon
a "business" party dealing on the other's "written standard terms of
business" or on the contract being a standard form contract. Follow¬
ing the recommendations of the Joint Law Commissions these terms have
2
not been defined. Attempts have been made in other countries to
define standardized contracts, but these have never been entirely
successful and it was thought that it would be better to leave it to
the courts to decide whether a contract qualified or not. Problems
may occur about the extent of negotiation which will be sufficient to
take a contract out of this category.
Neither Scots nor English law has previously attempted to
isolate specific categories of contract by reference to their factual
3
settings, and subjected them to special rules. It is submitted that
Sections 3 and 17.
2
On. cit., paras. 151-157.
3
See, however, J.P. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion - The German
Version (1976) 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1041, 1103, who asserts that German law
has for a long time treated standard form contracts differently
from negotiated contracts.
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this, rather than the normal monolithic approach, is in principle, a
better way of dealing with problems which may involve different policy
considerations in different contexts.
Types of clauses affected:
The Act sets out to control clauses which "exclude or restrict"
the liability of the promisor. Such clauses include those which seek
to do so by imposing conditions on enforcement, or by excluding or
restricting rights or remedies, or the rules of evidence and procedure."''
The Act, furthermore, provides that the controls proposed in certain
specified sections also apply to exclusions and restrictions of liability
by reference to terms and notices which exclude or restrict the relevant
2
duty or obligations. In other words, the controls are extended to
terms which prevent the accrual of a promisor's obligation.
(ii) The Controls of the Act
Liability for negligence or breach of duty;
Clauses exempting a party from liability for his own negli¬
gence constituted a major source of injustice before the passing of
3
the Act and was also the most difficult to justify on moral grounds.
On the whole,courts thought it "inherently improbable that one party to
a contract should intend to absolve the other party from the consequences
of the latter's own negligence"^ and were, therefore, extremely reluctant
Sections 13(l) and 25(3).
Sections 13(l) and 25(5). This provision applies only to sections
2, 5-7, 15, 16 and 19-21.
3
Joint Law Comm. op.. cit. , para. 44.
^
Gillespie Bros. & Co.Ltd. v. Roy Bowles Transport Ltd., Ronnie Hogg
Ltd. /I9737 Q.B.400. 419 per Buckley L.J.
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to give effect to such clauses. The Joint Law Commissions had con¬
sidered the possibility of declaring all such exemption clauses void,
but decided instead to subject them to a reasonableness test on the
ground that such a clause might be justified where it would be more
practical or economical for customers to insure themselves against loss
or damage.^
3The Act has followed this approach by providing that a clause
which limits or restricts a party's liability for loss or damage (other
than for death or personal injury) occasioned by negligence or breach
of duty, is subject to the reasonableness requirement. Negligence or
breach of duty includes a breach - whether inadvertant or intentional
and irrespective of whether the liability in respect of which arises
directly or vicariously - of a duty to take reasonable care or exer¬
cise reasonable skill, whether express or implied under the contract or
4
arising under common law.
The different treatment of clauses excluding or restricting
liability for death and personal injury and those exempting from
liability for other loss or damage was suggested by the Joint Law
Commissions, who thought it appropriate to attach greater importance
5
to human life and person than to material goods. However, unlike
the Act, the Law Commissions were of the opinion that there might be
See the strict rules of construction which the courts developed in
order to limit the effectiveness of such clauses, ante, 251 .et seq.
2
On. cit.. paras. 54-57.
^ Sections 2(2) and l6(l).
^
Sections l(l) and 25(l).
5
Op. cit., para. 72.
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situations where it was reasonable that the promisee took upon himself
the duty to insure against death or injury and that clauses exempting
from liability for such loss should be banned only where a party of weak
bargaining strength relied greatly for his personal safety on the
skill of the other.1
Contractual liability:
Both section 3 and the corresponding provision in Part II,
section 17, apply in two situations: firstly, where one party is deal¬
ing in the course of business and the other not, and secondly, where
one party is dealing on the other's "written standard terms of business"
or where the contract is a "standard form of contract". In the latter
setting protection is extended even to a party acting in the course
of a business. The Law Commissions felt that to impose the controls
on all contracts where both parties act in the course of a business
would infringe too greatly on freedom of contract. It was, nevertheless,
thought proper to give protection to a party acting in the course of
business who had to submit to another's standard terms and who might
have insufficient bargaining strength to prevent the inclusion of
2
unreasonable terms. Although the Commissions' proposal to extend
protection to non-consumers was much criticised at the time it is
submitted that it was realistic and its inclusion in the Act justified:
a businessman may, because of particular contingencies, such as the







In terms of sections 3(2)(a) and 17(l)(a) a party in breach may
not exclude or restrict his liability for such a breach by a contract
term unless it is reasonable to do so. The Law Commissions gave two
examples of the exemption clauses which they wished to subject to con¬
trol: (a) a provision that a carrier shall not be liable for loss
unless it is reported to him in writing within seven days after
delivery, and (b) a term in a builder's contract to the effect that
liability for late delivery shall not exceed £X.4 The injustice in
such clauses lies in the fact that a promisor combines an apparently
unqualified undertaking with a clause which excludes liability for
failure to render proper performance. The unfairness is further com¬
pounded by the fact that the promisee, when he assesses the value of
the contract does not normally contemplate a breach and does, therefore,
2
not take account of provisions dealing with breach.
A reasonableness requirement has also been imposed on a term
which enables a party, in respect of a contractual obligation, to render
3
no performance or to render a performance which is substantially differ¬
ent from that which the consumer or customer reasonably expected from
4
the contract. These provisions deal with the situation where the
terms of the contract imposes obligations on the promisor, but at the
same time gives him such a wide discretion that he is more or less free





5 Sections 3(2)(b)(ii) and 17(l)(b).
4 Sections 3(2)(b)(i) and 17(l)(b).
5
For example, where performance is made "subject to strikes" which,
in fact, occur.
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term defines a party's obligation rather than restrict his liability for
breach."*" Indeed, one of the main considerations of the Law Commiss¬
ions in recommending these provisions was the fact that a clause may
be drafted in such a way that technically it is not an exemption of
2
liability at all. It was clearly felt that such clauses which define
and limit a party's obligation may mislead the promisee about the
extent of the promisor's obligations and even where he does appreciate
their effect, he may not have the bargaining strength to negotiate a
3material variation of the terms. Although the traditional judicial
techniques of strict construdtion and fundamental breach may have
ameliorated the effect of exemption clauses they are not suitable tools
4
for dealing with clauses which limited the promisor's obligation.
The provision relating to the rendering of substantially different
performance is potentially the most significant in the Act. Because
account is taken of the reasonable expectations of the consumer or
customer the other will not be able to cut down his obligations by
careful drafting.
This approach is wholly justified and has in the U.S.A. been
applied for a long time in respect of insurance contracts. Accord¬
ing to Kessler
/I7n dealing with standardized contracts courts have to
determine what the weaker contracting party could legitimately
expect by way of services according to the enterpriser's
'calling', and to what extent the stronger party disappointed




See, for example, the facts of Anglo-Continental Holidays Ltd. v.
Typaldos Lines (London) Ltd. /I96j7 2 Ll.Rep.6l.
On. cit., para. 143.
Ibid.
See, for example, Anglo-Continental Holidays Ltd. v. Typaldos Lines
(London) Ltd. /I96j/ 2 Ll.Rep. 61, 67~ per Russell L.J.
P. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts about Freedom of
Contract (1943) 43 Col.L.Rev. 629, 637. See also K.N. Llewellyn,
Book Review (1939) 52 Harv.L.Rev. 700, 704.
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Although Kessler limited his discussion to standardized contracts
there is nothing to prevent a similar analysis being applied to contracts
which, although formally negotiated, exhibit a similar tension between
the core duties implicit in a specific type of contract and the
ancillary terms."'" The subject matter of this provision is not limited
to exemption clauses, but may extend to any term of the contract.
In determining whether performance is inconsistent with the reason¬
able expectations of a party the court will presumably have recourse
to all the circumstances concerning the contract, for example, the
reasonableness of the term, the opportunities for changing any standard
terms, the comprehensibility of the wording of the contract, the oppor¬
tunities provided to read the terms, whether such terms are often in¬
cluded in the particular type of contract, the extent of negotiation
about the terms, and the representations made at the formation of the
contract.^
Sections 4 and 18 apply only to consumer contracts and extend
the requirement of reasonableness to any term which obliges the con¬
sumer to indemnify the other party for any liability of his to third
parties in respect of his negligence or breach of duty or of his breach
of contract. Such a clause will presumably seldom be held reasonable
as against a consumer, if only because it will generally be easier for
the business party to insure against such liability. However, in
3
Gillespie Bros & Co.Ltd. v, Roy Bowles Transport Ltd., Ronnie Hogg Ltd.,
"*"
M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability (1969) 78 Yale L.J.
757, 796 footnote 177.
2
Reynolds, op. cit., 205.
3 ZI972/ Q.B. 400, 416-417.
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Lord Denning thought that such a clause between two business parties was
reasonable.
Sale of goods, hire-purchase and related contracts:
In terms of the Supply of Goods (implied Terms) Act 1973»
the same statutory undertakings are implied into sale of goods and hire-
purchase contracts."'" The Act also placed certain restrictions on the
power of a seller or owner to limit his liability for breach of these
undertakings: exemption clauses relating to the implied terms as to
2
title are void, and those relating to implied terms as to conformity
with description or sample, quality or fitness for purpose are void
in the case of consumer sales and hire-purchase contracts, but subject
to a reasonableness test in the case of other sales or hire-purchase
3
contracts. These provisions have been re-enacted in, and made
4
subject to, the reasonableness test as formulated in the 1977 Act.
5
The Joint Law Commissions felt that a similar system of control
should be applied to other contracts under which ownership or poss¬
ession of goods pass such as exchange, hire of goods and, in English
law, the contract for work and materials, not only because they
resembled sales and hire-purchase contracts, but also because of the
possibility that the provisions of the 1973 Act might be evaded by
""
Sections 12-15 of the Sale of Goods Act 1892 as amended by the
Supply of Goods (implied Terms) Act 1973 and sections 8-11 of the
latter Act.
p
Sections 55(3) of the amended Sale of Goods Act 1893 and 12(2) of the
Supply of Goods (implied Terms) Act 1973.
^ Sections 55(4) of the amended Sale of Goods Act 1893 and 12(3) of
the Supply of Goods (implied Terms) Act 1973.
^
Sections 6 and 20.
5
Op. cit., paras. 13-27.
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framing the agreements as something other than sales or hire-purchases.
Such a system of control was accordingly introduced in sections 7 and
21. The Act does not purport to imply any terms into such contracts
hut refers only to those terms which are implied "by law from the nature
of the contract". The controls contained in the Act do not,
therefore, apply to terms implied other than by law or to express
terms regulating the same subject-matter. As against a non-consumer
a supplier can only exclude liability for breach of his implied obli¬
gations as to title, correspondence with description or sample, quality
or fitness for purpose, if it is reasonable to do so. Unlike the
provisions relating to sales and hire-purchase contracts the 1977 Act
does not render void terms in this type of contract which exempt a
supplier from liability for breach of the implied undertaking that he
has the right to transfer or supply the goods. There may be cases
where it will be reasonable to transfer goods even if the supplier
only has a limited title to them, for example, where the transfer is
only temporary.
(iii) The Reasonableness requirement
The centre of the Unfair Contract Terms Act is the reasonable¬
ness test, and the success of the Act will largely depend on the manner
in which the courts administer this test. There is a difference
between the ways in which the test is formulated in Part I and Part II.
According to Part I the provisions subject to the test will be ineffect-
1 2
ive "except in so far as" or effective "only in so far as" they
1
Sections 2(2), 3(2), 4(1) and 7(4).
^
Sections 6(3) and 7(3).
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comply with the reasonableness test. Part II provides that similar
provisions will have no effect if it was not fair and reasonable to
incorporate them in the contract."'" Although it is thus possible
under Part I to hold a clause partly effective and partly ineffective
it is doubtful whether there will, in practice, be many cases in which
such a finding will be made.
There was disagreement between the Law Commission and the
Scottish Law Commission as to the time at which the reasonableness
2
test should be applied. The latter was of the opinion that regard
should be had only to the circumstances which were, or ought reasonably
to have been, known to or in the contemplation of the parties at the
time the contract was made. It was thought that to provide otherwise
would be contrary to the normal practice and would create unacceptable
uncertainty as to the extent of each party's rights and obligations
with the result that a rational allocation of risks would be imp¬
ossible to make. In the event, the legislature accepted the recom-
3
mendation of the Scottish Law Commission. However, there is consid¬
erable force in the proposition of the Law Commission that because the
controls deal with unreasonable defences rather than unreasonable
terms regard should be had to circumstances which actually occurred
4




Op. cit., paras. 170-182.
^ Sections ll(l) and 24(l).
4
Op. cit., para. 179.
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practice the courts will, by holding that the parties ought to have
known of certain circumstances, be able to judge the reasonableness
of a term with some hindsight.
The reasonableness test proposed in section 3 of the Mis¬
representation Act 1967 was criticised primarily because the standard
was said to be so undefined that its application would lead to un¬
certainty. When a similar test was introduced in the Supply of Goods
(implied Terms) Act 1973, the legislature accordingly provided a number
of guidelines for the application of the provision. These have been
substantially reproduced in Schedule 2 of the 1977 Act for those
transactions, and extended also to the analogous transactions covered
by sections 7 and 21 respectively, and read as follows:
(a) the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties
relative to each other, taking into account (among other
things) alternative means by which the customer's
requirements could have been met.^
The question of whether inequality of bargaining power exists
will be affected by the promisee's knowledge or presumed knowledge
that he could have contracted elsewhere without having to agree to
an exemption clause, his experience in transactions of the kind under
2
scrutiny and the presence or absence of independent advice.
(b) whether the customer received an inducement to agree
to the term, or in accepting it had an opportunity of
entering into a similar contract with other persons, but
without having to accept a similar term;3
Cf.Levison v. Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co.Ltd. 3 W.L.R.
90.
2
Joint Law Comm., op. cit., para. 189.
^ Cf. Peek v. North Staffordshire Railway Co. (I863) 10 H.L.C. 473.
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(c) whether the customer knew or ought reasonably to have
known of the existence'and extent of the term (having
regard, among other things, to any custom of the trade ^
and any previous course of dealing between the parties);
(d) where the term excludes or restricts any relevant lia¬
bility if some condition is not complied with, whether
it was reasonable at the time of the contract to
expect that compliance with that condition would be
practicable;
(e) whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted
to the special order of the customer.^
The Law Commissions were unwilling to provide guidelines for
the application of the reasonableness test in respect of other contracts
lest they should restrict the range of the factors to which the courts
have recourse. However, it is likely that the guidelines supplied
in Schedule 2 will be taken into account in all cases where the
reasonableness test is applied.
The Act itself lays down two guidelines for determining the
reasonableness of terms which restrict liability to a specific sum of
money: regard must be had to the resources which the party seeking
to rely on the clause could expect to be available to him for the
purpose of meeting the liability should it arise, and the extent to
3
which he could cover himself by insurance. It is thought that
these provisions refer to the situation where it is not possible to
obtain insurance cover great enough to meet the liability which may
be foreseen or where the cost of the insurance is disproportionately
Cf. British Crane Hire v. Ipswich Plant Hire Q.B. 303; Gray-
ston Plant v. Plean Precast 1976 S.C. 206.
^
Cf. Harbutt's "Plasticine", Ltd. v, Wayne Tank and Pump Co.Ltd.
Zl9707 1 Q.B. 447.
^ Sections ll(4) and 24(3)-
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high. The intention was, in particular, to cushion the effect of the
liability on parties with limited resources. The onus of showing that
a term is reasonable rests on the party who claims that it is.""
The reasonableness test "under the 1973 Act has been applied
2
only in Rasbora Ltd. v. J.C.L. Marine Ltd. There it was held that
a clause limiting to a short time period a boat-builder's liability
to repair or replace items which were defective, was unreasonable.
The Law Commissions seem largely to have taken the view that
the purpose of the reasonableness requirement was less to provide
substantive justice inter partes than to provide a corrective to
inequality of bargaining power, in so far as that is possible, so that
the market may operate without distortions. If their endorsement of
the practice developed under the Railway and Canal Traffic Act is an
indication of future application of the reasonableness test the Act
will provide little threat to contracts which are concluded under
choice, however limited, and which are commercially justified. Never¬
theless, the Act should obviate the need for conscious misconstruction
by the courts in order to avoid giving effect to unfair clauses.
""
Sections ll(5) and 24(4).





The foregoing survey was intended to demonstrate that the courts
have over a period of more than three centuries, frequently intervened
in contracts because of a recognition -albeit often unarticulated - of
the substantively unfair features of the transactions before them.
Between the late seventeenth century and the present, the judicial
approach towards unfair contracts has gone through roughly four phases
of development."'"
(l) 1673-1800
Seventeenth and eighteenth century lawyers, unlike their nine¬
teenth century counterparts, did not conceive of private autonomy as
an all-pervading ethic. While the courts recognised a sphere of
private autonomy in contract law they were at the same time not reluct¬
ant to intervene in order to enforce the moral norms of the community.
A whole system of controls arose, the effect of which was to enforce
a standard of equivalence in the values exchanged. This standard,
which derived from the doctrine of usury, found expression in two




These phases are not watertight compartments. The classification
adopted serves to illustrate general trends in judicial attitude
and does not suggest that conflicting decisions do not exist.
2
The terms "paternalistic" and "regulative" are derived from D.
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication (1976)
89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1735-1736. In adopting these terms to
describe the forms which judicial action can tahe I have not nec¬
essarily adhered to the.meanings which Kennedy assigned to them.
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In the case of paternalistic control the standard of fair
exchange was enforced through the principle that the function of
contract is compensatory, not punitive. All contract terms which
violated this principle were set aside, without reference to the cir¬
cumstances in which the contract was entered into. Although inter¬
vention might initially have been motivated by circumstances external
to the contract terms, such as the respective positions of the parties,
the test subsequently applied wa3 objective and aimed solely at estab¬
lishing whether or not a term had infringed the fundamental nature of
contract as a compensatory mechanism. Examples of this form of
control were the doctrines against forfeitures, penalties and penal
irritancies.
In other areas the role of the courts was circumscribed by the
realization that too strict an insistence on equal exchange would lead
to commercial stagnation. The control exercised by the courts was
therefore confined to exceptional cases. The function of regulative
control was to detect and correct those factors which distorted the
normal bargaining process. Of these factors the most significant
were those relating to the condition of and relationship between the
parties. Although neither Scots nor English law ever accepted a
doctrine as inflexible as laesio enormis the cases clearly indicate
that relief was granted from a bargain transaction where a gross
disparity in the values exchanged could be explained by a bargaining
handicap in the disadvantaged party. This form of control was
exercised mainly through instruments like fraud, which, because of their
width and undefined character, enabled the courts to take into account
all the circumstances of the case before them.
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(2) 1800-1870
The rise of the classical theory of contract in the nineteenth
century resulted in the reformulation of contract principles so as
to express the individualistic premise on which not only law, but also
politics and economics were then based. In terms of this theory the
highest good to the community would follow from a judicious and enlight¬
ened seeking of self-interest and the only task of the courts was to
protect a party's free will. Justice was to be done by adhering to
the principle of freedom of contract and not by pursuing an objective
of individualized justice through external regulation.
The main effect of the new doctrine was the scaling down of
the wide, undefined remedies like fraud and bona fides to clearly
circumscribed and more limited proportions: a system in terms of
which justice would follow from a strict application of general
principles could not allow the existence of discretionary judicial
powers of intervention. In addition, the function of the judicial
remedies which remained was redefined so as to accord more closely
with the fundamental aim, not of regulating unfair transactions, but
of protecting the freedom of the individual will.
However, the practice of the courts was not as monolithic as
the prevailing dogma. In England the Chancery courts continued to
give relief from unfair contracts on the ground of equitable fraud,
and also extended the scope of relievable coercion. And although
the Scots law concept of fraud was severely whittled down, regulative
control was still exercised on a limited scale through facility and
circumvention and occasionally through extortion. By the mid-nine¬
teenth century the full implications of freedom of contract had not
yet infiltrated into all areas of contract law.
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(3) 1870-1943
The strictest judicial adherence to freedom of contract
occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In
English law one of the main reasons for the increased rigidity was
the fusion of common law and equity in the 1870s. The result was the
virtual eclipse of equity as a residual system of discretionary justice
and the consequent disappearance of many of the protective doctrines
developed by the Chancery courts. As a result of the restricted role
assigned to the courts, instances of regulative control were limited
to an absolute minimum and earlier examples of paternalistic control
were ascribed to the supposed intention of the parties rather than to
judicial lawmaking. In Scots law a similar contraction in the scope
of judicial control took place, a process which was exacerbated by the
increasing tendency to rely on English decisions for guidance.
Paradoxically, all this was occurring at a time when in the
political and economic spheres the virtues of individualism were
beginning to be questioned and when interventionism was again gaining
respectability. The assimilation of these ideas by the courts was
slow and limited, but it did, especially in the twentieth century,
cause a subtle change in judicial attitude: whereas some earlier
courts had shrugged off individual cases of hardship as the price
which inevitably had to be paid for the long-term good of the commun¬
ity there was then an increasing recognition of and concern about the
substantive unfairness in contracts. This shift in attitude was
further impelled by the increasing use of standard form contracts.
But although the courts were prepared to recognise that the exclusive
power of one party to prescribe the terms of the transaction was
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frequently abused, they were constrained from exercising direct control
by the classical notion that the courts should not police substantive
unfairness in contracts. Control of unfair contracts was, therefore,
exercised indirectly, by manipulating the rules of consent and inter¬
pretation. The courts, unable to conceive of contracts otherwise than
in terms of the classical model with its implicit assumption of indi¬
vidualized bargaining, lacked the perspective needed to deal effect¬
ively with the problem of unfair standard form contracts.
Whereas in the previous era relief from unfair bargains was
refused because individual cases of unfairness were regarded as irrele¬
vant in principle, in this phase direct control was refused because
the courts, it was said, did not have the power to control the sub¬
stantive fairness of contracts. In areas where hardship occurred
frequently it was left to the legislature to confer on the courts such
powers of intervention.
(4) 1945 -
The picture which emerges from the last thirty-five years is
a conflicting one. On the one hand, the trend away from the precepts
of classical individualism, already evident in the previous era, has
strengthened in contract law as it has in the fields of politics and
economics.
Apart from the general loss of confidence in individualism, the
most significant factor contributing to the decline of freedom of
contract has been the rise of the standardized contract to being the
norm rather than the exception. Two characteristics of standard form
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contracts caught the attention of the courts: firstly, the fact that
there was no individualized negotiation about the terms and that
parties often agreed to them unread or unseen, and secondly, that stand¬
ardized contracts are employed mostly by commercial enterprises which
often have greater economic power, information, expertise and exper¬
ience than the counterparty, who is required to assent to the terms in
toto. Standard form contracts again brought to the fore the relative
position of the parties. This has led not only to attempts by the
legislature and the courts to redress the balance by recognising the
special interest of the consumer, but also to an increased focus on
the respective positions of the parties even outside the sphere of the
consumer-merchant relation. All these developments involved the
court in a closer scrutiny of the facts of the particular case and
thus constituted a movement away from generalised justice attained
through the application of freedom of contract.
The insights gained by the courts in the sphere of standard
form contracts have resulted in a greater willingness to control
substantively unfair contracts generally: the discretionary power of
control has been re-affirmed in the sphere of forfeitures, the doctrines
of duress, force and fear and restraint of trade have been extended,
the rules of consent have been further tightened up, the substantive
doctrine of fundamental breach restricted the effectiveness of exempt¬
ion clauses, unfair contracts traceable to the exploitation of a
bargaining handicap have been set aside in a few cases and legislation
subjecting exemption clauses to a reasonableness test has been
introduced.
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On the other hand, although there has been a growing consensus
that control over contract terms is sometimes necessary, there is,
at the same time, a continuing reluctance on the part of some judges
to admit that to do justice in a particular case is a legitimate
judicial pursuit. The tendency is therefore to interpret those
instances where judicial control takes place as exceptions to the
principle of freedom of contract rather than as part of a fundamental
reassertion of the courts' role in marking out the boundaries beyond
which contractual terms become unacceptable.
The controls exercised in modern law do not present a systematic
and co-ordinated response to the problem of substantive unfairness in
contracts. The techniques employed are the products of different
philosophical backgrounds and often unconnected lines of development
originating from distinct sources. As a result of the ambivalent
judicial attitude towards the controlling function these techniques
have developed largely in isolation with little interchange of ideas
amongst them, and, consequently, with no emergence of any organising
principle to bind together the judicial remedies into a coherent system
of controls. In addition, although the peculiar nature of standardized
contracts has been fully diagnosed there has been an inability to adapt
the conventional contract rules so as to deal more effectively with
unfair terms which are unilaterally prescribed. Legislative inter¬
vention has been confined to specific areas of concern such as credit
transactions and exemption clauses. All'these factors have contrib¬
uted to making the present control of unfair contracts confused, in¬
consistent and often ineffective. This situation can only be remedied
if there is consensus about the degree and range of judicial action
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and about the premise upon which judicial control should proceed.
Comment
(a) The range of .judicial action
Judicial action should have only a limited objective. As the
courts do not have the wherewithal to restructure inequalities which
are inherent in the social and economic system they should not attempt
to redistribute wealth and economic power."'" While the courts might
outlaw certain contractual terms by reference only to their nature and
effect, they should not, in exercising regulative control, take account
of the basic inequalities between the parties: for example, a court
might set aside an unfair contract on the ground that it resulted from
the exploitation of a specific bargaining handicap of a party, but it
should not assume that contractual terms resulted from the exercise
of unequal bargaining power merely because there existed an institution¬
alised inequality between the parties, such as between a composer
wishing to publish his songs and a publisher. To establish the
necessary causal link between an unfair term and the exercise of
institutionalised unequal bargaining power would, in the absence of
monopolistic conditions, involve the court in a wide-ranging inquiry
into economic questions which it is not qualified to undertake.
Regulative judicial control should, therefore, be confined to those
cases where the determination of causation lies within the practical
capability of the courts.
See, generally, A. Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining Power and
the Judicial Process (1974) 49 Ind.L.J.367; J.P. Dawson, Economic
Duress - An Essay in Perspective (1947) 45 Mich.L.Rev. 253, 289;
R.L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty (1943) ColL.Rev.
603, 624.
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(b) The premise upon which control should proceed
Attempts have recently been made to supply an organising princ¬
iple or central premise underlying the various heads of control.
Lord Denning has suggested that inequality of bargaining power is the
common thread which runs through the various remedies,"'" and other
commentators have suggested a synthesis of the various protective
2
doctrines under the head of economic duress. In my view these
principles do not provide an adequate explanation of all the controls
exercised. Furthermore, by formulating the central principle in
non-substantive terms the main focus of the inquiry is again diverted
from the content of the contract.
Although it is difficult to postulate a single proposition
underlying controls as diverse as those examined, I believe, and have
attempted to demonstrate, that most instances of intervention proceed
from the premise, albeit often unexpressed, that the contract under
scrutiny is substantively unfair. And if there is to be consistency
in the control exercised the courts must either assume a general
power to police substantive unfairness in contracts or it must be
conferred by legislation. Only then can the courts build up a coherent
system of controls. Postulating substantive unfairness as the under¬
lying premise of judicial control does not mean that relief should be
1
Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundv /l97^/ 1 Q.B. 326, 336-339.
See, J. Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure (1942) 20 N.C.L. Rev.
237, 341; P. Wooldridge, Inequality of Bargaining Power in
Contract (1977) J.B.L. 312.
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granted from every contract which is one-sided or which stipulates
for an unequal exchange. To do so would place too great a limitation
on commercial activity. The task of the courts must, therefore, be
to identify those circumstances which will, together with substantive
inequitability, provide a sufficient ground for relief. There can be
no single such test of unfairness which is applicable to all contracts
and all factual settings. Judicial control of unfair contracts must
proceed through the recognition and classification of different type
situations and the establishment of various"models"of unfairness,
unconscionability or unreasonableness. It is clear, especially from
the practice in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that this is
a task which the courts are qualified to carry out.
The two most basic type situations which should be identified
and isolated for separate treatment are unfairness arising in the
context of negotiated contracts and that which occurs in the sphere
of standard form contracts.
(i) Standard form contracts
The standardized transaction has become the most common context
in which instances of substantive unfairness are found. This is not
only because the vast majority of contracts entered into are now in
standard form, but also because the terms of these contracts are, by
the very nature of these transactions, not fixed by negotiation between
the parties. Standard form contracts are depersonalised mass trans¬
actions, drafted by one party and presented for acceptance to a variety
of counterparties without taking into account their particular circum¬
stances and characteristics and often without intending the terms,
other than those which embody the core of the transaction, to be
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specifically scrutinised or understood.
This manner of contracting has great advantages, not the least
of these being that they facilitate a rational regulation of legal
risk. At the same time, the fact that one party has the exclusive
power to draw up the terms on which he is prepared to contract has
led to such contracts being drafted in a one-sided manner and with
disregard to the interests of the offeree. Quite correctly, the
courts have felt the need for control where the terms are grossly im¬
balance!. However, with a few exceptions, these controls have been
exercised either instinctively as in the case of strict construction
or by manipulating contract rules which were developed on the assum¬
ption of individualized negotiation. Clearly, these techniques are
unsuitable for dealing with unfairness in contracts which are by
definition mass, and not individualized transactions.
Recently some courts have purported to control unfair standard
terms by reference to unequal bargaining power."'' This approach is
also unacceptable. Where the nature of the contract itself precludes
any bargaining about the terms it is surely inappropriate to base
relief on the impairment of one party's bargaining power. The only
form of inequality of bargaining power which is relevant in the con¬
text of standard form contracts is that which arises from the market
structure and, as I have argued before, to establish a causal link
between such inequality and a specific term in a mass contract involves
A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. v. Macaulav /l97jl7 1 W.L.R. 1308;
Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. W.E.A. Records Ltd. 1 W.L.R.
61.
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the court in an inquiry so wide-ranging and of such complexity as to
make inequality of bargaining power unsuitable as a criterium for
relief in litigation where the complaining party will generally be a
private individual.
Instead, it is suggested that as standard form contracts are
by nature depersonalised, the test whether a contract is fair should
largely be confined to the terms themselves and individualized quest¬
ions such as those relating to the knowledge which the offeree had of
the terms or the inequality of the parties should be excised from
the court's enquiry. At most, the courts should take into account
the broad type of contracting party to whom the standard form is
usually offered, for example whether they are consumers or business¬
men. The role of the court is, therefore, to exercise paternalistic
and not regulative control and its task is to mark out, in accordance
with the standards of the community, the limits beyond which certain
contractual terms will not be tolerated.
In deciding whether a contract is fair or not the court should
take into account the commercial reasonableness of the terms, but
even so, it should not allow those which are clearly outrageous or
which are inserted only to harass or mislead the counterparty. To
a large extent the question of fairness must depend upon the type of
transaction involved. As the fairness of a standardized contract is
not to be judged by reference to the quality of consent or the relative
positions of the parties the courts' task is to develop techniques
for the
marking out for any given type of transaction what the
minimum decencies are which a court will insist upon as
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essential to an enforceable bargain of a given type, or as
being inherent in a bargain of that type.
According to Llewellyn "/t7he picture is one of this or that transaction-
type as having ... an essence which contains a minimum of balance, a
2
core without which the type fails of being."
This approach to unfair contracts is not new. It has long
3
been followed in German law in respect of standard form contracts and
in English and Scots law it has a precedent in the seventeenth and
eighteenth century treatment of forfeitures, penalties and irritancies
which infringed the fundamental nature of contract as a compensatory
mechanism and more recently in the substantive doctrine of fundament¬
al breach. A tool through which such delimiting of the "iron essence"
of each transaction type can be effected has now been supplied by the
provision in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 which subjects to a
reasonableness test all terms which enable a party to render perform-
4
ance substantially different from that expected of him.
(ii) Negotiated contracts
The control of unfairness in the context of negotiated bargains
must^just as in the sphere of standard form contracts, proceed by way
of recognition and classification of type-situations, both as regards
factual settings and remedies. One of the most important models of
^
K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review (1939) 52 Harv.L.Rev. 700, 703-
2
The Common Law Tradition. 368.
^ J.P. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion - The German Version (1976)
89 Harv. L.Rev. 1040, 1103-1126.
4
Sections 3 and 17.
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■unfairness occurs where a grossly unfair exchange is produced hy the
exploitation of a bargaining handicap - physical or mental disability,
a wide disparity of knowledge and experience, and economic necessity -
existing in one party. Relief in these circumstances, although it
has fallen into desuetude, was well-known in both English and Scots
law in the seventeenth, eighteenth and even in the nineteenth centuries.
Lord Denning's recent resurrection of the doctrine in the guise of
"the principle of inequality of bargaining power""'" is thus based on
firm precedent. Although no similar advances have been made in modern
2
Scots law the Scottish Law Commission has suggested the recognition
of a category of "lesion" in terms of which relief will be given
where a party can show that an unfair advantage has been taken - that
is when there is a gross disproportion between the respective exchanges
or when a serious prejudice has been or will be sustained - of his
weak personal or economic position.
Whereas the Scottish Law Commission proposed lesion as a sub¬
stitute for facility and circumvention, extortion and undue influence,
but not for force and fear, the place of Lord Denning's principle of
inequality of bargaining power in the fabric of controls is uncertain.
Although the principle was said to derive from duress of goods, the
doctrines of undue pressure, undue influence and the relief granted
from unconscionable bargains in equity and unfair salvage agreements,
it is not clear whether it merely supplements these or is a substitute
""
Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy 1 Q.B. 326.
2
Memorandum No. 42: Defective Consent and Consequential Matters,
paras. 3.129-3.131.
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for them. In English law the distinction between the exploitation
of a bargaining handicap and the exercise of coercion has, as a result
of the very narrow interpretation of common law duress, never been
very sharply defined. A strong case can therefore be made
for the subsumption of the various categories of control enumerated
by Lord Denning under either a principle of inequality of bargaining
power or a liberal doctrine of economic duress. In Scots law,
however, these abuses have always received distinct treatment.
The judicial exercise of a discretionary power of control over
unfair contracts has limited effectiveness as a means of consumer
protection. Litigation over transactions which may involve relatively
limited amounts will be initiated only by a small number of private
individuals. Yet, as a residual measure this form of control is of
great importance. The development of an effective system of controls
can, however, only take place if the courts openly recognise that
judicial control of unfair contracts has always taken place, that the
fairness of a contract is a legitimate judicial concern, and if there
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